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The Ten Commandments
Van Orden v. Perry
(03-1500)
Ruling Below: (Van Orden v. Perry, 5th Cir., 351 F.3d 173; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23100)
Monuments in the Texas Capitol building and grounds depict both the secular and religious
history of Texas. A Ten Commandments monument was placed forty-two years ago on the side
of the capitol opposite the main entrance. There was no legislative history on its placement there,
it was not erected with tax dollars, and it requires no maintenance. The court held that a
reasonable viewer touring the capitol grounds, informed of the Ten Commandments monument's
history and p lacement, would n ot c onclude that t he s tate w as g iving a religious rather than a
secular message. The monument was declared constitutionally sound.
Questions Presented: (1) Did Texas lack a secular purpose when they erected the monument?
(2) Is the primary effect of the display to advance religion?
THOMAS VAN ORDEN Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RICK PERRY, in his official capacity as Governor of Texas and Chairman, State
Preservation Board; DAVID DEWHURST, in his official capacity as Co-Vice Chairman,
State Preservation Board and President of the Senate of Texas; TOM CRADDICK, in his
official capacity as Co-Vice Chairman, State Preservation Board and Speaker of the House
of Representatives of Texas; CHRIS HARRIS, in his official capacity as Member of the
State Preservation Board; PEGGY HAMRICK, in her official capacity as Member of the
State Preservation Board; JOCELYN LEVI STRAUS, in her official capacity as Member
of the Texas Preservation Board; CHARLYNN DOERING, in her official capacity as
Interim Executive Director, State Preservation Board, Defend ants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Fifth Circuit
Decided November 12, 2003
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge: documents, testimony, and an extensive
stipulation of facts filed by the parties. In a
The p laintiff, Thomas V an 0 rden, a sks t he careful opinion, the court rejected the claim of
federal courts to order the State of Texas to First Amendment violations and entered
remove from the grounds of the State judgment for the State. The plaintiff appeals.
Capitol a granite monument in which the We affirm.
Ten Commandments are etched. In a bench
trial, the district court considered
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I
The Capitol, with its surrounding twenty-
two acres, was dedicated on May 16, 1888.
The first monument was erected on these
grounds three years later. It was "a bronze
statue of a Texan holding a muzzle-loading
rifle atop a Texas Sunset Red granite base."
Names of the Texans who died in the battle
of the Alamo are inscribed on its four
granite supports. Sixteen additional
monuments have s ince been erected on the
capitol grounds, a protected National
Historic Landmark maintained by the S tate
Preservation Board.
The Visitor Services of the State provides
tours of the Capitol Building with its historic
statuary, portraits, and memorabilia, and it
publishes a written guide for walking tours
of the grounds for visitors who wish to
continue with the outdoor displays. The
guided tour of the Capitol Building offers a
wide array of monuments, plaques, and seals
depicting both the secular and religious
history of Texas. They include a tribute to
African American legislators, a Confederate
plaque, a plaque commemorating the donors
of the granite for the building, and a plaque
commemorating the war with Mexico. There
is a Six Flags Over Texas display on the
floor of the Capitol Rotunda featuring the
Mexican Eagle and serpent which as
visitors will learn, is a symbol of Aztec
prophecy together with the Confederate
Seal containing the inscription "Deo
Vindice" (God will judge). Should the tour
continue to the Supreme Court Building,
visitors will find inscribed above the bench
the phrase "Sicut Patribus, Sit Deus Nobis"
(As God was to our fathers, may He also be
to us). Before reaching the Supreme Court
building from the Capitol, visitors will
encounter four other monuments in the
immediate vicinity: a tribute to Texas
children; a statue of a pioneer woman
holding a child in tribute to the role of
women in Texas history; a replica of the Statue
of Liberty; and a tribute to the Texans lost at
Pearl Harbor.
The Ten Commandments monument was a gift
of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, accepted by a
joint resolution of the House and Senate in
early 1961. It is a granite monument
approximately six feet high and three and a half
feet wide. In the center of the monument, a
large panel displays a nonsectarian version of
the text of the Commandments. Above this text,
the monument contains depictions of two small
tablets with ancient Hebrew script. There are
also several symbols etched into the
monument: just above the text, there is an
American eagle grasping the American flag;
higher still, there is an eye inside a pyramid
closely resembling the symbol displayed on the
one-dollar bill. Just below the text are two
small Stars of David, as well as a symbol
representing Christ: two Greek letters, Chi and
Rho, superimposed on each other. Just below
the text of the commandments, offset in a
decorative, scroll- shaped box, the monument
bears the inscription: "PRESENTED TO THE
PEOPLE AND YOUTH OF TEXAS BY THE
FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES OF
TEXAS 1961."
The parties stipulated that (1) the sparse
legislative history "contains no record of any
discussion about the monument, or the reasons
for its acceptance, and is comprised entirely of
House and Senate Journal entries"; (2) the State
selected the site on the recommendation of the
Building Engineering and Management
Division of the State Board of Control; (3) the
expenses "were borne exclusively by the
Eagles"; (4) the monument requires virtually no
maintenance; and (5) the dedication of the
monument was presided over by Senator Bruce
Reagan and Representative Will Smith. There
is no official record that any other person
participated.
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The main entry into the Capitol Building is
on its south side facing Congress Street. The
monument displaying the Ten
Commandments is located on the north side
of the Capitol Building on a line drawn
between the Supreme Court and the Capitol
Rotunda, about 75 feet from the Capitol
Building, and 123 feet from the Supreme
Court Building.
II
The plaintiff argues that Texas "accepted"
the monument "for the purpose of promoting
the Commandments as a personal code of
conduct for youths and because the
Commandments are a sectarian religious
code, their promotion and endorsement by
the State as a personal code contravenes the
First Amendment." He asserts that the
district court's finding that the State had a
secular purpose for the display is not
supported by the evidence and that a
reasonable viewer would perceive the
display of the decalogue as a State
advancement and endorsement of religion
favoring the Jewish and Christian faiths.
The State replies that the display serves a
secular purpose as found by the district court
and a reasonable observer would not
conclude that the State is seeking to
advance, endorse, or promote religion by its
display. To the contrary, the State observes
that the display has been in place without
legal attack for over forty- two years and,
viewed in context, is part of the state's
commemorative display of significant events
and strands of Texas history. It argues that a
reasonable person touring the Capitol
Building and its historical grounds would
not see the display of the decalogue as State
endorsement of religion. Rather, with its
simple presentation and location between
the Capitol Building and the Texas Supreme
Court Building, a reasonable viewer would
see the monument as a recognition of the
large role of the decalogue in the development
of Texas law. Equally, with its proximity to the
pioneer woman holding a child and to the
figures of children at play, it would be seen as a
fit location to express appreciation for the work
of the Eagles with American youth.
IV A
The district court found that the purpose of the
legislature was "to recognize and commend a
private organization for its efforts to reduce
juvenile delinquency." It gleaned this purpose
from the reason stated in the Resolution
granting the Eagles permission to erect the
monument. The plaintiff concedes that this
recited purpose is a valid secular purpose, but
contends that it was not the true purpose.
Rather, he argues that monuments "are not
erected to honor donors and they are not
erected to pay tribute [to] their acts of donation.
They are erected to pay tribute to and honor the
subject or ideal depicted."
The Legislature, of course, cannot dictate the
finding of secular purpose by a bland recitation.
The finding of the district court here, however,
rests on two powerful realities. First, there is
nothing in either the legislative record or the
events attending the monument's installation to
contradict the secular reasons laid out in the
legislative record, brief as it is; there is nothing
to suggest that the Legislature did not share the
concern about juvenile delinquency. Second,
Texas has a record of honoring the
contributions of donors and those they
represent, contrary to plaintiffs unsupported
argument. For example, ten years before its
resolution accepting the Ten Commandments
monument, the Legislature authorized the Boy
Scouts of America to install a replica of the
Statue of Liberty....
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B
Our conclusion that the legislative
authorization was supported by a valid
secular purpose is reinforced by the related
but distinct inquiry whether the primary
effect of the display advances or inhibits
religion as seen from the eyes of a
reasonable observer, informed and aware of
his surroundings.
The Ten Commandments have both a
religious and secular message. Given this
duality, our effects inquiry must focus on the
specific facts and context of the display. As
Justice Blackmun explained in Allegheny:
The effect of the display depends upon the
message that the government's practice
communicates: the question is "what
viewers may fairly understand to be the
purpose of the display." That inquiry, of
necessity, turns upon the context in which
the contested object appears: "[A] typical
museum setting, though not neutralizing the
religious content of a religious painting,
negates any message of endorsement of that
content."
Returning to our earlier description of the
Capitol, we note first that the grounds are
designated as a National Historic Landmark
that is dedicated to the display of "statues,
memorials, and commemorations of people,
ideals and events that compose Texan
identity; these displays document the
struggles and the successes that Texans have
experienced in the past and serve to inspire
us as we face the challenges of today." The
State points to the replica of the Seal of
Mexico displayed on the tour path of the
Capitol, reminding that it "acknowledges the
mystical traditions of the indigenous people
of the Southwest, who were displaced by a
religious Catholic regime for some 300
years.
Relatedly, the State suggests that the decalogue
in Texas is displayed in a museum setting. The
State points out that the Curator of the Capitol
is a professional museum curator, with an
advanced degree in museum science and the
Texas State Preservation Board qualifies as a
museum as defined by federal statute....
We need not accept the State's museum
analogy in full measure to acknowledge that,
while short of the museum envisioned by
Justice O'Connor, a setting which would
wholly negate endorsement, the manner in
which the seventeen monuments are presented
on the grounds portion of the Capitol tour
supports the conclusion that a reasonable
viewer would not see this display either as a
State endorsement of the Commandment's
religious message or as excluding those who
would not subscribe to its religious statements.
V
History matters here. For forty-two years, the
monument has stood in Austin without the
filing o fa ny I egal c omplaint. T his quiescence
is remarkable for Travis County, the seat of
state government and the home of the
University of Texas, whose campus is a stone's
throw away from the Capitol grounds. This
Court is well a ware that Travis County isn ot
lacking in persons willing and able to seek
judicial relief from perceived interferences with
constitutional rights. Had this monument been
recently installed, the inference of religious
purpose would have been stronger. That it has
been in place for so long adds force to the
contention that the legislature had a secular
purpose. As Judge Becker observed:
The reasonable observer would perceive an
historic plaque as less of an endorsement of
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religion than a more recent religious display
not because the Ten Commandments have
lost their religious significance, but because
the maintenance of this plaque sends a much
different message about the religious views
of the County. . .. The reasonable observer,
knowing the age of the . . . plaque, would
regard the decision to leave it in place as
motivated, in significant part, by the desire
to preserve a longstanding plaque.
In sum, we are persuaded that Texas does
not violate the First Amendment by retaining
a forty-two-year-old display of the
decalogue. The Ten Commandments
monument is part of a display of seventeen
monuments, all located on grounds
registered as a historical landmark, and it is
carefully located between the Supreme
Court Building and the Capitol Building
housing the legislative and executive
branches of government. We are not
persuaded that a reasonable viewer touring
the Capitol and its grounds, informed of its
history and its placement, would conclude
that the State is endorsing the religious
rather than the secular message of the
decalogue.
To say this is not to diminish the reality that
it is a sacred text to many, for it is also a
powerful teacher of ethics, of wise counsel
urging a regiment of just governance among
free people. The power of that counsel is
evidenced by its expression in the civil and
criminal laws of the free world. No judicial
decree can erase that history and its
continuing influence on our laws - there is
no escape from its secular and religious
character. There is no constitutional right to
be free of government endorsement of its
own laws. Certainly, we disserve no
constitutional principle by concluding that a
State's display of the decalogue in a manner
that honors its secular strength is not
inevitably an impermissible endorsement of
its religious message in the eyes of our
reasonable observer. To say otherwise retreats
from the objective test of an informed person to
the heckler's veto of the unreasonable or ill-
informed - replacing the sense of proportion
and fit with uncompromising rigidity at a costly
price to the values of the First Amendment. A
display of Moses with the Ten Commandments
such as the one located in the United States
Supreme Court building makes a plain
statement a bout t he d ecalogue's divine o rigin.
Yet in context even that message does not
drown its secular message. So it is here.
AFFIRMED.
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Johnson v. Baker
(03-1661)
Ruling Below: (Johnson v. Baker, 6th Cir., 86 Fed. Appx. 104; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 481)
School Boards in Ohio erected Ten Commandments monuments on high school grounds. When
their constitutionality was questioned, they surrounded the Ten Commandments monuments with
other monuments to documents that were influential in the founding of our country. The Court
held that there was no evidence that the Ten Commandments monuments were originally erected
for a secular purpose, and thus were unconstitutional.
Questions Presented: (1) Did the monuments originally have a secular purpose?; (2) Did the
monuments' principle and primary effect neither advance nor inhibit religion? (3) Did the
monuments foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion"?
BERRY BAKER and ANONYMOUS PLAINTIFF # 1, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
ADAMS COUNTY/OHIO VALLEY SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant-Appellant,
KENNETH W. JOHNSON, THOMAS D. CLAIBOURNE, RONALD D. STEPHENS, and
DOUGLAS W. FERGUSON, Intervening Defendants-Appellants.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit
Decided January 12, 2004
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge.
In the Fall of 1997, the Adams County/Ohio
Valley School Board erected stone
monuments inscribed with the Ten
Commandments on the grounds of four
newly constructed high schools. The Adams
County Ministerial Association paid for the
four monuments and agreed to indemnify
the Board for any litigation expenses.
County residents Berry Baker and an
anonymous plaintiff sought an injunction
against the Board, alleging that the display
violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. After the suit was commenced,
the Board modified the display by adding
monuments that included excerpts from the
Justinian Code, the Preamble to the United
States Constitution, the Declaration of
Independence, and the Magna Carta. The
district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the
removal of the Ten Commandments
monuments. For the reasons set forth below,
we affirm the judgment of the district court.
BACKGROUND
The comprehensive opinion of Magistrate
Judge T imothy Hogan provides a complete
recitation of the facts. (By consent, the case
was decided by a magistrate judge in the
district court below.) Only the most
pertinent facts are recounted here.
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In 1997, the Board erected permanent stone
monuments near the entrance of four new
high schools within Adams County. Each
monument had etchings of the American
flag and an eagle on the sides, and bore the
following inscription on biblical-looking
tablets:
THE TEN COMMANDMENTS
THOU SHALT HAVE NO OTHER GODS
BEFORE ME
THOU SHALT NOT WORSHIP ANY
GRAVEN IMAGE
THOU SHALT NOT TAKE GOD'S NAME
IN VAIN
REMEMBER THE SABBATH TO KEEP
IT HOLY
HONOR THY FATHER AND THY
MOTHER
THOU SHALT NOT KILL
THOU SHALT NOT COMMIT
ADULTERY
THOU SHALT NOT STEAL
THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE
WITNESS
structures symbolic of local or national
history. The Board subsequently installed
signs indicating that no costs were borne by
the Board and that no endorsement of
religion was intended by the display.
On February 9, 1999, Baker and the
anonymous plaintiff filed suit against the
Board alleging that the monuments violated
the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment....
The Board, which had not previously
articulated a secular reason for exhibiting
the original Ten Commandments
monuments, then surrounded each
monument with four additional monuments
of identical size to form a semi-circular wall
with the Ten Commandments at the center.
Two of the new monuments, placed to the
left to the Ten Commandments, bore ...
excerpts from the Justinian Code and the
Declaration of Independence....
The other two monuments were placed to
the right of the Ten Commandments and
bore ... excerpts from the Preamble to the
United States Constitution and the Magna
Carta....
THOU SHALT NOT COVET
The Board's president spoke informally with
each Board member before accepting the
donation of the four monuments from the
Ministerial Association. No resolution or
minutes document the action taken. After
the monuments were erected, the Board
adopted a resolution designating the area
where the monuments stood as land upon
which county residents could erect
Finally, plaques were installed at the base of
each monument. The plaque for the center
monument read:
THE TEN COMMANDMENTS
The Ten Commandments have profoundly
influenced the formation of Western legal
thought and the formation of our country.
That influence is clearly seen in the
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Declaration of Independence. This
understanding of rights as God-given is
rooted in the tradition of thought known as
ethical monotheism. This is the belief-
shared by Muslims, Jews, Christians, and
others-in a Divine lawgiver who imposes
upon earthly rulers a duty to recognize and
respect each person's basic human rights
and equal dignity. The Ten Commandments
express the fundamental tenets of ethical
monotheism. The Commandments remind
us of our obligation to one another and to
the Creator. They remind us that we owe
one another respect. The Ten
Commandments provide the moral
background of the Declaration of
Independence and the foundation of our
legal tradition.
Comparable explanations were placed on
plaques in front of the other four
monuments. Despite these modifications to
the original stand-alone display of the Ten
Commandments monuments, the district
court found that the display of the latter ran
afoul of the purpose, effect, and
entanglement prongs of the test set forth in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 29 L. Ed.
2d 745, 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971). It
consequently ruled that the display violated
the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment
ANALYSIS
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 29 L.
Ed. 2d 745, 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971), the
Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island statutes providing for state aid
to church-related elementary and secondary
schools violated the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment, which provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion." U.S. Const.
amend. I. The Establishment Clause has
been applied to state and local governmental
action through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth A mendment. See Everson v.
Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 91 L. Ed. 711, 67
S. Ct. 504 (1947) (noting that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment).
A three-prong test was formulated in Lemon
to evaluate Establishment Clause challenges
to government action: (1) the action "must
have a secular legislative purpose," (2) "its
principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion," and
(3) it must not foster "an excessive
government entanglement with religion."
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quotation marks
and citations omitted). We are "bound to
follow [the Lemon] test until the Supreme
Court explicitly overrules or abandons it."
Adland, 307 F 3d at 479.
The outcome of the present case is
controlled by this court's recent decision in
ACLUv. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438,
2003 US. App. LEXIS 25606, No. 01-5935
(6th Cir. Dec. 18, 2003) (McCreary
County), which dealt with a nearly identical
factual situation. In McCreary County, the
court upheld a supplemental injunction
prohibiting the exhibition of a modified
display titled "The Foundations of American
Law and Government." The supplemental
injunction was granted on the heels of an
earlier injunction prohibiting the county and
its school board from exhibiting the Ten
Commandments alone. In her concurring
opinion, Judge Gibbons explained that there
was a strong indication of improper purpose
behind the modified display in light of:
(1) the inherently religious nature of the Ten
Commandments, (2) defendants-appellants'
failure to articulate a secular purpose until
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after litigation had commenced, (3) the
''overtly religious" quality of the second
display, (4) the absence of any evidence in
the record indicating that the Ten
Commandments have been or will be
integrated into the school curriculum as part
of an appropriate program of study, (5) the
absence of any discussion integrating the
Ten Commandments into a secular subject
matter other than a conclusory assertion
about the Declaration of Independence, and
(6) the emphasis on the Ten Commandments
as the only religious text in the displays[.]
Id. (Gibbons, J., concurring) (citations
omitted) (numbers added). These same
factors are manifested in the present case.
In particular, there is no evidence that the
Ten Commandments monuments were
originally erected with a secular purpose.
The fact that the monument was donated by
the Adams County Ministerial Association,
a Christian religious organization that also
agreed to indemnify the Board for any
litigation expenses, implies the opposite.
Furthermore, as the district court noted,
"there are no contemporaneous minutes,
documents, or formal policy explaining the
intent or purpose of the School Board in
permitting the permanent placement of [the
original] monoliths." The fact that the
original displays contained only the Ten
Commandments monuments "imprinted the
defendants' purpose, from the beginning,
with an unconstitutional taint . . . ."
McCreary County (quotation marks
omitted).
Failing to set forth a secular explanation
until after the litigation had commenced is a
further indication that the purported secular
justification was belatedly adopted solely to
avoid Establishment Clause liability. See id.
(citing Adland, 307 F.3d at 481).
Furthermore, "the secular purpose
requirement is not satisfied . . . by the mere
existence of some secular purpose, however
dominated by religious purposes." Id.
(quoting Adland, 307 F.3d at 480). In this
regard, we note that even as the Board
surrounded the Ten Commandments with
four other stone monuments engraved with
passages from selected historical documents,
it added a plaque to the center of the display
that stated, in part: "The Commandments
remind us of our obligation to one another
and to the Creator. " (Emphasis added.)
A failure to satisfy any one of the Lemon
test's three prongs is fatal to government
action that is being challenged on
Establishment Clause grounds. Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583, 96 L. Ed. 2d
510, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987). Because the
Board failed to satisfy the secular-purpose
prong, we therefore have no need to address
the second and third prongs of the Lemon
test.
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A Most Unusual Lawyer;
A homeless man with psychological scars is challenging Texas over a Ten Commandments
statue. The Supreme Court may take his case.
Los Angeles Times
December 9, 2003
Scott Gold
The enormous windows of the Texas law
library, an otherwise musty and lonely place,
capture Austin's gentility frame by frame -
a towering oak tree, a garden of yellow
roses, the granite rotunda of the state
Capitol.
Inside, a homeless man with tired eyes
works at a corner carrel in the basement
amid his belongings - a duffel bag with a
broken zipper, reading glasses he found in a
parking lot, chicken-scratch notes sullied
with splashes of instant coffee. His carefully
parted hair and striped shirt contrast with his
stained teeth and dirty fingernails. Armed
with scraps of paper and pens he digs out of
the trash, he's been here for two years,
trying to define, once and for all, the
boundaries of a governmental endorsement
of religion.
A former defense attorney whose career
collapsed under the weight of a debilitating
psychological condition, Thomas Van Orden
sued the state of Texas two years ago in
federal court. His lawsuit contends a 5-foot-
tall monolith to the Ten Commandments,
erected on the grounds of the Capitol,
violates the Ist Amendment's ban on
"establishment of religion."
Earlier this month, an appeals court ruled
that the monument constitutes a "secular
message" and can stay. Today, Van Orden is
piecing together a last appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court. A growing chorus of state
officials and legal analysts, many of whom
initially dismissed Van Orden as an
amusement at best, now believe the
Supreme Court might take the case in an
effort to reconcile a conflicting pile of lower
court decisions.
A thoughtful man with an admittedly
troubled soul, Van Orden plans to argue the
case himself - provided he can find a ride to
Washington. "What else am I going to do?"
he said. "Sit on a bench in a park?"
Last summer, the nation's attention was
focused on a courthouse in Alabama, where
Chief Justice Roy Moore erected a Ten
Commandments monument and defied
orders to remove it. That became a
flashpoint dispute between Christian
activists and advocates of the separation of
church and state.
But many analysts and even some
evangelical leaders believed that
monument represented such a clear
constitutional violation that it was unlikely
to set legal precedent. They were not
surprised when, in November, the Supreme
Court refused to hear Moore's appeal.
Still, most analysts believe the high court
will be forced eventually to wade into the
issue, if only because of widespread
disagreement among lower courts about
when the Ten Commandments can be
displayed by the government. If the justices
weigh in, they are expected to select another
of the 20-odd disputes over the display of
the Ten Commandments simmering in
courts across the nation. Many believe the
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pieces are falling into place for Van Orden's
lawsuit, [...] to reach Washington.
"I want to make this clear: I didn't sue
religion," Van Orden, 59, said. "I sued the
state for putting a religious monument on
Capitol grounds. You wouldn't put that
statue on a Hindi's lawn, so why would you
put it on the lawn of the Capitol, the home
of all people? It is a message of
discrimination. Government has to remain
neutral."
He stood from the desk that has effectively
been ceded to his case by librarians who
know him by name and shuffled off in
search of a legal brief. Rifling through a
storage c abinet, he pulled out a frayed ball
of kite string. It's the one he used to measure
the 75-foot span between the Capitol and a
granite slab etched with the words of the
Ten Commandments, beginning with "I am
the Lord thy God."
"This," he said, holding the string next to a
window to bathe it in more adoring light,
"will be in a museum one day. Like Davy
Crockett's hat."
It's heady talk for a man who saves money
by eating every other day, and by living in a
tent. Whether Van Orden can turn his ball of
string into a piece of history remains to be
seen - and will turn not on the monument
itself, but on its surroundings.
In contrast to Moore's monolith, which
dominated the Alabama courthouse rotunda,
the Texas monument is one piece in a
scattered sculpture garden. Other
monuments in the area are dedicated to
historic events and people, from Texans who
served in the Korean War to the state's
"pioneering women."
That context seems to allow for two
legitimate interpretations - that the
government is promoting Judaism and
Christianity at the exclusion of other
religions, as Van Orden argues, and that the
government is merely celebrating history, as
state officials argue. That's why many
believe the case is a perfect test for the
Supreme Court.
"Judge Moore's case was an in-your-face
expression of religion. Even deeply devout
Christians and Jews don't want the Ten
Commandments shoved down their throat,"
said Alan Wolfe, director of the Boisi Center
for Religion and American Public Life at
Boston College. In contrast, Wolfe said, Van
Orden's case "is about style, about form,
rather than content."
"Most people think that we ought to have
some kind of religious symbolism in our
public life, but it should be very general and
not confrontational," Wolfe said.
"Americans want it to be capacious and
inclusive, not sectarian. This might pass that
test."
Would it?
"I'll give you a good lawyer answer: It
depends," said John Ferguson, a Baptist
minister, attorney and education coordinator
for the First Amendment Center in
Tennessee. Ferguson is among those who
believe Van Orden's case has a good shot at
reaching the Supreme Court.
"It's not presented in isolation. So you have
to look at why it's there. If it's some veiled
attempt to promote religion, it can't stay. If
it's an element of something larger, and it's
done to truly educate the public, then it's
probably OK."
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Texas officials have pledged to do whatever
it takes to keep the piece where it is.
"The Ten Commandments, undeniably, are a
sacred religious text and have an important
religious component," said Texas Solicitor
General Ted Cruz. "But equally undeniably,
they have an important secular aspect. They
were a fundamental building block behind
Western legal codes and culture."
So far, the state's argument has carried the
day.
Last year, Senior U.S. District Judge Harry
Lee Hudspeth ruled that the monument has a
"valid secular purpose." Hudspeth opened
his decision by quoting Rudyard Kipling's
"Mandalay," a poem depicting a fun-loving
but lawless place: "Ship me somewheres
east of Suez ... [w]here there aren't no Ten
Commandments an' a man can raise a
thirst."
Then last summer, Van Orden appealed to
the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals. He
prepared for the hearing by delivering
arguments in a University of Texas
classroom, with law students sitting as a
mock jury. The hearing was in New Orleans,
500 miles east of Austin. Trevor Rosson, 32,
the student most involved in his case, gave
him a ride.
"The man knows his law," Rosson said. "He
was so well prepared it was unbelievable.
He'd been working on this for so long it was
just implanted in his brain."
In November, the U.S. 5th Circuit agreed
that the monument could remain, saying a
"reasonable viewer" would not "conclude
that the state is endorsing the religious rather
than secular message." The ruling puts the
court at direct odds with other courts around
the country - the scenario when the
Supreme Court is most likely to step in.
At issue is a 5-foot-tall tablet depicting an
eagle, an American flag and the Ten
Commandments. The Fraternal Order of
Eagles, a service organization, donated it to
the state in 1961 as part of a campaign to
provide moral guidance to juveniles. The
group had started by passing out scrolls
listing the commandments. Movie director
Cecil B. DeMille suggested it would be
more effective - and, it went unsaid, more
effective for promoting his movie "The Ten
Commandments" - if monuments were
erected instead.
State officials placed the monument next to
the Capitol, where it sat, largely unnoticed,
for 40 years. Then, along came Van Orden.
Van Orden was born in the East Texas town
of Tyler, the third of four siblings. His father
died when he was young and his mother,
who has since died, took him to Methodist
church every Sunday. It is one of many
periods in his life that Van Orden won't talk
about, insisting that his case should remain
focused on constitutional principles, not his
past.
"His mother was active in her church,
religious, but not fanatical," said his ex-
wife, Melanie Curtis. "She helped people,
took them food if they needed it. He liked to
irritate his mother by making sure he didn't
show any affection for the church. But it
was just his personality. He knew all the
hymns."
After junior college, Van Orden received a
scholarship to study law at Southern
Methodist University. SMU records confirm
that he graduated in 1969. By then a "Bobby
Kennedy liberal," he says he was drafted a
short time later.
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Ordered to serve as a gunner in Vietnam, he
instead talked his way into working for the
Army's Judge Advocate General, often
writing wills for soldiers on the eve of
deployment. Later, he w as an assistant city
attorney and criminal defense lawyer,
hopping from Houston to Dallas, then
Austin.
He won't talk about his career, but Rosson
said Van Orden was involved enough in the
attorneys' "scene" that he developed a solid
golf swing. Curtis said she frequently went
to court to watch him defend accused drug
dealers a nd wife-beaters. " I never s aw h im
lose," she said. They married in 1984, had a
daughter a short time later a nd d ivorced in
1989.
Around the same time, Van Orden began
suffering from a fear of humiliation that
caused him to shy from social and
professional interaction. The condition
killed his career. He lost touch with his
family, and by the late 1990s was depressed
and homeless.
Unable to afford help, he began visiting
libraries to research his condition. He
learned enough, he says, to teach himself to
recover. He began putting his life back
together, though he says he still isn't well
enough to work in an office - not that
anyone would hire him anyway, he adds.
He survives on food stamps and sleeps in his
tent in the woods, nestled in a well-heeled
Austin neighborhood that he travels to by
bus. He won't discuss its location, saying he
must protect himself from his unwitting
neighbors and drug addicts who would steal
his tent.
"I am who I am," he said. "But the nights
are hard. I don't like living in the bushes."
Eventually, his confidence renewed, he
began dabbling in law again. Each day, en
route to a cafeteria where he gets free hot
water for his coffee, he passed the
monument. He says he began to appreciate
its prominence on the Capitol grounds, the
way its shadow seemed to seep into the halls
of power.
His law license had lapsed, largely because
he hadn't paid his State Bar dues. But that
only keeps him from representing other
people, not himself. So two years ago, he
said, he decided to sue.
Kelly Shackelford, chief counsel of the
Liberty Legal Institute, a Texas group that
lobbies for religious freedom, is among
those who believe the Supreme Court might
be attracted to the intricacies of Van Orden's
case. He said the court must address the
issue of whether government can
acknowledge a particular religion without
being seen as endorsing it. "Is the Ten
Commandments religious? Well, yeah, it's
religious. So what?" he said. "We don't
censor our religious history, any more than
we would go into the national museum of art
and rip down the Renaissance paintings."
Doug Laycock, a law professor at the
University of Texas and a leading expert on
the issue, says that's a shortsighted
argument. As the joke goes, there are two
religions in Texas - football and Christianity
- and the monument is a less-than-subtle
reminder of who runs the Capitol, he said.
"There is no doubt that it is an
endorsement," he said. "This moves
religious choice from where it belongs, in
the private sector, to the public domain. It
serves no purpose except for one side to say:
'Hey, we're in charge here.' "
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Now that the time has come to make his last
appeal, Van Order is worried - not that he
wouldn't be able to hold his own, but that he
won't be able to get there in the first place,
even if the justices take his case. So far, he's
gotten by without money. Taking a case to
Washington would be more expensive.
Legal briefs must be printed in dozens of
booklets, 40 of them just for the court's
research staff. Printing alone would cost
$2,000.
"I can do the legal part," he said. "But the
money - that might be something I can't
recover from."
In recent days, he and a few supporters in
Austin have begun talking about handing his
case off - possibly to USC law professor
Erwin Chemerinsky, who said he'd be
happy to take it - in an effort to give the
case more of a shot at landing in front of the
Supreme Court.
Then again, Van Orden's made it this far on
his own. He has a dream, and he figures he
can't let a little thing like money get in his
way.
"I'll sleep outdoors the night before," he
said. "I'll get out of the bushes and go to the
Supreme Court to argue the case. How about
that? Only in America."
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Two Tablets May Renew A High Court Headache;
Disputes in Alabama, Other States Prompt Call For Supreme Court to Issue Definitive
Ruling
The Washington Post
August 31, 2003
Manuel Roig-Franzia
Those familiar tablets with the parallel
strings of thou-shalt-nots peek out from
mossy granite blocks tucked into city hall
gardens. They are chiseled into limestone
monuments rooted on statehouse grounds
and are cast onto bronze plaques that loom
over county courthouses.
Some of these Ten Commandments displays
were o nce forgotten, obscured b y u ntended
shrubbery or simply ignored. But a surge in
efforts by conservative Christians to place
more tablets in public buildings, and the
resulting constitutional challenges to both
new and existing displays, have transformed
the Ten Commandments into the most
visible symbol of the moment in the church-
state conflict.
Judges at all levels are being tugged,
sometimes reluctantly, into a deeply divisive
debate over Ten Commandments displays.
Their rulings, so many and so seemingly
contradictory, have led to a growing clamor
for the U.S. Supreme Court to make a
definitive statement about where and how
the tablets can be displayed.
"There is a line, but it's not a clear line,"
said Eugene Volokh, a law professor at the
University of California at Los Angeles who
specializes in cases involving the separation
of church and state. "There are some white
areas and some black areas, but there's
plenty of gray."
The two-ton monument that w orkers rolled
out of the Alabama Supreme Court rotunda
Wednesday might be the best-known Ten
Commandments display in the nation,
primarily because its champion, Alabama
Chief Justice Roy S. Moore, defied a federal
court order to remove it.
But 20 or so other cases inching through the
courts may eventually become more
important, legal experts said. Some displays,
such as the Ten Commandments monument
on the Texas state capitol grounds in Austin
and the tablets on the courthouse in Chester
County, Pa., have withstood federal court
challenges. Others have been ruled
unconstitutional, including a six-foot granite
monument to the Ten Commandments
placed on the state capitol in Frankfort, Ky.,
and tablets at four public high schools in
Adams County, Ohio.
Some rulings have said that displays
grouping the Ten Commandments with
other historical documents, such as the
Declaration of Independence and the Magna
Carta, are constitutional. Other rulings have
said the opposite.
"The courts are issuing confusing and
conflicting opinions," said Jay Sekulow,
chief counsel of the American Center for
Law and Justice, which was founded by
religious broadcaster Pat Robertson. "The
Supreme Court is going to have to weigh in
on this, but I think they're going to try to
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avoid this as long as they can; that's
becoming painfully obvious."
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently
refused to hear cases about Ten
Commandments displays in public buildings
since a 1980 decision overturning a
Kentucky law that required public schools to
display the tablets in every classroom.
Some Ten Commandments proponents hope
the high court will pass on hearing Moore's
case because he emphasized religion inh is
public remarks rather than playing up the
historical aspect of the commandments. "Of
the cases out there, that's the worst case
legally," said Matthew Staver, president and
general counsel of the Liberty Counsel,
which has had some successes advising
government clients to install displays
coupling the Ten Commandments with
historical documents. "It could cause
damage to the legal landscape that could
adversely affect the other Ten
Commandments cases."
No one is sure exactly how many Ten
Commandments displays are in public
buildings in the United States, but the
highest estimates place the figure in the
hundreds, perhaps even the thousands.
A movie promotion might have a lot to do
with it.
In the mid-1950s, the director Cecil B.
DeMille and the Fraternal Order of Eagles
service organization distributed several
thousand sets of stone tablets to promote
DeMille's film "The Ten Commandments."
Lawsuits challenging the monuments
distributed by the Eagles are popping up
across the country. Ken Falk, of the Indiana
Civil Liberties Union, said there may be a
dozen of the monuments in his state alone.
City officials in Everett, Wash., have vowed
to fight a lawsuit seeking removal of the Ten
Commandments monument they received
from DeMille and the Eagles, which for a
time was partially hidden by tall grass
outside the police station. The statehouse
monument in Austin, which came from the
Eagles, h as b een allowed tos tay; a similar
monument in front of the Elkhart, Ind.,
municipal building was ordered removed.
The Elkhart case produced the closest thing
to a U.S. Supreme Court statement about
Ten Commandments displays since the
Kentucky schools case. Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, along with Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, took
the rare step of commenting on a decision
not to hear the case. Rehnquist wrote that
Elkhart's Ten Commandments monument
was "a celebration of its cultural and
historical roots, not a promotion of religious
faith." He also pointed out that the U.S.
Supreme Court has a carving of Moses with
a pair of tablets on a frieze inside its
courtroom.
Attorneys for Moore and other Ten
Commandments advocates often cite the
U.S. Supreme Court frieze as evidence of
what they say is a fundamental unfairness in
the application of the First Amendment to
religious displays. But their opponents cite
the frieze just as often, saying it is an
example ofan appropriate display, because
Moses holds tablets with Hebrew lettering
and stands alongside other lawgivers, such
as Hammurabi and Justinian.
The possible ambiguity, and the lack of a
firm Supreme Court mandate, provides an
opening for groups that have the means to
wage court fights. Moore, for instance, is
backed by Coral Ridge Ministries, a Florida-
based evangelical group that has collected $
375,000 in donations for his ongoing legal
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fight to keep, and now to try to return, his
monument to the Alabama Supreme Court
rotunda. The state of Alabama, which is
facing a budget crisis and a $ 600 million
shortfall, may be asked to pay $ 900,000 to
cover the plaintiffs' legal costs.
Despite the high costs for both sides, the
courts could swell with more cases soon.
Angered by their defeat in Alabama, several
fundamentalist groups have vowed to install
hundreds of Ten Commandments slabs and
plaques in public buildings in the coming
months.
Even Moore's monument, now hidden from
view in a storage room at the Alabama court
building, may someday get a new life and,
perhaps, face a new legal challenge: Both
candidates for governor in Mississippi,
incumbent Ronnie Musgrove (D) and
challenger Haley Barbour (R), issued
statements last week saying they'd be happy
to take it off his hands.
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Federal appeals court rules against Ky. Ten Commandments
display
Church & State
February 1, 2004
Efforts by three Kentucky counties to
camouflage Ten Commandments displays
by posting other documents alongside the
Decalogue failed in December when a
federal appeals court struck down the
scheme.
The 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
2-1 Dec. 18 that the displays at courthouses
and public schools in McCreary, Pulaski and
Harlan counties were still religious in
nature.
Officials had originally posted the Ten
Commandments without other additional
materials. After a federal court struck down
those displays, other items were added,
including the words to "The Star Spangled
Banner," excerpts from the Declaration of
Independence, the Mayflower Compact, the
Bill of Rights, the Magna Carta and the
Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution.
The exhibits in the courthouses contained a
caption asserting that the Ten
Commandments "provide the moral
background of the Declaration of
Independence and the foundation of our
legal tradition."
The appeals court found this assertion
unpersuasive, noting that the caption "offers
no explanation how the quotation from the
Declaration is in any way connected with
the Ten Commandments, which say nothing
about men being created equal and with the
rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness. The only facial similarity
between the two documents is that they both
recognize the existence of a deity. The
concept of a deity, however, is by no means
unique to the Ten Commandments or even
the Judeo-Christian tradition. Thus, this
solitary similarity hardly demonstrates how
the Ten Commandments in particular
influenced the writing of the Declaration
and, hence, the foundation of our country
and legal tradition."
Liberty Counsel, a Religious Right legal
group affiliated with the Rev. Jerry Falwell,
represented the counties and has vowed to
appeal the American Civil Liberties Union
of Kentucky v. McCreary County ruling.
In other news about Ten Commandments
displays:
* A federal court in Georgia has ruled that a
government-sponsored Ten Commandments
display in Habersham County violates the
separation of church and state.
U.S. District Judge William O'Kelley ruled
that county officials, who had originally
displayed the Ten Commandments standing
alone, did not make the display
constitutional by adding copies of the
Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the
Declaration of Independence and other
documents.
O'Kelley reported that his office received
death threats after he issued the ruling in the
Turner v. Habersham County case. He noted
that he had turned the threats over to U.S.
marshals and said, "We've got a place in the
south of Atlanta" for people who make such
threats, referring to a federal prison.
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O'Kelley noted that he was raised in a "very
Christian family" but said the threatening
message left on his answering machine
"wasn't very Christian, I can tell you that."
* The Ten Commandments and seven other
documents have been posted in the Iowa
statehouse. A local Religious Right group,
the Iowa Family Policy Center, originally
offered the display to the Iowa Judicial
Branch Building, but court officials there
refused it. House Speaker Chris Rants (R-
Sioux City) then agreed to house it in the
legislative chamber.
Aside from the King James Version of the
Ten Commandments, the display includes
the Magna Carta, the Declaration of
Independence, the Bill of Rights and other
documents.
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Turmoil in Adams County; Religious Displays Taken from Schools
Columbus Dispatch
June 10, 2003
Randy Ludlow
Deputy sheriffs cordoned off the entrance to
West Union High School with yellow crime-
scene tape while those who chose to take a
stand remained rooted in front of the gray
granite monument.
But they, and the object they sought to
protect - a tablet inscribed with the Ten
Commandments - soon were taken, one
after the other, from the school grounds. The
nine protesters responded to warnings to
leave with a prayer for the "grace to endure
this experience." Then they were escorted
away.
The deputies leading them to patrol cars
confronted the nine not with handcuffs, but
with consoling pats on the back.
The monument, bearing the Protestant
version of the message that the Bible says
Moses received from God, had been ordered
removed by a federal magistrate. And it was
the next to go.
Free of the protesters, Dan and Jon Modlich
of Columbus resumed their hammer-and-
chisel work. They used a crane to hoist the
granite slab onto their truck, then left with a
police escort to remove identical monuments
at high schools in Peebles, Manchester and
Seaman, where similar scenes played out.
In all, about 30 peaceful protesters were
detained yesterday and later released
without charges.
All four monuments - each bearing the Ten
Commandments - were removed.
The acts of civil disobedience were
prompted by a federal magistrate's order a
year ago to the Adams County/Ohio Valley
school board to remove the tablets.
The magistrate ruled the tablets represent an
unconstitutional entanglement of church and
state. Appeals by the school board and local
ministers have failed. Remove them - or
face contempt charges, U.S. Magistrate
Judge Timothy Hogan said last month.
Kathy Hull earlier had counseled protestors
"to hold on to it so they can't take off with
it."
Later, she shared a back seat with the Rev.
Phil Fulton of Union Hill Church near
Peebles. Together, they awaited a ride to the
county jail. "I have no regrets at all," the
grandmother of 10 Adams County
schoolchildren said.
After local companies refused to play a role
in removing the Ten Commandments from
school grounds, Modlich Monument of
Columbus was tapped for the job.
At West Union High School, Superintendent
Pat Kimble sympathetically asked protesters
to leave, and Fulton pleaded with protesters
to limit their numbers to ease the deputies'
workload.
"We're common citizens who have a fear of
God and believe in living and teaching
moral values," he said. We had to stand up
for what is right."
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Adams County resident Berry Baker had
prevailed in the lawsuit filed with the
assistance of the American Civil Liberties
Union.
At first, Baker petitioned the school board to
permit him to install 6-foot-tall statues of
penises at the high schools.
The rally at Peebles was winding down -
protesters were-prepared to disperse to the
three other high schools - when Baker was
seen at the edge of the gathering.
A minister called for the audience to pray
for him to find "love and God." Baker
briskly walked away from the rally. Asked
what he hoped to see, Baker replied: "The
law enforced . . . They'll come down;
they're immoral."
Lely Palmer interrupted him as he strode
toward Rt. 41. The Head Start teacher asked
to shake his hand and then, in the only
public display of support at the time,
thanked him.
"Even though I believe in the Ten
Commandments, this is a public school,"
Palmer said. "It is very inappropriate. We
need to concentrate on teaching children to
read and write and not insert this issue."
The tablets were gifts to the district from the
Adams County Ministerial Association in
1997, when four new buildings opened.
After the lawsuit was filed, four more tablets
joined them. They are inscribed with
excerpts from the Preamble to the U.S.
Constitution, the Declaration of
Independence, the Magna Carta and the
Roman Justinian code.
The departure yesterday of the religious
tablets was met with prayer and tears by
about 400 people who gathered at Peebles
High School. In a rally that was part
religious revival and part wake, some
demonstrators expressed disbelief at the
event.
They raised their hands and Bibles skyward,
prayed, and then entwined arms and held
hands to form a barrier around the
monument at Peebles.
The U.S. flag lowered to half-staff in a sign
of distress, the audience sang patriotic and
religious standards and shouted "amen" to
the points offered by a series of speakers.
"This community believes the Ten
Commandments provide a moral foundation
our students so desperately need," said the
Rev. Ron Stephens of the Peebles Church of
God. "This will be but a temporary
relocation."
School board member Joyce King told the
crowd: "Our prayers are that these
monuments will be put back in front of our
schools. Our country would be a lot better
off if people would read and live by these
monuments."
Christian activist Dave Daubenmire, the
former London High School football coach
who stirred controversy in 1999 by leading
his players in prayer, was among those who
pledged to face arrest by "drawing a line in
the sand."
Calling judges "terrorists in black robes,"
Daubenmire said: "Let's find out how big a
jail they've got.
"It's our moral obligation to stand here."
The founder o f A dams C ounty for t he T en
Commandments said they will be re-erected
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on private property pending further court
appeals.
"It's a sad, sad day," the Rev. Ken Johnson
said as he watched the monument taken
from West Union High School. "There is a
higher moral authority than the courts."
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Debate Lingers As Monument Is Removed From View;
Commandments Display Put In Storage in Ala. Courthouse
The Washington Post
August 28, 2003
Alan Cooperman & Manuel Roig-Franzia
Workmen levered a 5,280-pound Ten
Commandments monument onto a dolly and
wheeled it into a back room at the Alabama
Supreme Court building yesterday, ending a
confrontation that initially unified
evangelical Christians but ended up deeply
dividing them.
Evangelicals across the country had cheered
two years ago when Alabama's Chief Justice
Roy S. Moore installed the granite marker in
the building's rotunda. But when he
disobeyed a federal court order to remove it
by Aug. 20, religious conservatives began
quarreling among themselves.
Several leading voices on the religious right
- including Christian broadcaster Pat
Robertson, Southern Baptist minister
Richard Land, legal strategist Jay Sekulow
and Free Congress Foundation chairman
Paul M. Weyrich - have criticized Moore
for undermining "the rule of law."
Other figures with a nationwide Christian
following - i ncluding Focus o nt he F amily
founder James Dobson and Coral Ridge
Ministries evangelist D. James Kennedy -
have praised him for placing "God's law"
above the changing judgments of human
beings.
People on both sides of the debate predicted
yesterday that it will continue because
conservative Christians are growing
increasingly frustrated with federal court
decisions and more inclined to civil
disobedience. If the U.S. Supreme Court
upholds the ruling by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit that the words
"under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance are
unconstitutional, " then I think you w ill s ee
sit-ins and people refusing to pay their
taxes," Land said.
With a "runaway, dictatorial judiciary" that
has legalized sodomy, upheld abortion rights
and restricted prayer in schools, "we're
getting to a point where there are a lot of
people who are being forced to choose
between their conscience and obeying court
orders," he said.
In Alabama yesterday morning,
demonstrators dropped to their knees in
prayer after spotting a five-man work crew
gathering around the monument. Some
pastors lay prostrate on the ground.
By moving the monument to a storage room
that is not open to the public, state officials
complied with the federal court order
without having to wrestle "Roy's Rock" past
the 100 protesters, some of whom had
camped out for a week to prevent its
removal.
It took the crew an 11/2 hours of painstaking
labor to wheel away the monument with
demonstrators watching through the
courthouse's glass doors.
"This is one of the most tragic days for
America," said the Rev. Phil Fulton of
Pentecostal Union Hill Church in Peebles,
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Ohio. "I feel like our constitutional rights,
our religious freedoms, are eroding away."
Even after the monument had disappeared,
the protesters could not bring themselves to
leave. Instead, their numbers grew. Some
activists were roused by urgent calls to
nearby hotels. Several hundred had gathered
by midday, many vowing to press the fight
to place Christian imagery in public
buildings in other parts of the country.
David Williams, a spokesman for the state
Supreme Court, said lights in the storage
room where the monument was placed will
remain on 24 hours a day. "It's just
symbolic of respect," he said.
Moore has appeared before cheering crowds
twice since defying the order from U.S.
District Judge Myron H. Thompson. But he
stayed away yesterday. "It is a sad day in
our country when the moral foundation of
our laws and the acknowledgment of God
has to be hidden from public view to
appease a federal judge," he said in a
statement.
Moore still intends to file an appeal with the
U.S. Supreme Court. But the high court last
week denied his request for a stay, and eight
of his colleagues on the state Supreme Court
overruled him and ordered the monument's
removal. On Friday, Moore's attorneys told
Thompson that he would not interfere with
the physical removal of the monument.
Moore also was suspended last week by a
state judicial commission, which will hold a
hearing on whether to discipline or remove
him from the bench.
Although Moore has gained the adoration of
many evangelical Christians across the
country, Alabama's top state officials - who
had once supported him - have distanced
themselves from his defiance. Both Gov.
Bob Riley (R) and Attorney General
William H. Pryor Jr. (R) favored the
monument's display, but opposed defying a
court order.
That is the same position taken by
evangelical leaders such as Land and
Robertson. Although there is "no question"
that the courts erred in declaring the
monument an unconstitutional infringement
on the separation of church and state, "we
are people who respect the role of law,"
Robertson said in a radio interview this
week.
Kennedy, also a religious broadcaster, said
he is "a law-abiding citizen. There are,
however, some exceptional cases when
man's law conflicts with God's law, and in
that case . . . according to the New
Testament, it is better that we obey God
rather than men."
Kennedy cited the war of independence and
the civil rights movement as precedents for
civil disobedience.
Removing the Ten Commandments from a
courthouse rises to that level, he said,
because "if we abandon the divine sanction
of law in our country and revert merely to
men's laws, then we open the door for the
kind of tyranny that we saw in the Soviet
Union and Vietnam, North Korea and
Cuba."
Weyrich, who has been called the "father"
of the Christian right, said the movement is
now "deeply divided" and that he has taken
"enormous heat" from his supporters over
his criticism of Moore. "You try to explain,
but they won't listen," he said. "As far as
they're concerned, this is an issue of good
versus evil, and Judge Moore is on the right
side."
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Alabama Justice's Ouster Upheld in Ten Commandments Case
The New York Times
May 1, 2004
Ariel Hart
An ad hoc Alabama Supreme Court on
Friday denied the appeal of Roy S. Moore,
the former chief justice who was removed
from office in November for defying a
federal judge's order to stop displaying a
Ten Commandments monument in the State
Judicial Building in Montgomery.
The temporary court voted 7-to-0 to uphold
Mr. Moore's ouster, writing that the
evidence against him was so "sufficiently
strong and convincing" that the lower court
"could hardly have done otherwise." Mr.
Moore responded in a statement that the
court was "illegally appointed, politically
selected," and that "the people of Alabama
have a right to acknowledge God and no
judge or group ofjudges has the right to take
it from them."
The judicial panel was made up of retired
judges drawn at random to stand in for the
State Supreme Court. All members of the
court, an elected body, had recused
themselves from the case.
Mr. Moore's lawyers said he respected the
rule of law. "Certainly, federal court orders
must be obeyed," said one of the lawyers,
Phillip Jauregui. "But unlawful court orders
shouldn't be obeyed by other oath-bound
officers."
The court said that it lacked the jurisdiction
to review the lawfulness of the order itself,
and that in any case higher federal courts
had reviewed and upheld it.
Mr. Moore had the monument installed in
the building's rotunda overnight on July 31,
2001. Judge Myron H. Thompson of Federal
District Court ordered it taken from public
view, but Mr. Moore refused. He was
suspended, the remaining justices sent the
granite block to a closet, and the State Court
of the Judiciary unanimously removed Mr.
Moore from office in November.
Mr. Moore's legal team was incensed two
weeks ago when the state agreed to pay
$550,000 in plaintiffs' legal bills for the
case. Now a group of citizens has filed suit
for Mr. Moore to repay the state.
Mr. Moore's team is frustrated.
"One of the problems we've had is we've
been asking the federal courts to correct
themselves," Mr. Jauregui said. "It's like
asking a thief to arrest themselves. And so
now the approach that we're taking is saying
that this problem needs to be addressed in
Congress."
Mr. Moore is supporting legislation to
prevent the federal courts from reviewing
public acknowledgments of God. Mr.
Jauregui is running for Congress. And Tom
Parker, Mr. Moore's former spokesman and
legal adviser, is running for the State
Supreme Court.
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Felony Voting Rights
Muntaqim v. Coombe
(01-7260)
Ruling Below: Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 8077
At issue was whether the Voting Rights Act of 1965 could be applied to N.Y. Elec. Law § 5-106,
which disenfranchised currently incarcerated felons and parolees. The court concluded that the
VRA did not apply to the New York law. Applying § 1973 of the VRA to the state law would
alter the traditional balance of power between the states and the federal government. The court
was not convinced that there was a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Further, there was no clear statement
from Congress (either in the language of § 1973 or in its legislative history) that § 1973 applied
to state felon disenfranchisement statutes.
Question Presented: Whether a state law that bars felons from voting is immune from
challenge under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. (2) Whether the "plain statement
rule" of statutory construction may be applied to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Jalil Abdul MUNTAQIM, Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
Philip COOMBE, Anthony ANNUCCI, and Louis MANN, Defendants-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Decided: April 23, 2004
Amended: May 18, 2004
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
CABRANES, Circuit Judge:
We are asked in this case to decide whether
the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"), which
prohibits voting qualifications that result in
the abridgment of the right to vote on
account of race, can be applied to a New
York State statute that disenfranchises
currently incarcerated felons and parolees.
Although we recognize that this is a difficult
question that can ultimately be resolved
only by a determination of the United States
Supreme Court, we conclude that the VRA,
which is silent on the topic of state felon
disenfranchisement statutes, cannot be
applied to draw into question the validity of
New York's disenfranchisement statute. We
believe that, in light of recent Supreme
Court [...] the application of the VRA to
felon disenfranchisement statutes such as
that of New York would infringe upon the
states' well-established discretion to deprive
felons of the right to vote. [...]
Plaintiff-Appellant Jalil Abdul Muntaqim, a
convicted felon imprisoned in New York,
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appeals from a judgment of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of New
York, granting defendants' motion for
summary judgment and dismissing the
complaint in its entirety. [...]
The District Court concluded that Muntaqim
had failed to state a § 1973 claim because
that provision of the VRA is not applicable
to New York's felon disenfranchisement
statute. We agree. Under Supreme Court
precedent, because § 1973 would alter the
constitutional balance between the states
and the federal government if it were
construed to extend to state felon
disenfranchisement statutes such as § 5-106,
we look for a clear statement from Congress
to support that construction of the statute.
Having found no such statement, we hold
that § 1973 cannot be used to challenge the
legality of § 5-106. [...]
BACKGROUND
Muntaqim is a black inmate at the
Shawangunk Correctional Facility in
Wallkill, New York who is currently serving
a maximum sentence o f life i mprisonment.
[ ... ]
[His] complaint asserts that, even if the New
York State legislature did not intend to
discriminate when it enacted § 5-106, that
statute violates the VRA because it has
"'resulted' in unlawful dilution of voting
rolls in the African-American and Hispanic
communities of New York City."
Muntaqim alleges that, although blacks and
Hispanics constitute less than thirty percent
of the voting-age population in New York
State, they make up over eighty percent of
the inmates in the state prison system.
Moreover, according to the complaint,
eighty percent of incarcerated Hispanics and
blacks come from "New York City and its
environs." Based on these figures,
Muntaqim claims that § 5-106 violates §
1973 both by denying him the right to vote
and by "diluting" the so-called black and
Hispanic vote in New York City.
DISCUSSION
[...] We review District Court
determinations on motions to dismiss and
motions for summary judgment de novo.
[...]
Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 5-106 of the New York Election
Law provides that no person convicted of a
felony "shall have the right to register for or
vote at any election" unless he has been
pardoned, his maximum sentence of
imprisonment has expired, or he has been
discharged from parole. Accordingly, no
residents of New York State who are
presently incarcerated for a felony or are on
parole may vote in local, state, or federal
elections.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 and originally enacted
in 1965, prohibits any state limitation on the
right to vote that has a racially
discriminatory result. In particular, the
current version of § 1973(a) provides:
No voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be
imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color ....
549
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). The VRA states that
"[a] violation of subsection (a) . . . is
established if, based on the totality of the
circumstances, it is shown that ... members
[of protected racial minorities] have less
opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their
choice." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
The current language of § 1973 was enacted
by Congress [...] in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, (1980). In Bolden, a
plurality of the Court held that racially
neutral state action violates § 1973 only if it
is motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
The a mended version o f § 1 973 eliminates
this "discriminatory purpose" requirement
and, instead, prohibits any voting
qualification or standard that "results" in the
denial oft he right to vote " on account o f
race.
Applicability of § 1973 to Felon
Disenfranchisement Statutes
In Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir.
1996), our in banc Court addressed the
exact legal question presented by this case-
namely, whether § 1973 is applicable to
felon disenfranchisement statutes generally
and to § 5-106 in particular. Because the ten
members of the Court who decided Baker
split evenly on its disposition, the opinions
in that case have no precedential effect, and
the decision of the District Court was left
undisturbed. [...]
In an opinion written by Judge Mahoney,
[...] five members of our Court concluded
that § 1973 is not applicable to felon
disenfranchisement statutes because such an
application of § 1973 "would raise serious
constitutional questions regarding the scope
of Congress' authority to enforce the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and
would alter the usual constitutional balance
between the States and the Federal
Government."
Five other members of our Court reached
the opposite conclusion. [An] opinion
authored by Judge Feinberg [...] rejected
Judge Mahoney's view that "since 'felon
disenfranchisement is a very widespread
historical practice that has been accorded
explicit constitutional recognition,' applying
the Voting Rights Act to § 5-106 would
raise 'serious constitutional questions."'
[...] Contrary to Judge Mahoney's view,
"felon disenfranchisement statutes often
have been used to deny the right to vote on
account of race." [...]
Judge Feinberg acknowledged the
requirement set forth by the Supreme Court
in Gregory that Congress articulate a "plain
statement" when it intends to alter the state-
federal balance of power, but he concluded
that "the Voting Rights Act does not alter
the constitutional balance between the
federal government and the States."
Instead, according to Judge Feinberg, §
1973 simply implements the balance that
had already been achieved by the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments, which "were
specifically designed as an expansion of
federal power and an intrusion on state
sovereignty." [...] Judge Feinberg
concluded that, because the application of §
1973 to state judicial elections "is at least as
much of an intrusion of federal authority
into state affairs" as is its application to
felon disenfranchisement statutes, the
Supreme Court would not have applied the
plain statement rule in Baker.
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After reviewing the opinions in Baker, the
District Court in the instant case followed
Judge Mahoney's opinion and concluded
that § 1973 "does not limit New York's
authority to disenfranchise felons under
Section 5-106."
In contrast to the District Court in the
instant case, two of our sister circuits have
recently held that § 1973 applies to felon
disenfranchisement statutes. In Johnson v.
Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287 (1 Ith Cir.
2003), a divided panel of the Eleventh
Circuit, over a dissent b y Judge Phyllis A.
Kravitch, reinstated claims that the felon
disenfranchisement provision of the Florida
Constitution violates both the Equal
Protection Clause and § 1973.
In Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009
(9th Cir. 2003), a panel of the Ninth
Circuit, like the Eleventh Circuit, held that a
claim of vote denial based on Washington
State's felon disenfranchisement scheme is
cognizable under § 1973.
After careful consideration of the opinions
in Baker, the decision below, and the
decisions of our sister circuits, we hold that
§ 1973 does not apply to § 5-106. [...] We
affirm the District Court's decision that
Muntaqim's § 1973 claim fails as a matter
of law.
The canon of construction that is most
relevant to our analysis has been called the
Supreme Court's "super-strong clear
statement rule." "If Congress intends to alter
the usual constitutional balance between the
States and the Federal Government, it must
make its intention to do so unmistakably
clear in the language of the statute." [...J
Since the Baker litigation was completed in
1996, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
considered the scope of Congress's
enforcement power under the
Reconstruction Amendments. In the words
of one commentator, "the Rehnquist Court
has [since 1997] introduced an entirely new
framework for analyzing the scope of
Congress's power under Section 5. of the
Fourteenth Amendment 'to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article."' [...]
[The court discussed recent Rehnquist Court
federalism rulings, including United States
v. Lopez, City of Boerne v. Flores, and
University ofAlabama v. Garrett.]
Finally, there is a longstanding practice in
this country of disenfranchising felons as a
form of punishment. When the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, 29 of 36
States had provisions in their constitutions,
which prohibited, or authorized the
legislature to prohibit, exercise of the
franchise by persons convicted of felonies
or infamous crimes.
For these reasons, we believe that § 1973
cannot be constitutionally applied to New
York's felon disenfranchisement statute
merely because it may be constitutionally
applied to other facially neutral voting
restrictions. Instead, City of Boerne and its
progeny dictate that the application of §
1973 to § 5-106 can be upheld only if two
conditions are met: First, "there must be a
congruence and proportionality between the
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injury to be prevented or remedied [by §
1973]" and the prohibition of
nondiscriminatory felon disenfranchisement
laws. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
Second, Congress must have identified a
"history and pattern of unconstitutional ...
discrimination" that would be deterred or
prevented by prohibiting or limiting the
power of states to disenfranchise
incarcerated felons.
In sum, we are not convinced that "there [is]
a congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied," i.e.,
the use of vote denial and dilution schemes
to avoid the strictures of the [...], "and the
means adopted to that end," ... Moreover,
even if there were a sufficient nexus
between the injury to be prevented by §
1973 and the application of § 1973 to § 5-
106, Congress has not identified a "history
and pattern of unconstitutional . . .
discrimination". [...] Based on these
conclusions, it is apparent to us that the
application of § 1973 to § 5-106 would
disturb the balance of power between the
States and the Federal Government, as
conceived by the Supreme Court.
Because we have concluded that the
application of § 1973 to § 5-106 would alter
the federal balance, the next question is
whether Congress made its intention
sufficiently clear that we need to address the
constitutional issue posed in this case. In
applying the clear statement rule, the
Supreme Court has asked whether Congress
has made its intent to alter the federal
balance "unmistakably clear in the language
of the statute."
Thus, although Congress has not expressly
stated that § 1973 does not apply to felon
disenfranchisement statutes, the one-sided
legislative history of t he V RA is sufficient
to raise serious doubts about whether the
statute can be applied to felon
disenfranchisement statutes.
Thus, in these circumstances, we
conclude that the clear statement
rule is applicable, despite the fact
that, on its face, § 1973 extends to
all voting qualifications. [...]
Because we find that Congress did
not make an unmistakably clear
statement that § 1973 applies to
state felon disenfranchisement
statutes, we will not apply § 1973 to
§ 5-106.
CONCLUSION
This case raises a difficult question
regarding the applicability of the VRA's
"results" test to a New York statute that
disenfranchises currently incarcerated felons
and parolees. More broadly, it also asks us
to evaluate the impact of City of Boerne and
its progeny on Section 2 the Voting Rights
Act, and to apply the clear statement rule in
an unfamiliar context. Accordingly, all three
judges on this panel believe that the issues
presented in this case are significant and, in
light of the differing perspectives among
and within the courts of appeals, warrant
definitive resolution by the United States
Supreme Court.
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Disenfranchised without recourse?
National Law Journal
Gary Young
May 31, 2004
A handful of decisions dealing with felon
disenfranchisement statutes show continuing
uncertainty about the extent of Congress'
authority to dictate anti-discrimination
policy to the states.
In April, the Second U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that a New York state law
depriving felons of the right to vote while
their sentences are running could not be
challenged under the Voting Rights Act
even if it has a disproportionate effect on the
African-American community. Muntaqim v.
Coombe, No. 01-7260.
In contrast, last year the ninth and eleventh
circuits ruled that such challenges should not
be dismissed out of hand, but require an
inquiry into "the totality of the
circumstances," particularly into possible
carry-over effects of discrimination in the
criminal justice system.
Two other circuits, the fourth and sixth-in
2000 and 1986 decisions, respectively-
assumed without discussion that felon
disenfranchisement statutes must pass
muster under the Voting Rights Act. But
since they ultimately found that the statutes
at issue were blameless, they may have
assumed so merely "for the sake of
argument."
Tea leaves
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken
on the precise issue at hand, it has looked at
related questions. In 1974's Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, the court held that
felon disenfranchisement statutes do not on
their face violate the equal protection clause
because another section of the 14th
Amendment expressly exempted the states
from punishment for felon
disenfranchisement.
However, in 1984's Hunter v. Underwood,
471 U.S. 222, the court said that a facially
neutral Alabama felon disenfranchisement
law violated the 14th Amendment because
of evidence it was enacted after the Civil
War for the express purpose of depriving
African-Americans of the vote. [Neither
Richardson nor Hunter dealt with the Voting
Rights Act.]
In a 1980 case dealing with at-large election
systems, not felon disenfranchisement, a
plurality of the court said that the Voting
Rights Act is violated only when intent to
discriminate is proven. City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55. Congress responded to
Bolden by amending §[ 2 of the act, codified
at 42 U.S.C. 1973, to encompass not only
intentional discrimination, but also state
action that "results" in an abridgement of the
right to vote on the basis of race. The
amendment also instructed courts to look at
the "totality of the circumstances."
Also relevant are a string of cases, including
Bd. of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 [2001], in
which the Supreme Court has held that
Congress' 14th Amendment enforcement
powers vis-a-vis the states do not come into
play unless it makes formal findings of a
history of discrimination.
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In Muntaqim, the Second Circuit said that
the act could not be extended to felon
disenfranchisement statutes in the absence
of Congress' express authorization, but also
hinted that Congress might then be
overstepping the line drawn in Garrett.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Johnson v. Gov. of
Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, and the 9th Circuit, in
Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009,
both pointed to the results-oriented language
of the 1982 amendments, but also seemed to
hedge their bets by pointing to possible
intentional discrimination at one step
removed [i.e., in the criminal justice
system].
Dissenters in both courts argued that the
majority opinions ignored the federal-state
line drawn in Garrett.
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Felony Disenfranchisement in the United States
The Sentencing Project
Overview
Since the founding of the country, most states in the U.S. have enacted laws disenfranchising
convicted felons and ex-felons. Today, almost all states have disenfranchisement laws. In the last
30 years, due to the dramatic increased use and expansion of the criminal justice system, these
laws have significantly affected the political voice of many American communities.
State Disenfranchisement Laws
. 48 states and the District of Columbia prohibit inmates from voting while incarcerated for a
felony offense.
- Only two states - Maine and Vermont - permit inmates to vote.
35 states prohibit felons from voting while they are on parole and 31 of these states exclude
felony probationers as well.
* S even states deny t he right to vote toa ll e x-offenders w ho have completed t heir s entences.
Seven others disenfranchise certain categories of ex-offenders and/or permit application for
restoration of rights for specified offenses after a waiting period (e.g., five years in Delaware and
Wyoming, and three years in Maryland).
. Each state has developed its own process of restoring voting rights to ex-offenders but most of
these restoration processes are so cumbersome that few ex-offenders are able to take advantage
of them.
Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement
- An estimated 4.7 million Americans, or one in forty-three adults, have currently or permanently
lost their voting rights as a result of a felony conviction.
.1 .4 million African American m en, or 1 3% o f b lack m en, a re d isenfranchised, a rate s even
times the national average.
An estimated 676,730 women are currently ineligible to vote as a result of a felony conviction.
More than 2 million1 white Americans (Hispanic and non-Hispanic)2 are disenfranchised.
Over half a million women have lost their right to vote.3
In six states that deny the vote to ex-offenders, one in four black men is permanently
disenfranchised.
- Given current rates of incarceration, three in ten of the next generation of black men can expect
to be disenfranchised at some point in their lifetime. In states that disenfranchise ex-offenders, as
many as 40% of black men may permanently lose their right to vote.
. 1.7 million disenfranchised persons are ex-offenders who have completed their sentences. The
state of Florida had an estimated 600,000 ex-felons who were unable to vote in the 2000
presidential election.
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Policy Changes
-Alabama: In 2003, Governor Riley signed into law a bill that permits most felons to apply for a
certificate of eligibility to register to vote after completing their sentence.
- Connecticut: In May 2001, Governor Rowland signed into law a bill that extends voting rights
to felons on probation. The law is expected to make 36,000 persons eligible to vote.
- Delaware: Until recently, Delaware imposed a lifetime voting ban for felons. In June 2000, the
General Assembly passed a constitutional amendment restoring voting rights to some ex-felons
five years after the completion of their sentence.
. Florida: The Brennan Center and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law have a
voting rights case pending in the US District Court for the Southern District of Florida
challenging the constitutionality of the voting - laws that disenfranchise ex-felons. Separate
litigation filed by the ACLU contends that the state Department of Corrections is not fulfilling its
obligation under current law to aid ex-felons in seeking clemency.
* Kansas: In 2002, the legislature added probationers to the category of excluded felons.
* Kentucky: In 2001, the legislature passed a bill that requires that the Department of
Corrections inform and aid eligible offenders in completing the restoration process to regain their
civil rights.
* Maryland: In 2002, the legislature repealed its lifetime ban on two-time ex-felons (with the
exception of felons with two violent convictions) and imposed a three-year waiting period after
completion of sentence before rights can be restored.
. Massachusetts: Until the 2000 presidential election, Massachusetts was one of three states that
allowed inmates to vote. On November 7, 2000, the Massachusetts electorate voted in favor of a
constitutional amendment, which strips persons incarcerated for a felony offense of their right to
vote.
. Nevada: In 2003, the state approved a provision to automatically restore voting rights for first-
time nonviolent felons immediately after completion of sentence.
. New Mexico: In March 2001, the Legislature adopted a bill repealing the state's lifetime ban on
exfelon voting.
- Pennsylvania: A Commonwealth Court restored t he right to vote to thousands of ex-felons
who, as a result, were entitled to vote in the 2000 presidential election.
- Virginia: The Virginia legislature passed a law in 2000 enabling certain ex-felons to apply to
the circuit court for the restoration of their voting rights five years after the completion of their
sentence; those convicted of felony drug offenses must wait seven years after completion. The
circuit court's decisions are subject to the Governor's approval.
Wyoming: In March 2003, Governor Freudenthal signed a bill to allow people convicted of a
nonviolent first-time felony to apply for restoration of voting rights five years after completion of
sentence.
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Categories of Felons Disenfranchised Under State Law
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Once a Felon, Never a Voter?
National Journal
Megan Twohey
January 6, 2000
Thomas Johnson is a black resident of
Florida who was eager to vote for George
W. Bush for President. Johnson, who lives
in Gainesville with his wife and five
children, is executive director of a nonprofit
Christian residential program that helps
recently released state prison inmates re-
enter s ociety. Jo hnson likes t he Republican
principle of self-help, and supports the
party's stance against abortion rights.
But on Election Day, Johnson was unable to
vote. In 1992, he was convicted in New
York City of selling cocaine and carrying a
firearm without a license. When he moved
to Florida in 1996, he learned, much to his
dismay, that the state bans anyone convicted
of a felony from ever voting in any kind of
election unless he or she applies for and
receives an exemption from the state
clemency board-an arduous task.
"I've been in this community for five years,"
he said. "I'm a taxpayer. I help mold this
community through my work. The sheriff is
a friend of mine. But voting is the power by
which you truly shape and mold, and I'm
being denied that. I watch my sons see me
stay home when my wife goes off to v ote.
I'm appalled by it."
Johnson has plenty of company. Altogether,
500,000 Florida residents-4.6 percent of the
state's voting-age population-have served
time behind bars for various crimes and thus
are unable to vote because of the ban, which
has been on the law books since 1868. A
disproportionate number of those residents
arc black. Nearly 170,000 black adult men
in Florida-roughly 25 percent of the state's
black male residents-can't vote because of a
current or past conviction.
In September, the Brennan Center for
Justice at New York University School of
Law and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law, based in Washington,
filed a suit on behalf of
Johnson and the state's ex-felon population
in U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. Like many Southern
states, Florida during Reconstruction
adopted a ban on a former
felon's right to vote, which was aimed in
part at disenfranchising former slaves. White
lawmakers wrote those laws to include what
were then regarded as mainly "black"
crimes, such as rape and theft. The civil
rights lawyers assert that the ban violates the
14th Amendment's equal-protection clause,
as well as the federal 1965 Voting Rights
Act.
The Florida case highlights a growing
national concern: The increasing number of
disenfranchised Americans w ho are current
or former members of the exploding prison
population. More than 4 million Americans-
36 percent of whom are African-
American men-couldn't vote this year as a
result of state laws that ban voting by
convicted felons, according to the
Sentencing Project, a nonprofit, nonpartisan
organization in Washington
that's pressing for an overhaul of sentencing
laws and guidelines and conducts research
on criminal justice issues. Nearly three-
quarters of those felons are on probation or
parole; one-third have completed sentences.
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Convicted felons and their allies in the civil
rights community are challenging the laws
in state legislatures, Congress, and the
courts. They maintain that the bans are
racist, unconstitutional, and simply
irrational. These critics, who began their
effort in earnest two years ago, are
encountering formidable obstacles-
politicians of both major parties who are
uninterested in -tinkering with the laws for
fear of appearing soft on crime, and
supporters of the restrictions, who insist that
the bans are legally secure and just. As a
result, advocates of change have made little
headway.
The disenfranchisement I aws have surfaced
in waves over the past two centuries. Some
of the restrictions date to the first half of the
19th century, when society viewed voting as
a privilege, not a right. State and national
lawmakers at that time believed that
disenfranchising people who conmmitted
serious crimes was a fair part of punishment.
After the Civil War, many
Southern states included criminal
disenfranchisement, along with poll taxes
and literacy tests, in their voting laws as a
way of denying blacks the vote. At the turn
of the century, during the
Progressive era, a new logic emerged. States
outside of the South used
disenfranchisement laws as a way of
protecting the purity of the ballot box-or so
legislators said. Politicians assumed that
criminals would be more inclined to engage
in electoral fraud or to band together to
rewrite electoral laws even though, analysts
say, there was no empirical evidence to
support those assumptions.
During the civil rights movement of the
1960s and '70s, a few states relaxed their
restrictions. Then, in the 1980s, as crime
rates started to climb, many states revived or
broadened their bans.
Today, 48 states and the District of
Columbia have laws on the books that, in
one way or another, disenfranchise people
who've been convicted of felonies. Thirty-
two states deprive convicted offenders of the
vote while they're on parole, and 29 prohibit
offenders on probation from voting. In
addition to Florida, 12 states disenfranchise
for life ex-offenders who have completed
their sentences.
Yet certain states held out. Until recently,
four states-Maine, Massachusetts, Utah, and
Vermont-allowed all felons, even those in
prison, to vote. In a 1998 ballot initiative in
Utah, however, 80 percent voted to
disenfranchise felony inmates.
Massachusetts' voters did the same in
November.
Those who support voting bans insist that
people who are not willing to follow the law
should not be given the power to make the
law. "We don't let everyone vote," said
Roger Clegg, vice president and general
counsel for the Center for Equal
Opportunity, a conservative organization
based in Washington. "We require that
people meet a minimum level of
trustworthiness and loyalty to our system of
government. Consequently, we don't let
children, noncitizens, or people who are
certifiably insane vote. Just as these groups
don't meet the basic requirements, those
people who commit serious crimes don't
either."
In general, Republicans are not eager to
restore voting rights to ex-felons because
most of them are likely to vote for
Democrats. Jeff Manza, an associate
professor of sociology at
Northwestern University, has been studying
hypothetical voting habits of felons. "A
large portion of the current disenfranchised
population is low-income, has a low level of
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education, and is single," Manza said. "And
more than 40 percent is black. When you
take all of these pieces of information and
put them together, you have a demographic
group that is inclined to be more favorable
to the Democrats."
Voting-rights advocates, however, argue
that, in addition to undermining the nation's
democratic principles, the restriction
prevents former offenders from fully
rejoining society. They say the bans are
particularly damaging today because more
and more people-especially blacks-are being
locked up for nonviolent drug offenses that
are classified as felonies.
These advocates are turning to state
legislatures to press for changes. Despite
only minor success, their cause may be
gaining momentum. Felon advocates scored
their biggest victory of the year in Delaware,
where the Legislature voted to scale back
the state's lifetime ban on voting; now
former offenders can vote again five years
after they have completed their sentences. In
Alabama and Connecticut, measures that
would shorten voting bans passed in the
House but were not taken up in the Senate.
"Some of the (Connecticut) senators were
concerned that they'd be perceived as soft
on crime," said Miles Rapoport, a former
secretary of state in Connecticut who is
executive director of DemocracyWorks, a
coalition of organizations that pushed for
changes.
"Gaining the franchise for any group is a
tricky thing," said Alexander Keyssar, a
professor of history and public policy at
Duke University and the author of The Right
to Vote: The Contested History of
Democracy in the United States. "No group
has been able to do so until it reaches that
historical moment in time when it has
political leverage or political allies. Felons
have neither. No one Wants to run for office
saying, 'I gave the vote to the Boston
Strangler.' "
Frustrated by the slow pace of change, John
Conyers Jr. of Michigan, the senior
Democrat on the House Judiciary
Committee, and 37 co-sponsors proposed
legislation in March 1999
that would restore the right to vote in federal
elections to all people convicted of a
criminal offense who are not behind bars.
The Judiciary Committee's Constitution
Subcommittee held hearings on the bill later
in the year. Despite compelling testimony on
the negative impact of disenfranchisement
laws on the black community, critics had a
strong hand to play: Article I, Section 2 of
the Constitution, which grants states the
authority to set voting requirements for
federal elections, and Section 2 of the 14th
Amendment, which explicitly allows states
to deny voting rights to people who commit
treason and other crimes. Conyers'
bill has remained stuck in committee.
Challenging the restrictive laws in the courts
can be tricky. Take the Florida case. In their
federal District Court case, attorneys for ex-
felons argue that the state's 1868 law was
intended to specifically disenfranchise
blacks and thus collides
with the 14th Amendment's equal-protection
clause. They also maintain that the law has
had a racially discriminatory impact, and
therefore violates the 1965 Voting Rights
Act.
In a 1985 ruling, Hunter vs. Underwood, the
Supreme Court struck down an Alabama
disenfranchisement law because, the Justices
said, it had been created for purposes of
discrimination. In its 1974 Richardson vs.
Ramirez decision, however, the Court said
that such discriminatory intent must be
proven before felon disenfranchisement laws
can be struck down.
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Because that intent was rooted in only a
handful of Southern laws, conservative legal
scholars say that the majority of
disenfranchisement laws are legally secure.
Still, civil rights lawyers hope that the laws'
disproportionate impact on the black
community will become legal grounds for
striking them down. The case in Florida-
which is still pending-tests that claim. The
outcome could strengthen, or erode, the
underpinnings of other states'
disenfranchisement laws.
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Votes for Felons
National Review
April 3, 2000
John J. Miller
Governor Paul Cellucci discovered a couple
ofy ears ago that a group of Massachusetts
prison inmates were organizing a political-
action committee. Cellucci moved
immediately to q uash t he group. He i ssued
an executive order and then went a step
further, filing a state constitutional
amendment to deny inmates the vote.
Massachusetts is expected to join 47 other
states soon in an outright ban on prisoner
voting.
Liberals gnashed their teeth over Cellucci's
move. It "sends the wrong message," said an
ACLU lawyer to the Boston Globe, as if
letting a bunch of felons lobby the
legislature and mail checks to candidates
sent a really positive message to society. A
key leader of the Massachusetts Prisoners
Association was a convicted murderer.
But if Massachusetts jailbirds lose some
political freedom, those in other states may
win a bit more-because of an embryonic
nationwide campaign to liberalize the voting
rights of people enmeshed in the criminal-
justice system. Thirty-two states currently
forbid people on probation or parole to vote,
and, in 14 states, a felony conviction can
mean disenfranchisement for life. As a
result, about 4 million Americans-one in 50
adults-won't be eligible to vote in this year's
fall elections. And since more than a third of
them are black, voting rights for felons is
emerging as one of the Left's hottest civil-
rights issues. Republicans may have their
neo-cons and paleo-cons; now Democrats
are trying to organize a voting bloc of their
own, the ex-cons.
In the last twelve months, at least nine states
have considered the matter, and Congress
held a hearing for the first time on a bill that
would override state laws and grant voting
privileges to felons on parole, probation, or
in halfway houses.
This is a tempting strategy for Democrats on
the lookout for new race-baiting
opportunities. Human Rights Watch
estimates that 13 percent of all black men
can't vote today because of current or prior
felony convictions, a rate that balloons to 20
percent in ten states. "In the next generation
of black men, we can expect as many as 40
percent of them to lose the vote for some or
all of their adult lives," says Marc Mauer of
the Sentencing Project. During a Martin
Luther King Day debate, Vice President
Gore was asked what he intended to do
about this. "I will review it," he promised
gravely.
Voting-rights issues have always been
racially charged, and southern blacks were
systematically prevented from voting until
the 1960s. That memory lingers, and
Democrats try to take advantage of it today,
even though black and white turnout rates
are nearly identical. When Gore speaks to
black audiences, for instance, he often
mentions that his father supported the 1965
Voting Rights Act (true) and lost his Senate
reelection bid because of it (false; his GOP
opponent also supported the bill).
Indeed, there's an urban myth among
African Americans that they won't be able
to vote starting in 2007, because that's the
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year a portion of the Voting Rights Act
comes up for reauthorization in Congress.
This fear is expressed so frequently on black
radio stations and in black newspapers that
the Department of Justice has posted
disclaimers on its webpage rebutting it. But
the concern won't go away, partly because
Demo crats won't let it. When Bill Bradley
repeatedly said during the primary debates
that he would press Congress to make the
Voting Rights Act permanent, he was
deliberately exploiting black paranoia.
Liberal civil-rights leaders have embraced
the ex-con crusade; they will grasp at
virtually any cause they can find to sustain
their movement in an increasingly non-racist
society. Their efforts diminish the
achievements of their predecessors, who, of
course, toiled to win poll access for law-
abiding citizens. They also approach self-
parody: "Felony voting restrictions are the
last vestige of voting prohibitions in the
United States. When the U.S. was founded,
only wealthy white men were allowed to
vote. Women, ethnic minorities, those who
were illiterate, and the poor were excluded,"
said the NAACP's Hilary Shelton in House
testimony last October. "Yet I have faith that
the morally correct path, blazed by the
inspiration of a more democratic union, shall
ultimately prevail, and that this imperfection
in our society too shall be corrected."
Advocates o f felon enfranchisement like to
suggest that the U.S. is unusually oppressive
when it comes to criminals and voting.
France, Germany, and other industrial
countries allow inmates to cast ballots. And
the g uilt-ridden Left, always in search of a
racial angle, loves to point out that South
Africa's highest court ruled last year that
inmates could vote in national elections.
They are somewhat less interested in
acknowledging that Yitzhak Rabin's
assassin has voted in Israel (a fact that
Rabin's widow has called "an
unprecedented scandal").
There's actually a good argument to be
made in favor of voting rights for felons
who have completed their sentences. "When
you pay your debt to society, the
government ought to get off your back,"
says Charles Sullivan of Citizens United for
the Rehabilitation of Errants. This logic
makes special sense in the case of
nonviolent offenders.
But even stronger arguments can be made
against the idea. For one thing, denying the
vote to felons is rooted in non-racist
historical e xperience. B ans on ita re as o Id
as the Constitution. Unlike a literacy test in
1965 Mississippi, this form of
disenfranchisement doesn't grow out of
malign intentions. Furthermore, it's
plausible that communities with a large
share of ex-felons receive better
representation when these people can't vote.
Texas state representative Harold Dutton, a
Democrat who plans to launch a voter-
registration drive targeting former criminals
in Dallas and Houston, makes this point,
albeit unwittingly: "40,000 ex-felons with
registration cards is more of a threat than
40,000 ex-felons with guns." In many
jurisdictions, sheriffs and judges are elected.
If Democrats were truly committed to
extending the franchise to people who have
served out their sentences, rather than using
the issue as an anti-GOP bludgeon, their bill
in Congress, introduced by John Conyers of
Michigan, could attract Republican co-
sponsors. It has none. Getting a few ought to
be easy; Charles Colson's Prison Fellowship
Ministries, one of the most effective
evangelical lobbying organizations on
Capitol Hill, supports its content. "We agree
with it, but we're concerned about the
partisan way it's been handled," says Pat
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Nolan of the Justice Fellowship, the public-
policy arm of Colson's outfit. "It looks like
their objective is partisan advantage rather
than changing the law."
Contrast this urgent crusade to give felons
the vote with the broad support for an
existing restriction on ex-cons. Convicted
felons-even nonviolent offenders-are forever
barred from possessing firearms. Under
federal law, they face a mandatory five-year
sentence if they're caught with one. That
means accountants who've spent six months
in the pokey can't go hunting. The National
Rifle Association thinks that's okay. At the
same time, liberals are stressing the moral
necessity of letting murderers and rapists
vote after their release from prison.
It's a topsy-turvy scenario, but an important
case study of politics today.
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Restoring Felons' Voting Rights A Heated Election-Year Issue In Florida
Chicatgo Tribune
July 28, 2004
Debbie Hardy admits she has made some
big mistakes. She got hooked on drugs, had
nine children out of wedlock and lost
custody of them, and she spent six months in
jail on a felony charge after getting into a
fight with her boyfriend.
Nine years ago, Hardy decided she had had
enough. She got off drugs and helped her
older sister, Catherine Garvin, do the same.
Now 40, Hardy is a manager at Burger King
and is caring for two of her oldest children.,
one of whom is heading to college next year
with the other going into the Navy.
In most states, she would have automatically
regained her civil rights after completing her
jail time and probation. But Florida requires
most former inmates to have a hearing
before the governor in order to gain
restoration of certain rights such as
registering to vote and acquiring an
occupational license,
"I am trying to do the right thing, but I have
had this felony hanging over my head for 12
years," Hardy said. "This time, I will gladly
accept my civil rights because I know what
it is like to be without them. I always wanted
to be a good citizen, but before, I didn't
know how."
Since the 2000 election, when Florida
became the battleground to determine the
next president, the state has been under
intense national scrutiny. Officials have
overhauled the election system including
replacing the controversial punch-card
ballots with electronic machines. They also
are re-examining laws that civil rights
groups claimed led to the
disenfranchisement of thousands of
minorities.
As the 2004 presidential election
approaches, voter disenfranchisement
remains a heated issue in Florida, where
Gov. Jeb Bush and other Republicans are
determined to re-elect Bush's brother, and
Democrats are eager to replace him with
John Kerry.
In a series of lawsuits, the NAACP, the
American Civil Liberties Union and other
groups charge that Florida continues to
operate an unfair and chaotic voting system,
particularly for an estimated 600,000 felons
in the state who have completed their
sentences but cannot vote.
In addition, some say, the state is plagued by
a flawed voter purge list. In 2000, an
undetermined number of legal voters were
turned away at the polls because their names
inexplicably appeared on a database of
felons. The state reportedly had worked to
reform the list, but two weeks ago, elections
officials were forced to throw it out after it
was disclosed that the list shielded virtually
all Hispanic felons from being purged.
In response to a lawsuit filed on behalf of
the Florida Conference of Black State
Legislators, a judge ruled last year that the
Florida Corrections Department had failed
to notify 125,000 former inmates who
completed their terms between 1992 and
2001 that they could seek to have their rights
restored.
Bush said that after the
review, 22,000 felons'
automatically restored. The
court-ordered
rights were
governor also
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said that the Office of Executive Clemency
had reduced its 38,000-application backlog
from a year ago to 8,000. And of those,
21,000 former prisoners' rights were
restored.
Florida is among seven states that ban felons
from voting. Convicts in prison or who arc
on probation are not granted certain civil
rights.
In an attempt to cut through the backlog, the
state in 2001 b egan automatically restoring
rights to people convicted of nonviolent
crimes and requiring others only to fill out a
form. Those convicted of crimes such as
murder or child molestation still must have a
hearing.
"Gov. Bush believes that rights should be
restored, and he has streamlined the
clemency process," said his spokesman,
Jacob DePietre.
Political experts said the former prisoners,
most of whom are black and presumed
likely to vote Democratic, could affect the
presidential election in Florida, where
George Bush defeated Democrat Al Gore by
537 votes in 2000.
According to Chris U ggen, a sociologist at
the University of Minnesota, the outcome of
the 2000 election would have been different
had the disenfranchised felons been allowed
to vote. In a 2002 study, he concluded that
had 600,000 disenfranchised felons voted,
Gore would have won Florida by 40,000 to
80,000 votes.
"The horrors that occurred in 2000 have not
been rectified by the state of Florida and
Go%. Bush. They are doing their best to keep
people who have served their prison
sentence from getting their civil rights
restored, and it disproportionately impacts
African-Amencans and minorities," said
Randall Berg, executive director of the
Florida Justice Institute in Miami, who filed
the lawsuit on behalf of the black state
legislators.
The problems, however, began long before
Bush became governor, said Courtenay
Strickland, director of the American Civil
Liberties Union's Voting Rights Project.
"Both parties are to blame for what we are
experiencing," said Strickland, who directs
monthly voter restoration workshops for
felons. "The rules of executive clemency
determine what will make the process harder
or easier. Gov. Bush could eliminate that
bureaucratic hurdle, and he refuses to do it."
Bush, who sits on the clemency board with
three of his Cabinet members, has said he
does not believe that the review system
should be scrapped but believes that the
restoration process should be easier.
Prior to 2001, disenfranchised felons who
had outstanding court fines or had
committed a wide range of crimes had to
have a hearing, DePietre, Bush's
spokesman, said. Now, outstanding fines
and multiple felonies are not issues in
determining whether a hearing will be
required.
On the second Saturday of the month,
dozens of people such as Debbie Hardy
come to a thrift shop in Miami run by
recovering addicts to take the initial step to
restore their rights. In a room upstairs, law-
student volunteers help them fill out forms
and put together a portfolio.
But even if they qualify to have their rights
restored, it could take years before they get
to vote. There is a backlog of 8,000
applications, and each year the governor
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holds four hearings, at which about 50 cases
are heard each time.
Florida law dictates that felons who have
completed their sentences are supposed to be
handed forms requesting the restoration of
their civil rights and be assisted in filling it
out before leaving prison.
Since 2001, the Corrections Department has
been electronically submitting a list of
pending releases to the clemency office.
Last week, an appellate court ruled that this
method was inadequate and ordered the
department to help people submit the forms.
"We developed a more streamlined process
to provide t he i nformation tot he clemency
office. Now it seems like we might be going
backward a little bit," said Corrections
Department spokesman Sterling Ivey. "The
court is asking us to assist inmates to fill out
a form. That is what we were doing prior to
the 2000 election."
Voter disenfranchisement is a touchy issue
for civil rights leaders, who compare it to
Jim Crow laws, literacy tests and poll taxes
that kept blacks from voting before the 1965
Voting Rights Act.
[n 2001, the NAACP filed a lawsuit that
forced Florida to better scrutinize names on
its felons database. But other states,
particularly in the South, have problems too.
Nationwide, more than 4 million Americans,
almost half of them black men, are unable to
vote because of laws that bar felons,
according to the Sentencing Project, a
criminal justice research and advocacy
group in Washington.
Except for Vermont and Maine, which allow
incarcerated people to vote, every state has
some voting restrictions for felons. Thirty-
three deny voting rights to felons on parole.
But only Florida, Mississippi, Alabama,
Iowa, Kentucky, Nebraska and Virginia do
not automatically restore rights to felons
who have completed their sentences. Illinois
allows felons on probation or parole to vote.
Some laws, including Florida's, date to
Reconstruction, and state rules for granting
clemency vary widely.
In Mississippi, felons must file a petition
before the Legislature, and lawmakers
decide whose rights are restored. Last year,
Alabama lawmakers passed a bill allowing
some felons to bypass the clemency hearing
and obtain a certificate to register to vote.
However, most still require a hearing.
"The highest office in the land should have
constitutional protections guaranteeing an
individual's right to vote," said activist Jesse
Jackson. "We have 50 separate and unequal
state elections, and all of them have different
voter disenfranchisement schemes.
"The civil rights days are not over. We still
have unequal voting systems, which begs for
a constitutional amendment to grant all
Americans equal protection under the law."
Changing Florida's law would require
amending the state constitution. The ACLU
and other groups are gathering petitions to
put an amendment on the ballot. A class-
action lawsuit filed by the Brennan Center
for Justice at New York University on
behalf of 600,000 released felons
challenging the constitutionality of Flonida's
law is pending in a federal appeals court.
Meanwhile, people such as Michael Davis,
28, have filed paperwork and are waiting.
"Hopefully, getting my c ivil rights restored
can help me as well as others," said Davis,
who served time for three felony drug
convictions. "I am a different person now,
and all I want is a chance. My past is my
past. It does not define who I am today."
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Freedom of Religion for Prison Inmates
Bass v. Madison
(03-1404)
Ruling Below: (Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003))
The 4th Circuit held that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act's (RLUIPA's)
goal of exempting prisoners' religious exercise from regulatory burdens in a neutral fashion, as
distinguished from advancing religion in any sense, was a permissible secular purpose under the
Establishment Clause. Section 3 of RLUIPA did not have the impermissible effect of advancing
religion since Congress had simply lifted government burdens on religious exercise and thereby
facilitated free exercise o f religion for those who wished to practice their faiths. Section 3 of
RLUIPA did not create excessive government entanglement with religion because while the
statute may have required some state action in lifting state-imposed burdens on religious
exercise, RLUIPA did not require pervasive monitoring by public authorities. Thus, § 3 of
RLUIPA did not create an Establishment Clause violation.
Questions Presented: RLUIPA contains provisions prescribing what religious accommodation
policies must be implemented in state prisons ("Prison Provisions").
1. Do the Prison Provisions of RLUIPA violate the Establishment Clause?
2. Does Congress have authority to enact the Prison Provisions of RLUIPA, using the Spending
Clause, the Commerce Clause, or any other grant of authority?
3. If the Prison Provisions are constitutional, does the existence of a detailed remedial scheme
and/or a special sovereignty interest preclude the application of Ex Parte Young, thereby
leaving sovereign immunity as a bar to the federal court injunction sought by the respondent?
Ira W. MADISON, Petitioner-Appellant
V.
R. RITER, et al., Respondent-Appellee
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Decided Dec. 8, 2003
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Ira W. Madison, a convict held in Corrections, alleging among other claims a
a Virginia Department of Corrections prison, violation of section 3 of the Religious Land
was denied his requests for kosher meals Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
that he claims his religious beliefs require. 2000 (RLUIPA). The district court ruled that
He sued the Commonwealth of Virginia and the provision had an impermissible effect of
officials of the Virginia Department of advancing religion under the second prong
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of the Lemon test. Because we find that
Congress can accommodate religion in
section 3 ofR LUIPA without violating t he
Establishment Clause, we reverse. To hold
otherwise and find an Establishnent Clause
violation would severely undermine the
ability of our society to accommodate the
most basic rights of conscience and belief in
neutral yet constructive ways.
I.A.
From 2000 to the present, Madison has
claimed to be a member of the Church of
God and Saints of Christ, a congregation
founded in 1896 and headquartered at
Temple Beth El in Suffolk, Virginia. Church
members are commonly known as Hebrew
Israelites, and they claim to be "followers of
the anointed God" who honor but do not
worship Jesus Christ. Most importantly for
purposes of this case, Madison's church
requires its members to abide by the dietary
laws laid out in the Hebrew Scriptures.
The parties dispute the timing of Madison's
conversion and his affiliation with a wide
range of other religious groups during his
incarceration. What is clear is that in July
2000 and March 2001, Madison informed
correctional officials that his religious
beliefs required him to receive a kosher diet,
defined as a "common fare diet" by the
Virginia Department of Corrections. Both
requests were approved by local prison
officials, but denied by Department of
Corrections administrators in Richmond.
The Commonwealth rejected Madison's
requests because it determined that Madison
already had adequate alternatives from the
regular, vegetarian, and no pork daily
menus; because it doubted t he s incerity of
Madison's religious beliefs; and because it
considered Madison's history of disciplinary
problems.
In August 2001, Madison challenged the
denial of his request in district court, relying
in part on section 3 of RLUIPA. Section 3(a)
of RLUIPA states that "no government
shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or
confined to an institution ... even if the
burden results from a rule of general
applicability, unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden
on that person - (1) is in furtherance of a
compelling government interest; and (2) is
the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling government interest." Section
3(b) of RLUIPA states that Section 3(a)
applies whenever the substantial burden at
issue "is imposed in a program or activity
that receives Federal financial assistance."
In 2 002 t he C ommonwealth Department of
Corrections received $4.72 million -
approximately 0.5% of its budget - from
the federal government, thus triggering the
statute's applicability. Madison's lawsuit
relied on section 4(a) of RLUIPA, which
creates a private right of action that allows
any person to "assert a violation of this
chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial
proceeding" and to "obtain appropriate relief
against a government."
On January 23, 2003, the district court found
that section 3 of RLUIPA impermissibly
advanced religion by offering greater
legislative protection to the religious rights
of prisoners than to other fundamental rights
that were similarly burdened. The district
court therefore rejected Madison's statutory
claim, and simultaneously certified the
question of RLUIPA's constitutionality for
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b). Madison and the United States
filed timely petitions with this court to
appeal the order, and their petitions were
granted.
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I.B.
The legislative and judicial background that
led to RLUIPA's enactment are important
for considering Madison's appeal. Congress
crafted RLUIPA to conform to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Employment Division v.
Smith, and City of Boerne v. Flores. In
Smith, the Court held that laws of general
applicability that incidentally burden
religious conduct do not offend the First
Amendment. The neutrality principle in
Smith largely complemented the traditional
deference that courts afford to prison
regulations that impose burdens on
prisoners' rights. At the same time,
however, the Smith Court openly invited the
political branches to provide greater
protection to religious exercise through
legislative action.
In 1993, Congress responded to Smith by
enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act ("RFRA"), which Congress claimed was
premised on its remedial powers under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
RFRA prohibited federal and state
governments from "substantially burdening"
a person's exercise of religion, even as the
result of a law of general applicability,
unless the government could demonstrate
that the burden "(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is
the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest."
The Supreme Court's decision in City of
Boerne v. Flores, invalidated RFRA as it
applied to states and localities. The Court
held that the scope of the statute exceeded
Congress's remedial powers under section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
While RFRA continued to apply to the
federal government, in September 2000,
Congress attempted to reinstate RFRA's
protection against government burdens on
religious exercise imposed by states and
localities by enacting the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("
RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. This
statute mirrored the provisions of RFRA, but
its scope was limited to laws and regulations
concerning land use and institutionalized
persons. RLUIPA's enactment was premised
on congressional findings similar to those
made for RFRA, namely, that in the absence
of federal legislation, prisoners, detainees,
and institutionalized mental health patients
faced substantial burdens in practicing their
religious faiths.
In passing RLUIPA, Congress sought to
avoid Boerne's constitutional barrier by
relying on its Spending and Commerce
Clause powers, rather than on its remedial
powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as it had in RFRA....
II.
Among its numerous constitutional
challenges to RLUIPA, the Commonwealth
contends that the statute violates the
Establishment Clause. The district court held
that section 3 of RLUIPA violates the
Establishment Clause because it singled out
the religious exercise rights of prisoners for
special protection. The district court
explained:
Prison inmates exist in a society of
universally limited rights, one that is
required by the nature of the
institution. When Congress acts to
lift the limitations on one right while
ignoring all others, it abandons a
position of neutrality towards these
rights, placing its power behind one
system of belief.
The district court stated that " the practical
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effect of RLUIPA on the prison system in
the United States is to grant religious and
professed religious inmates a multitude of
exceptions and benefits not available to non-
believers." It concluded that "RLUIPA
extends far beyond regulations targeting
religion, protecting religious inmates against
even generally applicable and facially
neutral prison regulations that have a
substantial effect on a multitude of
fundamental rights."
Because Congress had failed to compile
"demonstrable evidence that religious
constitutional rights are at any greater risk of
deprivation in t he prison sy stem than o ther
fundamental rights," the district court found
that protecting the religious exercise of
prisoners violated the Establishment Clause.
It concluded that this provision sends "non-
religious inmates a message that they are
outsiders of a privileged community," and it
unconstitutionally advanced religion by
providing an inmate with incentives to
"claim religious rebirth and cloak himself in
the protections of RLUIPA."
The district court's decision is at odds with
two other circuits that have examined this
question and found that section 3 of
RLUIPA does not violate the Establishment
Clause. Courts have also rejected similar
Establishment Clause challenges to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, whose
religious accommodation provisions are
identical to section 3 of RLUIPA. [The Sixth
Circuit], however, has relied extensively
upon the district court's decision in this case
to hold that section 3 of RLUIPA does
violate the Establishment Clause. It is this
conclusion that we must address with care.
This court must review de novo the
constitutionality of a federal law. The basic
framework for Establishment Clause
challenges is well-settled: "first the
[targeted] statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the
statute must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion."
We address each ... prong in turn.
II.A.
We first consider whether section 3 of
RLUIPA has a legitimate secular purpose.
We are guided here by the Supreme Court's
decision in Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop v. Amos, which established that
Congress may accommodate the exercise of
faith by lifting government-imposed burdens
on free exercise. The Amos Court stated that
the Establishment Clause seeks to prevent
government decisionmakers "from
abandoning neutrality and acting with the
intent of promoting a particular point of
view in religious matters." But in
commanding neutrality, the Establishment
Clause does not require the government to
be oblivious to the burdens that state action
may impose upon religious practice and
belief. Rather, there is "ample room under
the Establishment Clause for 'benevolent
neutrality which will permit religious
exercise to exist without sponsorship and
without interference."' The Supreme Court
therefore held in Amos that "it is a
permissible legislative purpose to alleviate
significant governmental interference with
the ability of religious organizations to
define and carry out their religious
missions."
This alleviation of government burdens on
prisoners' religious exercise is precisely the
legitimate secular purpose that RLUIPA
seeks to a dvance. R LUIPA isn ot designed
to advance a particular religious viewpoint
or even religion in general, but rather to
facilitate opportunities for inmates to engage
in the free exercise of religion. This secular
goal of exempting religious exercise from
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regulatory burdens in a neutral fashion, as
distinguished from advancing religion in any
sense, is indeed permissible under the
Establishment Clause.
To be sure, Congress has no constitutional
duty to remove or to mitigate the
government-imposed burdens on prisoners'
religious exercise. But the Supreme Court
has held that Congress may choose to reduce
government-imposed burdens on specific
fundamental rights when it deems it
appropriate. The Supreme Court "has upheld
a broad range of statutory religious
accommodations against Establishment-
Clause challenges." These include statutes
that allow public school students time off
during the day solely for religious worship
or instruction, property tax exemptions for
religious properties used solely for religious
worship, and exemptions for religious
organizations from statutory prohibitions
against discrimination on the basis of
religion. While RLUIPA's scope may in
some ways be broader than the specific
religious exceptions that the Supreme Court
has p reviously upheld, t he c entral principle
- that Congress may legitimately minimize
government burdens on religious exercise -
remains the same. C ongress here h as a cted
properly in embracing this secular purpose.
II.B.
We next consider whether section 3 of
RLUIPA has the impermissible effect of
advancing religion. The district court found
that RLUIPA impermissibly advanced
religion by according special protection only
to prisoners' religious exercise.
We disagree. "For a law to have forbidden
'effects' under Lemon, it must be fair to say
that the government itself has advanced
religion through its own activities and
influence." Evidence of the impermissible
government advancement of religion
includes "sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity." Here, however, Congress
has not sponsored religion or become
actively involved in religious activity, and
RLUIPA in no way is attempting to
indoctrinate prisoners in any particular
belief or to advance religion in general in the
prisons. Congress has simply lifted
government burdens on religious exercise
and thereby facilitated free exercise of
religion for those who wish to practice their
faiths.
We cannot accept the theory advanced by
the district court that Congress
impermissibly advances religion when it
acts to lift burdens on religious exercise yet
fails to consider whether other rights are
similarly threatened. There is no
requirement that legislative protections for
fundamental rights march in lockstep. The
mere fact that RLUIPA seeks to lift
government burdens on a prisoner's
religious exercise does not mean that the
statute must provide commensurate
protections for other fundamental rights....
Indeed, the context in which Congress was
acting made it s ensible for Congress to lift
only state-imposed burdens on free exercise
through RLUIPA. It was reasonable for
Congress to seek to reduce the burdens on
religious exercise for prisoners without
simultaneously enhancing, say, an inmate's
First Amendment rights to access
pornography. Free exercise and other First
Amendment rights may be equally burdened
by prison regulations, but the Constitution
itself provides religious exercise with
special safeguards. And no provision of the
Constitution even suggests that Congress
cannot single out fundamental rights for
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additional protection. To attempt to read a
requirement of symmetry of protection for
fundamental liberties would not only
conflict with all binding precedent, but it
would also place prison administrators and
other public officials in the untenable
position of calibrating burdens and remedies
with the specter of judicial second-guessing
at every turn.
Apart from advancing religion, the district
court further found that RLUIPA may create
incentives for secular prisoners to cloak
secular requests in religious garb and thus
may increase t he burden ons tate and l ocal
officials in processing RLUIPA claims.
This may be true, but it is simply not a
concern under the Establishment Clause.
Any additional burdens that RLUIPA may
impose on states and localities speak more
to the wisdom of the law and to the
disincentives for states to assume their
RLUIPA obligations than to RLUIPA's
validity under the Establishment Clause. We
therefore conclude that section 3 of RLUIPA
has the effect of lifting burdens on
prisoners' religious exercise, but does not
impermissibly advance religion.
II.C.
We further conclude that section 3 of
RLUIPA does not create excessive
government entanglement with religion in
violation of the third prong of the Lemon
test. While the statute may require some
state action in lifting state-imposed burdens
on religious exercise, RLUIPA does not
require "pervasive monitoring" by public
authorities. RLUIPA itself minimizes the
likelihood of entanglement through its
carefully crafted enforcement provisions.
For example, the statute's broad definition
of "religious exercise" to "include any
exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief," 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
5(7)(A), mitigates any dangers that
entanglement may result from administrative
review of good-faith religious belief.
II.D.
Section 3 of RLUIPA thus satisfies the three
prongs of the Lemon test. The opposite
conclusion, we believe, would work a
profound change in the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and in
the ability of Congress to facilitate the free
exercise of religion in this country. It would
throw into question a wide variety of
religious accommodation laws. It could
upset exemptions from compulsory military
service for ordained ministers and divinity
students under federal law, since these
exemptions are not paired with parallel
secular allowances or provisions to protect
other fundamental rights threatened by
compulsory military service. It would
similarly imperil Virginia's and other states'
recognition of a "clergy-penitent privilege,"
which exempts from discovery an
individual's statements to clergy when
"seeking spiritual counsel and advice."
Other specific religious accommodation
statutes, ranging from tax exemptions to
exemptions from compulsory public school
attendance, would also be threatened.
Perhaps more importantly, the principle of
neutrality advanced by the district court
would create a test that Congress could
rarely, if ever, meet in attempting to lift
regulatory burdens on religious entities or
individuals. For example, if Congress sought
to grant religious organizations an
exemption from a particularly demanding
legal requirement, then Congress might have
to grant similar exemptions to radio and TV
stations or secular advocacy groups, absent
congressional findings that free exercise
rights were somehow more endangered by
the law than other rights. Congress would
have to make determinations in every
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instance of what fundamental rights are at
risk and to what degree they are at risk, and
it would be able only to heighten protection
for fundamental rights in a symmetric
fashion according to these assessments. The
byzantine complexities that such compliance
would entail would likely cripple
government at all levels from providing any
fundamental rights with protection above the
Constitution's minimum requirements.
III.A.
The Commonwealth recognized at argument
the problematic nature of the trial court's
rationale, but pressed several alternative
points in support of affirmance which we
feel obliged to address. It first contends that
RLUIPA's mandate for the religious
accommodation of prisoners violates the
Establishment Clause because it subjects
third parties to substantial burdens....
It is true that section 3 of RLUIPA also
seeks to have third parties - states
accepting federal correctional funds -
accommodate religious needs.... Here the
Commonwealth has voluntarily committed
itself to lifting government-imposed burdens
on the religious exercise of publicly
institutionalized persons in exchange for
federal correctional funds....
III.B.
The Commonwealth also protests that
RLUIPA's compelling interest test will bind
its hands and make it nearly impossible for
the Commonwealth to prevail if prisoners
challenge burdens on their religious
exercise. The district court echoed this
concern by proclaiming that "the change that
RLUIPA imposes is revolutionary,
switching from a scheme of deference to
prison administrators to one of presumptive
unconstitutionality."
We do not make light of this concern.
RLUIPA may impose burdens on prison
administrators as they act to accommodate
an inmates' right to free exercise. But
RLUIPA still affords prison administrators
with flexibility to regulate prisoners'
religious practices if the Commonwealth
"demonstrates that imposition of the burden
on that person - (1) is in furtherance of a
compelling government interest; and (2) is
the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling government interest."
Moreover, the experience of federal
correctional officials in complying with
RLUIPA's predecessor statute, RFRA,
suggests that the similar provisions of
RLUIPA would not impose an unreasonable
burden on state or local prisons....
IV.
Our society has a long history of
accommodation with respect to matters of
belief and conscience. If Americans may
not set their beliefs above the law, there
must be room to accommodate belief and
faith within the law. Regardless of the nature
of their beliefs, people must pay taxes and
observe other secular laws of general
applicability. However, legislative bodies
have every right to accommodate free
exercise, so long as government does not
privilege any faith, belief, or religious
viewpoint in particular. Section 3 of
RLUIPA fits comfortably within this broad
tradition.
The judgment is therefore reversed, and the
case is remanded to the district court for
further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
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Zoning Gets Religion: Land-Use, Prisoner Cases Likely to Revive Dispute Between
Congress and High Court
ABA Journal
March 2004
David L. Hudson Jr.
Federal appeals courts have split on the
[constitutionality of the R eglious L and Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act], with the
4th, 7th and 9th U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals upholding the law. Madison v.
Riter, Nos. 03-6362, 6363; Charles v.
Verhogen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003); and
Mayweather v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062
(9th Cir. 2002). In Riter the 4th Circuit ruled
in December that "RLUIPA has the effect of
lifting burdens on prisoners' religious
exercise, but does not impermissibly
advance religion."
However, the 6th Circuit held in Cutter v.
Wilkinson, that the act violated the
establishment clause because it had "the
primary effect of advancing religion."
The circuit split leads many to believe that
the Supreme Court will hear a prisoner case
before a land-use case. The issues tend to be
narrower and federal courts are more
accustomed to prisoner-rights claims, says
Hamilton. By contrast, she says, "The land-
use cases involve the entire zoning process,
including decisions by the zoning board."
However, Weinstein says that the high court
would be more interested in a land-use case
because "over the last decade the court has
undertaken a real reconsideration of the
federalism issue."
Either way, the high court is more than
likely to take on Congress once again in a
back-and-forth dispute dating to the court's
controversial 1990 decision in Employment
Division v. Smith. The court rejected two
drug counselors who claimed their First
Amendment free exercise rights were
violated when they were denied
unemployment compensation after they
were fired from their jobs for drug usage.
The two argued that they ingested peyote for
religious reasons. The court held that
generally applicable laws that do not target
but only incidentally affect religious
practices are constitutional so long as they
are reasonable.
That latter requirement significantly lowered
the burden of proof for local governments,
which previously were held to strict
scrutiny, meaning municipalities had to
show a compelling interest in the regulation,
and show that it was implemented in the
least restrictive way possible.
Smith created a furor in the religious liberty
community, prompting Congress to pass the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993.
RFRA required state and federal
government officials to show that their
regulations met the earlier compelling-
interest test.
Congress justified RFRA under the 14th
Amendment's section 5, the enforcement
clause, empowering Congress to uphold the
amendment via appropriate legislation.
However, in a 1997 church land-use case,
City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court
ruled 6-3 that RFRA was unconstitutional as
applied to the states. The court said
Congress exceeded its power under the 14th
Amendment in passing RFRA and extending
it to the states. Hamilton, who argued for the
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municipality in the case, says the court
agreed that the reach of RFRA was
"breathtaking."
In turn, Congress responded to Boerne with
RLUIPA, a more narrowly crafted piece of
legislation applying only to land-use and
prisoner rights cases.
Like its predecessor, RLUIPA received
strong, bipartisan support in Congress.
Unlike the failed RFRA, however, Congress
based its authority for RLUIPA on the
spending and commerce clauses of the
Constitution, as well as the 14th
Amendment. Thus, the new law applies in
cases involving receipt of federal funds,
interstate commerce or situations when the
government makes individualized
assessments for zoning permits.
What the high court will do when it debates
RLUIPA is anyone's guess.
"It's hard to predict how the Supreme Court
will judge RLUIPA," Picarello says. "[It]
was designed to comply with Boerne, not to
flout it. But the court in Boerne moved the
goal posts under the enforcement clause" of
the 14th Amendment. "They could move the
goal posts again."
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Lawsuit May Force Change in Prison Ban on Beards
The Los Angeles Times
October 7, 2002
Richard Fausset
Ray Morrison believes that shaving his
beard would betray the tenets of his
Orthodox Jewish faith. At the state prison in
Lancaster, where Morrison is serving a 10-
year sentence for assault with a
semiautomatic weapon, he is paying a price
for that belief.
The state Department of Corrections does
not allow prisoners to grow facial hair, and
Morrison, 38, has been punished nine times
for refusing to shave. Since his incarceration
in 1997, he has lost phone and visitation
privileges, been placed in solitary
confinement and sacrificed "good-time"
credits that would have reduced his
sentence.
"I've said to Raymond, 'Please, please shave
the beard,' " said his mother, Donna
Goldstein-Kekstadt. Yet her son has refused,
she said, saying that he is committed to
abide by the rules of the faith he adopted in
prison.
California c orrections o fficials i mposed t he
ban on long hair or facial hair on male
prisoners in 1997, the year an inmate shaved
his beard and walked out, unrecognized,
from a San Diego County prison. But in the
coming weeks, a federal lawsuit filed by
Muslim prisoners in Solano may force the
state to allow inmates to grow beards, if it's
part of their religious custom.
Security Issue
The prospect frightens prison guards, who
say the ability to tell who's who can be a
matter of life and death in a maximum-
security lockup. But inmate advocates say
the change would restore one of the many
prisoner privileges lost since the tough-on-
crime 1990s, when California corrections
officials tightened rules on visitation,
exercise, clothing and hairstyles.
"This would be an important step toward
recognizing that people in prison do retain
certain constitutional rights," said attorney
Steve Fama of the nonprofit Prison Law
Office in San Rafael.
The challenge to the beard ban, which is
under review by the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals, contends that it violates prisoners'
1st Amendment right to exercise their
religion. But because prison officials say
long beards can hide weapons and drugs, the
lawsuit calls for facial hair only a half-inch
long or less, said Susan Christian, the
attorney for the inmates.
Preliminary Injunction
The 300 Muslims at Solano state prison
have been allowed to wear beards since
February, when U.S. District Court Judge
Lawrence K. Karlton granted a preliminary
injunction. California has appealed the lower
court's decision. If the appeal is
unsuccessful and the state does not take the
case to the U.S. Supreme Court, the beard
ban would have to be altered for all
California prisons, the state attorney
general's office said.
That would not sit well with the California
Department of Corrections. Spokesman
Russ Heimerich said that even short beards
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allow inmates to radically alter their
appearances, increasing their chances of
escape.
"This is more than just a religious freedom
issue," Heimerich said. "It's a safety and
security issue, pure and simple."
State officials are not worried about
whiskers alone. They are also challenging
the constitutionality of the federal law that
Karlton relied on when he issued the Solano
injunction.
That law, the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, creates a more
stringent legal test for prison regulations that
inhibit religious practices. Before its passage
in 2000, prison officials had to prove that
such regulations served a legitimate purpose.
Now, they must prove that the rules are the
"least restrictive" way to achieve security
goals.
The California attorney general's office
argues that Congress overstepped its
constitutional powers in passing the law.
State attorneys have also argued that the law
violates the 1st Amendment because it gives
religious prisoners more rights than their
non-religious counterparts.
In California, Deputy Atty. Gen. Tami
Warwick said the law could eventually be
used to alter many other prison regulations,
costing untold millions and putting
prisoners' rights ahead of prison safety.
The state is facing a number of other
lawsuits whose outcomes may hinge on the
appeals court's decision, she said.
Among them is a challenge to the long-hair
ban, which has been criticized by Native
Americans and Sikhs. Many Native
Americans cut their hair only when in
mourning, and Sikhs do not cut any body
hair.
But Warwick is also worried that the new
law could be invoked to protect the most
unorthodox and personal concepts of
"religious" observance, forcing wardens and
guards to sort out esoteric theological issues
that even scholars disagree on.
Indeed, the idea that men must wear beards
is not shared by all Muslims, nor is it shared
by all Jews. While the Muslims at Solano
believe the half-inch beard is an acceptable
compromise, Morrison refuses to cut his
beard at all, Goldstein-Kekstadt said.
Although less-Orthodox Jews might
compromise, experts acknowledge that some
traditions justify Morrison's position. But
the interpretation o f s ome extremist groups
of what constitutes "religion" is proving
more troublesome.
In Ohio, for example, some imprisoned
white power groups say they are
practitioners of Asatru, the pre-Christian
religion of the Vikings, according to Todd
Marti, an assistant solicitor in the Ohio
attorney general's office. As symbols of
their faith, they often wear chains with
symbols of the god Thor.
Conveniently, the chains also signify gang
rank, Marti said.
Ohio, along with six other states, Puerto
Rico and the Virgin Islands, mentioned
these concerns in a friend-of-court brief filed
earlier this year in support of California's
appeal.
"Under the old law, we had a rational basis
for stopping these things," Marti said. "Now
we have to show that we have the least-
restrictive regulation."
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Regulations Vary
Grooming regulations at state prison
systems vary: Ohio prisoners, for example,
are allowed to wear half-inch beards. In
federal prisons, facial hair has been allowed
since the 1970s. When federal inmates
change their appearances, prison guards
simply take new security photos of them.
Aaron Levinson, director of the Anti-
Defamation League's San Fernando Valley
office, h as asked C alifornia prison officials
to switch to a similar system so inmates such
as Morrison can grow beards.
The department has rejected the idea.
Heimerich has said it would be too
expensive and complicated.
Still, Levinson and Goldstein-Kekstadt say
they are amazed that prisoners rounded up
during the war in Afghanistan have more
latitude than Morrison, a U.S. citizen.
Although some of the 600 detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were initially
forced to shave their beards, they have since
been allowed to grow them out, according to
Lt. Cmdr. Barbara Burfeind, a U.S. Navy
spokeswoman.
"We're bending over backward for the Al
Qaeda prisoners," Levinson said. "In
California, our own citizens are being
treated worse."
Goldstein-Kekstadt is trying to have her son
transferred to her home state of Illinois,
where state prisoners can grow long beards,
but are limited to non-contact visits and
subjected to more intense searches.
Thus far, she has been unsuccessful.
While Morrison has been punished at
Lancaster for refusing tos have, heh as n ot
been forced to remove his beard. In addition
to those citations, he has been cited for
violations, including fighting and possession
of alcohol.
"He's not a model inmate," Lt. Ron Nipper
said. "He's got his beard. He can work that
out with the courts."
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Joint statement of Senator Hatch and Senator Kennedy on the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
The Congressional Record - Senate
July 13, 2000
S6687-S6689
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to
introduce a narrowly focused bill that
protects religious liberty from unnecessary
governmental interference....
Seven years ago, recognizing the need to
strengthen the fundamental right of religious
liberty, Congress overwhelmingly passed
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA). Unfortunately, in 1997, in the case
of City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme
Court held that Congress lacked the
authority to enact RFRA as applied to state
and local governments. In an attempt to
respond to the Boerne decision, I introduced
S. 2081 earlier this year. Legislation similar
to S. 2081 passed the House of
Representatives. Yet, concerns were raised
by some regarding the scope of S. 2081, and
I undertook an effort to seek out a consensus
approach. The legislation I am introducing
today, which maintains certain provisions of
S. 2081, is a tailored version which
represents the product of our efforts.
The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
provides limited federal remedies for
violations of religious liberty in: (1) the land
use regulation of churches and synagogues;
and (2) prisons and mental hospitals.
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS
Our bill ... provides that substantial burdens
on the religious exercise of institutionalized
persons must be justified by a compelling
interest. Congressional witnesses have
testified that institutionalized persons have
been prevented from practicing their faith.
For example, some Jewish prisoners have
been denied matzo, the unleavened bread
Jews are required to consume during
Passover, even though Jewish organizations
have offered toprovide it to inmates at no
cost to the government. While this
legislation seeks to improve the ability of
institutionalized persons to practice their
religion, it remains under the complete
application of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995.
Both sections are based firmly on
constitutional principles that grant Congress
its authority. Thus, today's legislation
should withstand the scrutiny that has
thwarted our efforts in the past.
As we begin in this effort, it is worth
pondering just why America is, worldwide,
the most successful multi-faith country in all
recorded history. The answer is to be found,
I submit, in both components of the phase
"religious liberty." Surely, it is because of
our Constitution's zealous protection of
liberty that so many religions have
flourished and so many faiths have
worshiped on our soil.
While this bill provides much needed
preservation of our religious liberty, I
personally would have preferred a broader
approach. I recognize, however, in this
shortened legislative year, the long list of
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items before the congressional leadership
that require their attention. In order to ensure
enactment of a measure this year, I think all
advocates of a broader approach took a
prudent step in embracing a more targeted,
consensus bill.
Mr. KENNEDY. Religious freedom is a
bedrock principle in our nation. The bill we
are introducing today reflects our
commitment to protect religious freedom
and our belief that Congress still has the
power to enact legislation to enhance that
freedom, even after the Supreme Court's
decision in 1997 to strike down the broader
Religious Freedom Restoration Act that 97
Senators joined in passing in 1993.
In striking down the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act on constitutional grounds,
the Court clearly made the task of passing
effective legislation to protect religious
liberties more difficult. But too often in our
society today, thoughtless and insensitive
actions by governments at every level
interferes with individual religious
freedoms, even though no valid public
purpose is served by the governmental
action.
Our goal in proposing this legislation is to
reach a reasonable and constitutionally
sound balance between respecting the
compelling interests of government and
protecting the ability of people freely to
exercise their religion. We believe that the
legislation being introduced today
accomplishes this goal in two areas where
infringement of this right has frequently
occurred-- the application of land use laws,
and treatment of persons who are
institutionalized. In both of these areas, our
bill will protect the Constitutional right to
worship, free from unnecessary government
interference.
After numerous Congressional hearings on
religious liberties, the evidence is clear that
... institutionalized persons are often
unreasonably denied the opportunity to
practice their religion, even when their
observance would not undermine discipline,
order, or safety in the facilities.
Relying upon the findings from
Congressional hearings, we have developed
a bill-based upon well-established
constitutional authority-that will protect
the free exercise of religion in these two
important areas....
The broad support that this bill enjoys
among religious groups and the civil rights
community is the result of many months of
difficult, but important negotiations. We
carefully considered ways to strengthen
religious liberties in other ways in the wake
of the Supreme Court's decision. We were
mindful of not undermining existing laws
intended to protect other important civil
rights and civil liberties. It would have been
counterproductive if this effort to protect
religious liberties led to confrontation and
conflict between the civil rights community
and the religious community, or to a further
court decision striking down the new law.
We believe that our bill succeeds in
avoiding these difficulties by addressing the
most obvious threats to religious liberty and
by leaving open the question of what future
Congressional action, if any, will be needed
to protect religious freedom in America.
The institutionalized persons section applies
the strict scrutiny standard to cases in which
the free exercise rights of such persons are
substantially burdened. This provision is
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based upon Congress's constitutional
authority under the Spending and Commerce
powers.
Applying a strict scrutiny standard to prison
regulations would not lead, as some have
suggested, to a flood of frivolous lawsuits by
prisoners, and it will not undermine safety,
order, or discipline in correctional facilities.
Arguments opposing this provision have
been made in the past, but they were based
on speculation. Now, the arguments can be
proven demonstrably false by the facts.
Since the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act was enacted in 1993, strict scrutiny has
been the applicable standard in religious
liberties case brought by inmates in federal
prisons. Yet, according to the Department of
Justice, among the 96 federally run facilities,
housing over 140,000 inmates, less than 75
cases have ever been brought under the
Act-most of which have never gone to
trial. On average, over seven years, that's
less than 1 case in each federal facility. It's
hardly a flood of litigation or a reason to
deny this protection to prisoners.
Following the enactment of the 1993 Act,
Congress also passed the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, which includes a number of
procedural rules to limit frivolous prisoner
litigation. Those procedural rules will apply
in cases brought under the bill we are
introducing today. Based upon these
protections and the data on prison litigation,
it is clear that this provision in our bill will
not 1 ead to a flood o f frivolous 1 awsuits or
threaten the safety, order, or discipline in
correctional facilities. Sincere faith and
worship can be an indispensable part of
rehabilitation, and these protections should
be an important part of that process.
In sum, our bill is an important step forward
in protecting religious liberty in America. It
reflects the Senate's long tradition of
bipartisan support for the Constitution and
the nation's fundamental freedoms, and I
urge the Senate to approve it....
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Developments of the Law, the Law of Prisons:
IV: In the Belly of the Whale: Religious Practice in Prison
115 Hlarv. L. Rev. 1891
May 2002
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
B. Correctional Approaches to Religious
Accommodation
[Based on interviews with c]haplains and
religious program administrators ... between
November 2001 and February 2002[,
c]orrectional systems appear to take three
general approaches in determining whether
to accommodate or to deny a religious
practice. The first approach may be termed
"neutral-restrictive": maintaining neutrality
toward the inmate population by restricting
certain religious practices. Some requests for
accommodation, for example, are frivolous
and manipulative; others, even if sincere, are
not "religious" (however that word is to be
defined). Still others pose such threats to
security that they cannot be granted even in
a modified form. Finally, some requests
would impose significant administrative
burdens for which the institution is
unwilling to provide a costly or resource-
intensive accommodation. An example of
the neutral-restrictive approach is the policy,
employed in approximately one-third of the
jurisdictions surveyed, of refusing any
exemptions from a standardized grooming
protocol. By maintaining consistency and
minimizing costs, a neutral-restrictive policy
has clear administrative advantages - but it
is also the most likely to face, and lose, legal
challenges.
The second approach may be termed
"neutral-accommodating": policies
providing general religious accommodation
to religious adherents, but making such
accommodation available to any inmate.
Examples include a dining policy that
provides a vegetarian or no-pork diet to any
inmate upon request, or a policy permitting
an inmate to attend any religious service. A
neutral-accommodating policy is best suited
for accommodations that are not
substantially more costly for the institution
to provide or that can as easily be granted to
the overall population as to some discrete
subset of qualifying inmates. When taking a
neutral-accommodating approach, prison
administrators must still determine whether
an accommodation sought is "religious" and
evaluate the potential impact on security and
administration. However, to engage in the
generally permitted practice, inmates need
not demonstrate any particular commitment
or membership in a specific group.
Finally, a correctional system may take a
"targeted accommodations" approach:
following an exemption-based policy. Under
this approach, individual inmates may be
granted special diets or the opportunity to
possess particular religious items, but the
accommodation is not made available to the
entire population. Targeted accommodations
are awarded generally when correctional
administrators are faced with a legal duty to
provide a particular accommodation but are
reluctant, for administrative reasons, to
extend that privilege to the general
population. However, inmates with
"individualized" beliefs - beliefs that do
not fall under easily verifiable doctrines of
major religions - are unlikely to be
accommodated at all. Targeted
accommodations, in addition to the inquiry
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required under a neutral-accommodating
policy (whether the request is "religious"
and "sincere," and what the security and
administrative implications are), require the
prison to engage in an individually tailored
analysis involving either or both of the
following questions: Is the inmate a valid
member o ft he religious group? And is the
practice a "basic," "essential," or
"fundamental" tenet of the religion? The
first of these questions, however, is an
"unlawful e ntanglement" with r eligion, a nd
RLUIPA explicitly invalidates the second.
The targeted approach, while still common,
may therefore run afoul of both statutory
and judicial imperatives.
Outside prison, where people can eat what
they choose and groom as they like, there is
no "neutral-restrictive" or "neutral-
accommodating" - there is only "neutral."
Given a n eutral I aw, the state decides only
whether or not to grant a targeted exemption
from a generally applicable rule. The theory
of a religious accommodation or exemption
is, in a sense, to bring a religious believer to
the same level of well-being as anyone else
- to "make whole" someone whose ability
to live according to his beliefs is
compromised, and who is thereby "injured,"
by a rule of general law....
C. Religious Accommodations in Practice
1. Classification. States vary widely in the
methods they use to categorize faith groups
of inmates, ranging from a neutral-
accommodating approach that lists any
religion indicated by an inmate, to a targeted
approach that permits classification only of
"recognized" religions upon an inmate's
individualized showing of valid membership
or commitment, to a neutral-restrictive
approach that groups all religious
preferences into a small number o f general
categories. Of the states surveyed, Texas
lists by far the largest number of faith
groups, with 144 distinct religious
classifications. The average number of
religious groupslistedby state correctional
departments is approximately twenty. States
also vary in the methods they use to track
inmate religious preferences. While a large
majority of states track such preferences
using information provided at intake and
through any subsequent changes of
affiliation, a few state systems track inmate
religious numbers solely on the basis of
attendance at religious services, and others,
particularly smaller systems, simply do not
track these data at all.
Some methods of classification, by
consolidating religious groups or otherwise
limiting religious choices, may restrict an
inmate's free exercise of religion. The Texas
and Arizona approach of recording religious
preferences exactly as indicated by inmates
avoids this sort of classificatory imposition.
Correctional systems have a clear interest in
a simplified process and a legitimate fear
that a proliferation of religious affiliations
will engender a proliferation of
accommodation requests. Combining
permissive classification policies with
neutral-accommodating guidelines on
religious practices and time-and-space usage
may alleviate that fear.
Policies governing when and how an inmate
may change religious affiliation vary from
state to state. All such policies are neutral, in
that there is no explicit preference for
transferring into or out of a particular
religion. In some states, inmates may switch
their religious affiliation as often as they
like, with no verification process. These
permissive policies, however, may prompt
inmates to manipulate the system, changing
religious affiliation simply to obtain special
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privileges. In other states, although inmates
may change affiliated religions at will, they
must provide some documentation from an
authorized religious leader substantiating
their commitment to their new faith to
obtain the privileges of the new religious
group. Approximately one-quarter of the
states surveyed restrict the frequency with
which inmates may switch designated
religious affiliations. Frequency limitations
range from bimonthly to annually.
States often accommodate religions at
different levels. Institutional interests -
security considerations, as well as time,
space, and staffing limitations - may mean
that some groups are not recognized, while
others are placed on varying tiers of
accommodation. The Missouri Department
of Corrections, for example, maintains three
levels of religious accommodation: solitary
practitioner, provisional group
accommodation, and full group
accommodation.
In many instances, states provide general
Protestant, general Catholic, and to a lesser
extent, general Muslim services, rather than
separate denominational services for each
religious subgroup (such as Baptist or
Nation of Islam). Institutional pressures,
such as time a nd s pace limitations, as well
as the need for staff or volunteers to help
organize services, undoubtedly play the
predominant role in these decisions. Most
states permit a wide range of groups to meet,
provided they meet security requirements
and can obtain a volunteer sponsor to lead
services. A few states require a minimum
number of inmate requests before they will
schedule time and space for a service,
though such decisions are more commonly
made on an ad hoc basis.
2. Worship and Pastoral Services. A large
majority of the correctional systems
investigated take a neutral approach to
religious services, opening all services to all
inmates regardless of religious affiliation
(although subject to movement restrictions
and work details). One Nebraska
administrator s aid: " We d on't deny anyone
services or classes - inmates are
guaranteed one worship a week and can go
to any worship. Many are exploring, have no
faith background, and so they go to different
services." In virtually all instances, systems
are also r eligion-neutral; a11 a ccommodated
religions are given roughly equal access to
available time and space - generally a
minimum of one prayer service per week,
and in some cases a weekly study session as
well. Policies of general neutrality, in which
a correctional system divorces itself as much
as possible from religious determinations,
maximize the spiritual opportunities
available to inmates and insulate the
correctional system from charges of
discrimination or free exercise violation.
The distinction between a neutral-restrictive
policy and a neutral-accommodating one, in
this instance, would depend on the variety of
religious groups accommodated and the
degree of flexibility in movement between
religious groups.
As indicated above, religious groups with
common elements are often merged for
worship services. Were it otherwise,
administrators argue, institutions would be
unable to meet the time and space
requirements of a multiplicity of groups....
3. Diet. Many religions have dietary
requirements that make participation in a
standard prison meal plan difficult, if not
impossible. From the institutional point of
view, religious dietary requests add
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substantial expense and administrative costs
to benefit a small group of inmates.
Correctional policies reflect all three
approaches - neutral-restrictive, targeted,
and neutral-accommodating - in evaluating
inmate religious dietary requests. On the
farthest end of the spectrum is a policy
under which, as one administrator put it,
inmates "can choose to take the pork off
their plate." This neutral-restrictive
approach is no longer common, however, as
courts and correctional systems alike have
largely recognized the need to meet the
minimal religious requirements of major
faith groups.
4. Grooming. As with diet, correctional
grooming policies have generated a
considerable amount of litigation.
Correctional institutions argue that beards
and long hair may interfere with quick
identification of inmates inside the prison,
give an escaping inmate an easy way to
change appearance, serve as hiding places
for contraband, signal gang affiliation, or
may pose a health or hygiene risk. Courts
have largely upheld grooming restrictions
under both the O'Lone reasonableness
standard and the RFRA compelling interest
and least restrictive means test, but in some
instances have mandated religious
exemptions for inmates.
5. Personal Property. Sacred objects, such
as texts, symbolic items, clothing, and ritual
paraphernalia, are an integral part of many
religions and religious observances. Some
objects, such as the kirban dagger that Sikhs
wear, pose clear threats to institutional
safety, and are therefore restricted even by
the most accommodating correctional
systems. The reasons for restricting other
items may be more nuanced, but still reflect
concern for safety and order. Aside from
safety issues, prisons prohibit some items on
the basis of a determination that the objects
are not essential to a religion. In other
instances, administrators avoid the issue of
whether an object is central to a belief
system b y p ermitting i nmates to choose up
to a fixed number of items, but not
mandating which objects....
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Federalism and Federal Spending: Why the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 is Unconstitutional
23 Hawaii L. Rev. 479
Summer 2001
Gregory S. Walston
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
Truth is indeed stranger than fiction. Who
among us would have believed that a bizarre
alliance between Senators Orrin Hatch and
Ted Kennedy would produce a sweeping
statutory coup d'etat in our constitutional
balance of power between state and federal
governments? Who would have believed
that conservative senators, such as Senator
Hatch, would support a law that assaults
longstanding principles o f state sovereignty
by requiring the states to justify every state
prison regulation that affects religion under
strict scrutiny, even after the Supreme Court
explicitly held that such regulations are
subject to a reasonableness standard? Who
would have believed that they would do so
even when such a sweeping federal intrusion
into state matters is, at best, of dubious
constitutionality and when a virtually
identical act of Congress had been struck
down by the Supreme Court? This, however,
is exactly what happened in September
2000, when Congress passed the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), which re-enacts the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA") and establishes that state prisons
may not regulate inmates' religious rights
unless the regulation is narrowly tailored for
a compelling state interest.
While it is certainly true that a foolish act of
Congress does not necessarily offend the
Constitution, it is difficult to overlook the
ludicrous implications RLUIPA will have on
prisons and society if its constitutionality is
upheld. Remarkably, RLUIPA confers
greater religious rights on inmates than on
free citizens. It is well established that a
government regulation affecting the
religious activities of free citizens is
permissible if the burden on religion is
merely "incidental" rather than
"intentional." However, under RLUIPA, a
state regulation affecting the religious
activities of an inmate is invalid unless the
State can prove it is narrowly tailored for a
compelling state interest. To the extent that
Congress somehow believed these rewards
for convicted felons served a noble purpose,
RLUIPA's nobility has already been
overtaken by its naivete. In the necessarily
closed and perilous confines of state prisons,
no good act by prison officials will go
unpunished by prisoners who will exploit
the benefit for unintended evils. In only two
months between the enactment of RLUIPA
and the writing of this Article, we have
already seen Satanworshiping inmates, as
well as one inmate who made up his own
religion with a Monday S abbath so that he
would be exempted from his Monday job
duties, argue that they are entitled to special
rights under RLUIPA. It is in light of
exactly these types of problems that the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
prison regulations that burden prisoners'
constitutional rights are valid if they are
"reasonable," and it is for just these reasons,
and countless others, that RLUIPA will
wreak untold chaos on prisons and society.
RLUIPA's foolishness is not the end of the
Act's perils, but rather merely the beginning.
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RLUIPA re-enacts the language of RFRA,
which the Supreme Court explicitly held
unconstitutional. In City of Boeme v. Flores,
the Supreme Court struck down RFRA
because it required a strict scrutiny standard
where the Supreme Court had used a less
stringent standard, and thus "created"
constitutional rights in excess of Congress's
authority in violation of Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Now, in its own
words, Congress has reenacted RFRA by
passing RLUIPA under its Commerce
Clause and federal spending powers.
Long ago, in the early days of the Republic,
Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the
"powers of the legislature are defined and
limited; and that those limits may not be
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is
written." Some argue that many of the ideas
from the early Republic should be let to rest,
but those that are enshrined in the black
letter of our Constitution should not.
Congress does not have a police power.
Although Congress has the power to
regulate commerce between the states, that
power does not extend to non-economic
activities that have no effect on interstate
commerce. Although Congress has
constitutional authority to spend for the
general welfare, it does not have the
authority to regulate for that purpose.
RLUIPA burdens state penal authorities,
which have traditionally been subject to
exclusive State regulation as long as a
deferential reasonableness standard is met,
with the arduous burden of justifying prison
regulations under strict scrutiny. RLUIPA
justifies its sweeping provisions under the
Commerce and Spending powers, without
any explanation of how prison regulations
implicate either commerce or federal
spending, and notwithstanding the
incompatibility of RLUIPA's provisions
with the plain meaning of those words. The
intent of the Framers did not contemplate
such use of congressional power, and the
decisions of the modem Supreme Court do
not tolerate it.
The inevitable judicial review of RLUIPA
will provide an opportunity to extend the
principles of federalism the Supreme Court
has emphasized in recent years to the
context of the federal spending power.
While it remains to be seen whether the
Court goes so far as to disapprove of its
1987 decision in Dole, the Court will
undoubtedly recognize that the Federal
Spending power, like the Commerce power,
is not limitless, and is offended by an Acts
of Congress, such as RLUEPA, that blur the
distinction between federal and state powers
that has been enshrined in our Constitution
since the birth of our Republic.
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Internet Piracy and User Privacy
Recording Industry of America v. Verizon Internet Services
(03-1579)
Ruling Below (Recording Industry of America v. Verizon Internet Services, 351 F.3d 1229
(D.C. Cir. 2003))
The court of appeals found that a subpoena for customer identity may only be issued to an
Internet Service Provider (ISP) that stores. infringing material; ISPs must be more than mere
conduits. The case was remanded to the district court, with instructions to grant the motion to
quash the subpoena.
Questions Presented: Whether §512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act precludes
copyright holders from obtaining the identity of a copyright infringer through issuance of a
subpoena to the infringer's ISP, merely because the infringing material is stored on the
infringer's computer, rather than the service provider's server?
RECORDING INDUSTRY OF AMERICA, INC., Appellee
V.
VERIZON INTERNET SERVICES, INC., Appellant
United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit
Decided December, 19, 2003
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations
omitted]
GINSBURG, Chief Judge:
This case concerns the Recording Industry
Association of America's use of the
subpoena provision of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §
512(h), to identify internet users the RIAA
believes are infringing the copyrights of its
members. The RIAA served two subpoenas
upon Verizon Internet Services in order to
discover the names of two Verizon
subscribers who appeared to be trading large
numbers of .mp3 files of copyrighted music
via "peer-to-peer" (P2P) file sharing
programs, such as KaZaA. Verizon refused
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to comply with the subpoenas on various
legal grounds.
The district court rejected Verizon's
statutory and constitutional challenges to
§ 512(h) and ordered the internet service
provider (ISP) to disclose to the RIAA the
names of the two subscribers. On appeal
Verizon presents three alternative arguments
for reversing the orders of the district court:
(1) § 512(h) does not authorize the issuance
of a subpoena to an ISP acting solely as a
conduit for communications the content of
which is determined by others; if the statute
does authorize such a subpoena, then the
statute is unconstitutional because (2) the
district court lacked Article III jurisdiction
to issue a subpoena with no underlying
"case or controversy" pending before the
court; and (3) § 512(h) violates the First
Amendment because it lacks sufficient
safeguards to protect an internet user's
ability to speak and to associate
anonymously. Because we agree with
Verizon's interpretation of the statute, we
reverse the orders of the district court
enforcing the subpoenas and do not reach
either of Verizon's constitutional arguments.
I. Background
Individuals with a personal computer and
access to the internet began to offer digital
copies of recordings for download by other
users, an activity known as file sharing, in
the late 1990's using a program called
Napster. Although recording companies and
music publishers successfully obtained an
injunction against Napster's facilitating the
sharing of files containing copyrighted
recordings, see A&M Records,Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9 " Cir.2002);
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004 (9 " Cir.2001), millions of people
in the United States and around the world
continue to share digital .mp3 files of
copyrighted recordings using P2Pcomputer
programs such as KaZaA, Morpheus,
Grokster, and eDonkey. See John Borland,
File Swapping Shifts Up a Gear (May 27,
2003), available at
http://news.com.com/21001010261009742.h
tml.
The RIAA has used the subpoena provisions
of § 512(h) of the Digital Millennium
Copyright A ct (DMCA) to compel ISPs to
disclose the names of subscribers whom the
RIAA has reason to believe are infringing
its members' copyrights. See 17 U.S.C. §
512(h)(1) (copyright owner may "request
the clerk of any United States district court
to issue a subpoena to [an ISP] for
identification of an alleged infringer").
Some ISPs have complied with the RIAA's
§ 512(h) subpoenas and identified the names
of the subscribers sought by the RIAA. The
RIAA has sent letters to and filed lawsuits
against several hundred such individuals,
each of whom allegedly made available for
download by other users hundreds or in
some cases even thousands of .mp3 files of
copyrighted recordings. Verizon refused to
comply with and instead has challenged the
validity of the two § 512(h) subpoenas it has
received.
II. Analysis
The issue is whether § 512(h) applies to an
ISP acting only as a conduit for data
transferred between two internet users, such
as persons sending and receiving e-mail or,
as in this case, sharing P2P files. Verizon
contends § 512(h) does not authorize the
issuance of a subpoena to an ISP that
transmits infringing material but does not
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store any such material on its servers. The
RIAA argues § 512(h) on its face authorizes
the issuance of a subpoena to an "[internet]
service provider" without regard to whether
the ISP is acting as a conduit for user-
directed communications. We conclude
from both the terms of § 512(h) and the
overall structure of § 512 that, as Verizon
contends, a subpoena may be issued only to
an ISP engaged in storing on its servers
material that is infringing or the subject of
infringing activity.
A. Subsection 512(h) by its Terms
We begin our analysis, as always, with the
text oft he s tatute. S ee B arnhart v S igmon
Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122S.Ct. 941,
950, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002). Verizon's
statutory arguments address the meaning of
and interaction between §§ 512(h) and
512(a)-(d). [...]
Notably present in §§ 512(b)-(d), and
notably absent from § 512(a), is the so
called notice and take-down provision. It
makes a condition of the ISP's protection
from liability for copyright infringement that
"'upon notification of claimed infringement
as described in [§ 512] c (3)," the ISP
"responds expeditiously to remove, or
disable access to, the material that is claimed
to be infringing." See 17 U.S.C. §§
512(b)(2)(E), 512(c)(1)(C), and 512(d)(3).
Verizon argues that § 512(h) by its terms
precludes the Clerk of Court from issuing a
subpoena to an ISP a cting as a conduit for
P2P communications because a § 512(h)
subpoena request cannot meet the
requirement in § 512(h)(2)(A) that a
proposed subpoena contain "a copy of a
notification [of claimed infringement, as]
described in [§ 512] c (3)(A)." In Subsection
512 c (3)(A) provides that "[t]o be effective
under this subsection, a notification of
claimed infringement must be a written
communication that includes substantially
the following":
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a
person authorized to act on behalf of the
owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly
infringed.
(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work
claimed to have been infringed, or, if
multiple copyrighted works at a single
online site are covered by a single
notification, a representative list of such
works at that site. Recording Industry of
America v. Verizon Internet, 351 F.3d 1229
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
Verizon maintains the two subpoenas
obtained by the RIAA fail to meet the
requirements of § 512 c (3)(A)(iii) in that
they do not - because Verizon is not storing
the infringing material on its server -and can
not, identify material "to be removed or
access to which is to be disabled" by
Verizon.
Here Verizon points out that § 512(h)(4)
makes satisfaction of the notification
requirement of § 512 c (3)(A) a condition
precedent to issuance of a subpoena:
"If the notification filed satisfies the
provisions of [§ 512] c (3)(A)" and the other
content requirements of § 512(h)(2) are met,
then "the clerk shall expeditiously issue and
sign the proposed subpoena TTT for
delivery" to the ISP. Infringing material
obtained or distributed via P2P file sharing
is located in the computer (or in an off-line
storage device, such as a compact disc) of an
individual user. No matter what information
the copyright owner may provide, the ISP
can neither "remove" nor "disable access to"
the infringing material because that material
is not stored on the ISP's servers.
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Verizon can not remove or disable one
user's access to infringing material resident
on another user's computer because Verizon
does not control the content on its
subscribers' computers.
The RIAA contends an ISP can indeed
"disable access" to infringing material by
terminating the offending subscriber's
internet account. This argument is undone
by the terms of the Act, however.
As Verizon notes, the Congress considered
disabling an individual's access to infringing
material and disabling access to the internet
to be different remedies for the protection of
copyright owners, the former blocking
access to the infringing material on the
offender's computer and the latter more
broadly blocking the offender's access to the
internet (at least via his chosen ISP).
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1)(A)(i)
(authorizing injunction restraining ISP
"from providing access to infringing
material") with 17 U.S.C. §512 (j)(1)(A)(ii)
(authorizing injunction restraining ISP
"from providing access to a subscriber or
account holder TTT who is engaging in
infringing activity TTT by terminating the
accounts of the subscriber or account
holder").
According to the RIAA, the purpose of §
512(h) being to identify infringers, a notice
should b e deemed sufficient s o 1 ong ast he
ISP can identify the infringer from the IP
address in the subpoena. Nothing in the Act
itself says how we should determine whether
a notification "includes substantially" all the
required information; both the Senate and
House Reports, however, state the term
means only that "technical errors TTT such
as misspelling a name" or "supplying an
outdated area code" will not render
ineffective an otherwise complete § 512 c
(3)(A) notification. S.Rep. No. 105-190, at
47 (1998); H.R.Rep. No. 105-551 (II), at 56
(1998). Clearly, however, the defect in the
RIAA's notification is not a mere technical
error; nor could it be thought "insubstantial"
even under a more forgiving s tandard. T he
RIAA's notification identifies absolutely no
material Verizon could remove or access to
which it could disable, which indicates to us
that § 512 c (3)(A) concerns means of
infringement other than P2P file sharing.
In sum, we agree with Verizon that§ 512(h)
does not by its terms authorize the
subpoenas issued here. A § 512(h) subpoena
simply cannot meet the notice requirement
of§ 512 c (3)(A)(iii).
B. Structure
Verizon also argues the subpoena provision,
§ 512(h), relates uniquely to the safe harbor
in § 512 c for ISPs engaged in storing
copyrighted material and does not apply to
the transmitting function addressed by the
safe harbor in § 512(a).
[We agree that the presence in § 512(h) of
three separate references to § 512 applies
only to ISPs engaged in storing copyrighted
material and not to those engaged solely in
transmitting it on behalf of others.]
We think it clear, therefore, that the cross-
references to § 512 c (3) in §§ 512(b)-(d)
demonstrate that § 512(h) applies to an ISP
storing infringing material on its servers in
any capacity - whether as a temporary cache
of a web page created by the ISP per §
512(b), as a web site stored on the ISP's
server per § 512 c, or as an information
locating tool hosted by the ISP per § 512(d)
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- and does not apply to an ISP routing
infringing material to or from a personal
computer owned and used by a subscriber.
C. Legislative History
In support ofi ts claim that § 5 12(h) can -
and should - be read to reach P2P
technology, the RIAA points to
congressional testimony and news articles
available to the Congress prior to passage of
the DMCA. These sources document the
threat to copyright owners posed by bulletin
board services (BBSs) and file transfer
protocol ( FTP) sites, which the R IAA says
were precursors to P2P programs.
We need not, however, resort to
investigating what the 105th Congress may
have known because the text of § 512(h) and
the overall structure of § 512 clearly
establish, as we have seen, that § 512(h)
does not authorize the issuance of a
subpoena to an ISP acting as a mere conduit
for t he transmission of i nformation sent by
others. Legislative history can serve to
inform the court's reading of an otherwise
ambiguous text; it cannot lead the court to
contradict the legislation itself. See Ratzlaf
v. United States, 510 U.S. 135.
In any event, not only is the statute clear
(albeit complex), the legislative historyof the
DMCA betrays no awareness whatsoever
that internet users might be able directly to
exchange files containing copyrighted
works. That is not surprising; P2P software
was "not even a glimmer in anyone's eye
when the DMCA was enacted."
The C ongress h ad no reason to foresee the
application of § 512(h) to P2P file sharing,
nor did they draft the DMCA broadly
enough to reach the new technology when it
came along. Had the Congress been aware
of P2P technology, or anticipated its
development, § 512(h) might have been
drafted more generally. Be that as it may,
contrary to the RIAA's claim, nothing in the
legislative history supports the issuance of a
§ 512(h) subpoena to an ISP acting as a
conduit for P2P file sharing.
D. Purpose of the DMCA
Finally, the RIAA argues Verizon's
interpretation of the statute "would defeat
the core objectives" of the Act. [... ]. We are
not unsympathetic either to the RIAA's
concern regarding the widespread
infringement of its members' copyrights, or
to the need for legal tools to protect those
rights. It is not the province of the courts,
however, to rewrite t he DMCA i n order to
make it fit a new and unforeseen internet
architecture, no matter how damaging that
development has been to the music industry
or threatens being to the motion picture and
software industries. The plight of copyright
holders must be addressed in the first
instance by the Congress; only the
"Congress has the constitutional authority
and the institutional ability to accommodate
fully the varied permutations of competing
interests that are inevitably implicated by
such new technology."See Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
431, 104 S.Ct. 774, 783, 78 L.Ed.2d 574
(1984). [...]
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we remand this
case to the district court to vacate its
order enforcing the July 24 subpoena and to
grant Verizon's motion to quash the
February 4 subpoena. So ordered.
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Recording Industry Curbed on Music Suits
The Washington Post
December 20, 2003
Jonathan Krim and Frank Ahrens
A federal appeals court yesterday ruled that
Internet account providers do not have to
give record companies the names of
computer users who share songs online,
dealing a sharp blow to the industry's efforts
to crack down on illegal copying of
digital music. The ruling throws out two
lower-court decisions that gave the
Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) the right to subpoena the names of
thousands of suspected users of file-sharing
software programs without first filing
lawsuits.
The association sued 382 people and warned
398 others in a widely publicized campaign
to scare the estimated 60 million U.S. music
swappers, and the parents of those who are
teens, into giving up the practice and buying
songs instead.
The association settled with 220
defendants-some for thousands of dollars
- while 1,054 swappers signed "amnesty
letters" vowing to erase their song files and
promising never to steal music again.
Consumer advocates and Internet providers
hailed yesterday's ruling as an affirmation of
privacy rights for Internet users in the face
of a mass attack by a single industry.
The recording association said it would not
be deterred from protecting the business of
its members and promised additional
lawsuits, saying it would seek the names in a
more time-consuming way.
The RIAA contended that it was entitled to
expedited subpoenas issued by court clerks,
rather than judges, under a 1998 law
designed to protect copyrighted works in the
digital age. Although industry sleuths could
track down the numerical Internet
address of someone using file-sharing
software, they could not take legal action
without getting names and physical
addresses of the swappers from their Internet
access providers.
The music industry has suffered at the hands
of services such as Kazaa, Morpheus,
Grokster and LimeWire, which by some
estimates have cost it more than $5 billion a
year worldwide. But the subpoenas were
fought by Verizon Communications Inc.'s
online division, which provides Internet
access to 2.1 million consumers.
The company was forced to begin turning
over names in April after a lower-court
judge ruled against it.
Verizon argued that the privacy and safety
of its customers would be compromised if
the subpoenas were not issued by judges,
who first review their validity. The company
also argued that the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act prohibits Internet providers
from being held responsible for what moves
across their networks.
The law, the company said, only requires
network owners to remove illegal material
from their central computers. When
consumers use file-sharing, or peer-to-
peer, services, the songs they trade reside on
their personal computers.
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed
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unanimously. "Verizon cannot remove or
disable one user's access to infringing
material resident on another user's computer
because Verizon does not control the content
on its subscribers' computers," said the
ruling, written by Chief Judge Douglas H.
Ginsburg.
Perhaps more damaging for the recording
industry, and for the movie and software
industries, whose works also are traded
online, the court declared firmly that the
law was not designed to account for file-
sharing t echnology. It isuptoCongress to
fix that if it chooses, the court ruled.
"We are not unsympathetic either to the
RIAA's concern regarding the widespread
infringement of its members' copyrights, or
to the need for legal tools to protect those
rights," Ginsburg wrote. "It is not the
province of the courts, however, to rewrite
the DMCA in order to make it fit a new and
unforeseen internet architecture, no matter
how damaging that development has been to
the music industry or threatens . . . the
motion picture and software industries."
Cary Sherman, president of the RIAA and a
former Verizon lawyer, said his organization
has not decided if it will appeal the ruling to
the U.S. Supreme Court or ask Congress to
change the DMCA. Sen. Orrin G. Hatch (R-
Utah), chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee and a musician, said he would
push Congress to streamline the subpoena
process.
Sherman said his group would file a first
wave of "John Doe" lawsuits in January.
Such suits are filed when the identity of the
defendant is unknown. If a judge deems the
suits valid, subpoenas to get the names and
addresses of those using file-sharing
software would be issued to Internet service
providers, which have vowed to honor them.
"We think they can have the same deterrent
by following the standard legal process,"
said Sarah B. Deutsch, Verizon's associate
general counsel. "They wanted to have an
expedited process, even if it trampled on
user privacy and safety."
Less certain is the fate of an unknown
number of people whose names already have
been turned over to the RIAA by Internet
service providers. The RIAA has declined to
say how many subpoenas it served; Verizon
estimates it at about 4,000.
The RIAA could use the names as the basis
for lawsuits, but the defendants might be
able to argue that their names were obtained
through subpoenas now ruled unlawful.
"That one could keep lawyers happy for a
long time," said Peter P. Swire, an Ohio
State University law professor who helped
Verizon with its case.
But legal experts said that those who had
already settled were unlikely to be able to
recoup any payments to the RIAA. And
Sherman warned against anyone trying.
"If anybody tried to claim that somehow a
settlement or pending litigation is somehow
tainted by the process by which their name
was provided, it would simply encourage us
to file a new lawsuit and get exactly the
same information in another way," Sherman
said. "At that point, the settlement figure
would be that much higher because of
additional legal expenses."
Still, Tim Davis, a New York artist and a
lecturer at Yale University, s aid he intends
to try.
Davis was one of the first song swappers
targeted by the RIAA, and settled for $7,000
on the advice of his lawyers.
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"I would do anything it takes to get the
money back," said Davis, who said he
downloaded only 300 songs. "My hope is
there could be a class-action suit of the
people who did settle."
The ruling comes as legal alternatives to file
sharing are gaining ground. Apple Computer
Inc.'s iTunes, the top-selling legal online
music store, announced this week it had sold
25 million songs since its rollout in April.
Similar services have sprung up in iTunes's
wake, while use of file sharing appears to be
dropping.
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Music Industry's Move Against Swappers Hits a Snag Just as Impact Takes Hold
The Wall Street Journal
December 22, 2003
Ethan Smith
Just as the music business was making
headway in its fight against rampant online
piracy, a court ruling has threatened the
industry's comeback effort.
With music sales down over 14% since 1999
- thanks largely to online sharing, CD
burning and dissatisfaction over prices-the
industry this year rolled out initiatives
designed to drive music from Internet file-
trading services and revive legitimate music
buying. Since September, the rate of decline
in music sales has slowed.
But a ruling Friday by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia is
likely to hamper one of the industry's most
important strategies: lawsuits against illegal
file sharers. The court struck down a lower
court's ruling that had ordered Verizon
Communications Inc. to turn over the
identities of customers suspected of sharing
music via Internet peer-to-peer services. The
ruling will make it more cumbersome for the
recording i ndustry to 1 earn t he i dentities o f
major online music swappers-and thus
significantly impede the record labels'
ability to quickly file large batches of
lawsuits against these individuals.
The industry in September began filing
hundreds of such suits, a move that
provoked an outcry. "Everyone that hears
about these cases is most struck by the
arbitrariness ofi t," s aid Tim D avis, a New
York City photographer and part-time
lecturer at Yale University who was sued by
the Recording Industry Association of
America and recently settled for about
$10,000.
There were early signs the lawsuits had the
intended effect. According to recently
compiled data from Nielsen SoundScan, the
three-year slide in music sales began to slow
dramatically -on almost precisely the same
date the suits were filed, amid massive
publicity.
The data show that sales of CD albums and
singles had been down from the year-
previous week for 34 of the 36 weeks prior
to the start of the legal barrage. Since the
initial wave of suits was filed, however,
weekly s ales h ave b een up, year-over-year,
for 11 out of 14 weeks. Until early
September, sales for the year had fallen
8.4% compared with the same period in
2002; as of last week, sales had rebounded
enough that they were off only 2.2% for the
year.
At the same time, data from Nielsen
NetRatings show that usage of Kazaa, the
biggest of the peer-to-peer services, is down
sharply, from a high of over 17.4 million
unique users per month in March to 7.6
million in October. Other, similar services
haven't shown the same dramatic declines,
but their audiences are smaller. That
momentum is seriously threatened now, as
online music users may no longer feel the
legal heat. The RIAA had cited a section of
the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act
in seeking to compel Verizon to turn over
the names of two users it believed were
sharing music files illegally. A lower court
agreed with the recording industry.
But writing for a unanimous three-judge
appeals panel, Chief Judge Douglas
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Ginsburg ruled that the digital copyright law
didn't apply to the case at hand, because
Verizon was merely a conduit for the
copyrighted material, and didn't host it on
its computers.
Until Friday's ruling, lawyers for the RIAA
had a relatively straightforward means of
suing people they believed were sharing
copyrighted music. Simply by submitting a
form with a court clerk, the RIAA's lawyers
could automatically obtain subpoenas
compelling Internet-service providers to turn
over the names of people whose Internet
accounts were suspected of hosting
copyrighted music files for online
distribution. The industry could then either
file a lawsuit against the individual or, as it
has more recently, send warning letters
seeking to settle cases before they were
filed. Now, however, the RIAA's lawyers
will be forced to engage in a more
burdensome and expensive process that
involves filing suits against anonymous
"John Doe" defendants, and then obtaining
subpoenas for the users' identities from a
judge. "It's a huge victory for all Internet
users and consumers," said Sarah Deutsch, a
lawyer for Verizon. "They were engaged in
an online fishing expedition."
Cary Sherman, president of the RIAA,
called the decision "disappointing from a
procedural perspective," but said it wouldn't
affect his organization's overall strategy.
"This doesn't change our ability to sue," Mr.
Sherman said. "And it doesn't change the
fact that uploading and downloading music
is illegal." He said the RIAA hasn't decided
whether to appeal the ruling to the U.S.
Supreme Court, or to pursue congressional
help in changing the law so that it applies
more specifically to peer-to-peer services,
which didn't exist at the time the digital-
copyright law was written.
Nonetheless, the Verizon case and others
show how difficult it is for record
companies to make a legal stand against
piracy that stems from the elusive peer-to-
peer services. Last April, another federal
court ruled similarly that Grokster and
another peer-to-peer service, Morpheus,
weren't liable for whatever illegal purposes
users might put them to. Also on Friday, a
Dutch court reached the same conclusion in
a case against Kazaa.
Friday's appeals-court ruling also has
implications for the movie industry, which
hasn't yet been hit by widespread piracy but
is preparing for it. The Motion Picture
Association of America hasn't yet decided
to follow the music industry in filing suits
against individuals, although some studios
have been eager to do so. Hollywood
executives noted that the battle against
piracy alsoinvolves offering consumers
better legal access to digital versions of
movies and music, as well as the
development of technologies to make it
harder to make digital copies.
The recording industry has already been
pursuing those other paths, with varied
results. One of the most successful gambits
has been the rollout of affordable,
convenient, legal music downloading
services like Apple Computer Inc.'s iTunes
Music Store. According to Nielsen
SoundScan, the y ear-to-date music industry
sales drop of 2.2% would be 4.7% without
the inclusion of paid digital downloads.
Universal Music Group, a unit of Vivendi
Universal SA, took another tack, slashing
wholesale prices on most of its releases by
as much as 25%, and suggested retail prices
by as much as 32%, to less than $13.
Universal's plans called for it to make up the
revenue largely through a bump in volume.
The company didn't specify how much it
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needed sales to increase, but industry
insiders estimated it would need a lift of
about 20% to make up the difference.
But so far, Universal may not be getting the
bump it hoped for. Jim Urie, president of
Universal Music and Video Distribution,
said "it's too early to tell if [the program] is
a success or a failure." He added that the
retail pricing changes under the program
"cwere much slower to hit than we'd
anticipated."
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Piracy Has Hooks In
USA Today
May 6, 2003
Edna Gundersen
As growing swarms of online pirates
continue plundering music's treasure chests,
the $ 12 billion recording industry could b e
facing a walk down the plank. Computer
users download an estimated 2.6 billion
music files monthly; most are illegal.
Aggressive legal action, drastic security
measures and sophisticated counterattacks
may not be enough to slow, much less halt
or reverse, the illegal downloading that is
taking a significant bite out of record sales.
In its third year of slumping revenue, the
recording industry has little reason to expect
a turnaround.
"The record companies are history," says
James Hetfield of Metallica, the band that
stood up to file-swapping juggernaut
Napster. "They won't be around much
longer unless they get with it and morph into
something new that's going to help get
music directly to the masses. The Internet is
about as direct as it gets. Putting a CD in a
store is like putting a rotary-dial phone in
front of a kid: 'What's that? There's no
antenna.' Downloading is a sobering
change."
Some punishing numbers that have labels
down for the count: Record sales in the
world's top 10 markets declined 6.8% in
2002, according to the International
Federation of the Phonographic Industry.
Research estimates that piracy accounts for
40% of the global decline. First-quarter
album sales (144.7 million units) are down
10% from 2002 (160.7 million), according
to Nielsen SoundScan. Roughly 1.7 billion
blank CDs were sold in 2002, up 40% over
2001. The use of broadband, enabling quick
downloads, grew 9% from October to
March. After early missteps, the five major
labels - Universal, Warner, Sony, BMG
and EMI - and the trade group Recording
Industry Association of America are
pursuing new anti-piracy approaches that
may be too little and too late.
Among the strategies that are taking aim at
file-swappers:
Suing them into submission Strategy:
Verdicts have gone both ways so far. A
federal court ruled April 25 that peer-to-peer
file-swapping systems like Morpheus and
Grokster are not acting illegally since they
don't track traffic. But the decision does say
users are violating copyright law. Another
ruling reaffirmed the industry's right to
compel Internet providers to supply
identities of suspected copyright violators.
So the legal focus shifts to file sharers.
Last week, four college students sued by the
industry agreed to shut down their campus
file-sharing networks and pay up to $17,500
each. While it's implausible for labels to
chase down every bandit, making examples
of prolific abusers might scare off others.
Drawbacks: Pursuing students is far from
cost-effective and will likely harden
attitudes that labels - whose prices for CDs
have never dropped despite plunging
production costs - are rip-off agents.
Downloaders who wouldn't dream of
shoplifting a CD at Tower blithely swipe
songs from cyberspace without a twinge of
guilt. Getting music gratis is only half the
thrill; there's also a kick involved in joining
a rebel cult and beating an overpriced
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system. Creating instant martyrs of file
sharers can only intensify that sentiment.
"The image of record companies is so
negative that peer-to-peer users aren't
bothered by questions of legality," says
Charly Prevost, former executive at Liquid
Audio, which provides software for secure
Net music.
Outmaneuvering them technologically
Strategy:
Several trumpeted safeguards are in use or
in development, but labels also are resorting
to wily tactics, including "spoofing," or
flooding cyberspace with defective files that
confound users. Also possible are more
drastic measures that would lock up users'
computers.
Drawbacks:
Users have devised ways to skirt file-sharing
hurdles. And declaring open war by freezing
computers or Internet connections is no way
to win back consumers. Decoy tracks from
Madonna's American Life antagonized fans
and prompted hackers to temporarily disable
her Web site.
Rehabilitating them S trategy: W arner Bros.
Records chairman Tom Whalley says, "I'm
pushing for awareness and education ... to
let fans know that stealing music hurts
artists and people who make a livelihood off
music."
Parents also are natural targets for the
campaign:
"Years ago, we were under attack for our
morality," Whalley says. "As a result, we
put parental-guidance stickers on records.
Don't parents know their children are
stealing from the Internet? The people who
spoke out against record companies are
turning their heads in their own households.
It's a moral issue."
Last week, the RIAA began an instant-
message campaign that sends automated
warnings to those distributing or
downloading copyrighted music, reminding
violators that the act harms artists."
It's an uphill battle. Among Americans 12
and up, 28% have downloaded music, 18%
within the past month, according to Ipsos-
Reid marketing research firm. Of those 12 to
17, 48% downloaded music in the past
month. And 42% of all file-sharers reported
they copied a CD rather than buy it. An
Ipsos-Reid study shows that only 9% say
file-sharing is wrong, and just 20% say it
hurts artists. Many file-sharers consider the
RIAA volley a hostile nuisance.
Enticing them to buy Strategy: Convenience
and comfort may be the keys. Internet access
options offer a parallel, says analyst Phil
Leigh of Raymond James and Associates.
"The best way to combat piracy is to remove
the incentive by providing a better
alternative," he says. "The vast majority of
us pay for Internet access. You can get it for
free, but you have to live with constant pop-
up ads and limitations. Only a tiny fraction
of the public does that. We pay for Internet
access because we cannot abide the
annoyances. The renegade (file-sharing)
networks have an abundance of pop-up ads,
spy w are, d ecoy files, viruses a nd sporadic
crashes."
Until recently, label-sanctioned sites were
turnoffs. They were "expensive and the user
experience was unsatisfying," Prevost says.
"All the legal systems were difficult to use."
Apple's newly launched iTunes "is a
positive evolutionary step" toward weaning
users off illegal sites, Prevost says. "It's
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completely addictive, easier than Amazon.
It's easier than the illegal sites. If you go to
Kazaa for a p opular t rack, you find 1 00 to
pick through, and the quality is questionable.
At Apple, it's fast, smooth, no typos,
excellent quality."
Apple reports that iTunes sold more than 1
million digital songs in its first week.
Competitors Pressplay, MusicNet and Listen
have struggled to attract what analysts say is
less than a combined 300,000 monthly
subscribers. Apple offers 200,000 tracks at
99 cents each, with more songs to be posted
today.
But meanwhile, the file-sharing cosmos is
expanding. Recordable CDs outsell
prerecorded music CDs by more than 2 to 1.
Monster song-swapping service Kazaa has
218 million registered users. Sluggish dial-
up connections, long an impediment to easy
downloading, are on the wane as broadband
spreads rapidly outside the corporate and
university sectors to the residential realm,
inviting more throngs into the free-for-all.
Once dismissed as fringe alarmists,
doomsayers who predicted the demise of the
music biz are breaching the walls of denial
at labels, where alarming statistics are
forcing a reassessment of old-school
leadership and obsolete business models.
To survive, labels have to jump on the
bandwidth wagon, says Prevost. "The
delivery of music is critical," he says.
"Labels have to figure out how to use the
Internet, not replace it. We're seeing the end
of the beginning of the industry." Leigh
says, "The chances of the labels reversing
the trend toward Internet distribution are
about as slim as an Apache Indian being
elected pope. The labels have been
intellectually aware of this for two or three
years. Now they're feeling it at a gut level."
Labels headed for extinction?
Could the giant labels vanish? Some say
collapse or serious shrinkage is inevitable if
the perilous disconnect between
corporations and customers persists. It
started when labels ignored the Internet's
rise and technological advances thats owed
the seeds of online piracy. They resisted
adapting to a changed environment and then
fought the uprising rather than co-opting it
early enough to foil thieves and lure loyal
buyers. Says Leigh: "The labels anticipated
that Internet distribution would arrive when
Marriott opened a hotel on Mars. They
didn't know what to do, so they proceeded
on the characteristic path of litigation and
legislation. But these peer-to-peer networks
are as hard to stamp out as the Hydra. Cut
off one head, and two grow in its place."
Established acts are watching profits plunge
and prospects diminish as CD sales, the
bread and b utter for m ost recording artists,
sink. L inkin P ark t ook extreme p recautions
during recording and pre-release promotion
of current album Meteora, and while the
effort paid off in preventing leaks, the disc's
entire contents were up for grabs online as
soon as the album landed on shelves.
Metallica is braced for a similar brushfire
when St. Anger hits retail on June 10. The
band hopes to lure buyers with such
incentives as a DVD of rehearsals, a CD-
ROM peek into the band's upcoming video
game and an elaborate booklet.
"The idea was to throw out a bone that you
won't get in a download," Hetfield says.
He's relieved that security measures so far
have thwarted leaks. "Recording was like
working in a bank. The hard drives were in a
safe. Nothing left the studio. But then you
hand it off to the record company to mass-
produce it, and you have to let it go."
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Despite precautions, songs from
Radiohead's aptly titled Hail to the Thief,
due June 10, are circulating on the Net.
When live versions of songs from 2000's
Kid A saturated Napster within hours of the
concert, Radiohead initially was amused that
"there was suddenly this really cool global
distribution system," says Adam Sexton of
Macrovision's Audio Group. "Then it sunk
in: 'What does this mean to our album?' The
business w as ab it caught o ff guard by t he
rapid spread of Napster. It was voiced as a
theoretical problem before. By the time they
realized they had a problem, it was already
immense, and the genie was out of the
bottle."
Internet music looting "definitely got ahead
of us," says Whalley. "We got caught short
in the beginning, and now we're catching
up. We're the first industry really hurt by
this. The movie industry will benefit from
our suffering."
Tightened in-house security is preventing
pre-release leaks. Of four Warner albums in
the top 10, none reached the Internet before
landing in stores. "Once it hits the airwaves
or is sent to retail, we lose control," Whalley
says. Yet he sees cause for optimism. "The
business is reinventing itself, and I'm
excited to take on that challenge. You'll
never wipe out piracy; no industry can. But
we have a good chance of reaching the
average, honest music fans out there and
turning them around. The future is bright."
In the technology tug-of-war, the industry is
gaining ground. Macrovision, which ships
about 10 million copy-protected CDs
internationally each month, helps labels
combat piracy by producing "dual s ession"
CDs that allow music to be played on PCs
but inhibit file-trading and CD burning. The
company, in conjunction with Microsoft,
can produce protected CDs that let music be
saved on a PC, exported to a portable player
and burned onto a recordable CD but not
uploaded and traded online.
"What we basically a im todo isp ut speed
bumps up so that average consumers will
say they might as well just buy it," Sexton
says. The new configuration "gives
consumers the flexibility they have come to
expect. The rest of the world has moved
ahead of the U.S. and taken an aggressive
stance to protect intellectual property. Our
goal (in the USA) is to have some test
releases out in the summer and some major
releases this fall so that by Christmas we'll
see widespread use of copy protection on
CDs."
Also in development is "controlled
burning," in which songs burned onto a
blank CD can't be copied. "We have got to
get music piracy back to a level that the
industry can still survive with, so it's not
one copy begets a thousand begets a
million," Sexton says.
Far-reaching cultural effects:
If industry efforts fail, the fallout will hurt
more than the bean counters and
stockholders. A crippled system would send
ripples through myriad businesses and pop
culture itself A marketplace built around a
physical artifact - the silver disc inside a
shrink-wrapped jewel box - would shrivel.
"I don't see the day anytime soon when
brick-and-mortar stores will be obsolete,"
Whalley says. "People will still enjoy
browsing CD bins. But we'll see fewer
stores. And the independent accounts
around college campuses have been or are
being put out of business by online piracy."
If piracy spreads unabated, the very culprits
stand to suffer losses as well. "The industry
would not be able to produce and market the
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number of new artists it's offered
historically," RIAA president Cary Sherman
says. "It would mean far less investment in
music. Record companies make money by
selling music. There are very few other
revenue streams available. If they can't sell
music because people are downloading or
burning it for free, they'll take fewer risks
on fewer artists.
"If it weren't for Norah Jones having a
record contract, her music would still be
enjoyed by a few people in Texas at clubs.
EMI invested in her and marketed her
music, and now it's enjoyed by people all
over the world. We have one of the most
rich and vibrant cultures in the world, and it
would be criminal if all of that disappeared,
or contracted, because of uncontrolled
Internet piracy."
Metallica drummer Lars Ulrich, branded as
greedy by some fans for his criticism of
online thievery, says the band fought for
principles, not profit. "It's not the Metallicas
and Madonnas and Linkin Parks and Bruce
Springsteens that take the hardest hit, it's the
10 developing bands each label has on its
roster every month," Ulrich says. "That gets
trimmed to three. Instead of getting $1
million to make videos and tour, you go
home if nothing happens in the first five
minutes of that project. Young artists won't
have a chance." Hetfield chimes in, "What
about the band that's on the cusp of make it
or break it? It's so ironic that a band won't
be successful because the people who really
like their stuff are stealing it."
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Music industry spins falsehood
USA Today
October 23, 2002
Janis Ian
The recording industry says downloading
music from the Internet is ruining our
business, destroying sales and costing artists
such as me money.
Costing me money?
I don't pretend to be an expert on
intellectual property law, but I do know one
thing: If a record executive says he will
make me more money, I'd immediately
protect my wallet.
Still, the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) is now in federal court
trying to gain new powers to personally
target Internet users in lawsuits for trading
music files online. In a motion filed with the
U.S.District Court for the District of
Columbia, the RIAA is demanding that an
Internet service provider, Verizon, turn over
the name and contact information of one of
its Internet subscribers who, the RIAA
claims, might have unauthorized copies of
songs on a home computer.
Attacking your own customers because they
want to learn more about your products is a
bizarre business strategy, one the music
industry cannot afford to continue. Yet the
RIAA effectively destroyed Napster on such
grounds, and now it is using the same crazy
logic to take on Internet service providers
and even privacy rights.
The RIAA's claim that the industry and
artists are hurt by free downloading is
nonsense. Consider my experience: I'm a
recording artist who has sold multiple
platinum records since the 1960s. My site,
janisian.com, began offering free downloads
in July. About a thousand people per day
have downloaded my music, most of them
people who had never heard of me and never
bought my CDs.
Welcome to 'Acousticville'
On the first day I posted downloadable
music, my merchandise sales tripled, and
they have stayed that way ever since. I'm
not about to become a zillionaire as a result,
but I am making more money. At a time
when radio playlists are tighter and any kind
of exposure is hard to come by, 365,000
copies of my work now will be heard. Even
if only 3% of those people come to concerts
or buy my CDs, I've gained about 10,000
new fans this year.
That's how artists become successful:
exposure. Without exposure, no one comes
to shows, and no one buys CDs. After 37
years as a recording artist, when people
write to tell me that they came to my concert
because they downloaded a song and got
curious, I am thrilled.
Who's really hurt by free downloads? The
executives at major labels who twiddled
their thumbs for years while company after
company begged them to setup
"micropayment" protocols and to license
material for Internet-download sales.
Listen up
Many artists now benefit greatly from the
free-download systems the RIAA seeks to
destroy. These musicians, especially those
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without a major-label contract, can reach
millions of new listeners with a
downloadable song, enticing music fans to
buy a CD or come to a concert of an artist
they would have otherwise missed.
The RIAA and the entrenched music
industry argue that free downloads are
threats. The music industry had exactly the
same response to the advent of reel-to-reel
home tape recorders, cassettes, DATs,
minidiscs, VCRs, music videos, MTV and a
host of other products and services. I am not
advocating indiscriminate downloading
without the artist's permission. Copyright
protection is vital. But I do object to the
industry spin that it is doing all this to
protect artists. It is not protecting us; it is
protecting itself.
I hope the court rejects the efforts of the
music industry to assault the Internet and the
music fans who use it. Speaking as an artist,
I want us to work together - industry
leaders, musicians, songwriters and
consumers - to make technology work for
all of us.
Janis Ian's popular-music credits include 17
major-label albums, nine Grammy
nominations and 37 years of experience in
the music industry.
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Oregon Death with Dignity Act
Oregon v. Ashcroft
Ruling Below: 368 F.3d 1118; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 10349
Appellees, the State of Oregon and others, challenged the Ashcroft Directive, published at 66
Fed. Reg. 56,607, because it criminalized conduct specifically authorized by Oregon's Death
with Dignity Act. The court held that the Ashcroft Directive was unlawful and unenforceable
because it violated the plain language of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), because it
contravened Congress' express legislative intent, and overstepped the bounds of the U.S.
Attorney General's statutory authority. T he court found that t he C SA w as enacted to combat
drug abuse. The court further found that to the extent that the CSA authorized the federal
government to make decisions regarding the practice of medicine, those decisions were
delegated to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, not to the Attorney General.
Question Presented: Whether the attorney general under the federal CSA may criminalize
activity of doctors and pharmacists that is expressly authorized by state statute?
State of OREGON, et. al., Plaintiff-Appellee
V.
John ASHCROFT, et. al., Defendant-Appellant
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided May 26, 2004
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:
A doctor, a pharmacist, several terminally ill
patients, and the State of Oregon challenge
an interpretive rule issued by Attorney
General John Ashcroft which declares that
physician assisted suicide violates the
Controlled Substances Act of 1970 ("CSA"),
21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904. This so-called
"Ashcroft Directive," criminalizes conduct
specifically authorized by Oregon's Death
With Dignity Act, Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.800-
897. We hold that the Ashcroft Directive is
unlawful and unenforceable because it
violates the plain language of the CSA,
contravenes Congress' express legislative
intent, and oversteps the bounds of the
Attorney General's statutory authority. The
petitions for review are granted.
The Ashcroft Directive purports to interpret
and implement the CSA, which Congress
enacted as Title II of the Comprehensive
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Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970. The stated purpose of the CSA is "to
provide increased research into, and
prevention of, drug abuse and drug
dependence . . . and to strengthen existing
law enforcement authority in the field of
drug abuse." This legislation is designed to
deal in comprehensive fashion with the
growing menace of drug abuse in the United
States[.]").
In 1984, Congress amended the CSA to give
broader authority to the Attorney General.
The Attorney General is now authorized to
revoke a physician's prescription privileges
upon his determination that the physician
has "committed such acts as would render
his registration . . . inconsistent with the
public interest[.]" 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4).
When determining which acts are
inconsistent with the public interest, the
Attorney General must consider the
following factors:
(1) The recommendation of the appropriate
State licensing board or professional
disciplinary authority;
(2) The applicant's expertise in dispensing.
. . controlled substances;
(3) The applicant's conviction record under
Federal or State laws relating to the
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of
controlled substances;
(4) Compliance with applicable State,
Federal, or local laws relating to controlled
substances;
(5) Such other conduct which may threaten
the public health and safety.
Although this provision gives the Attorney
General new discretion over the registration
of health care practitioners, Congress
explained that "the amendment would
continue to give deference to the opinions of
State licensing authorities, since their
recommendations are the first of the factors
to be considered[.]" S. Rep. No. 98-225, at
267 (1984).
Against this backdrop of federal regulation,
in 1994, the State of Oregon enacted by
ballot measure the country's first law
authorizing physician assisted suicide.
Oregon's Death With Dignity Act authorizes
physicians to prescribe lethal doses of
controlled substances to terminally ill
Oregon residents according to procedures
designed to protect vulnerable patients and
ensure that their decisions are reasoned and
voluntary. Oregon voters reaffirmed their
support for the Death With Dignity Act on
November 4, 1997, by defeating a ballot
measure that sought to repeal the law.
Soon thereafter, several members of
Congress, including then-Senator John
Ashcroft, urged then-Attorney General Janet
Reno to declare that physician assisted
suicide violated the CSA. She declined to do
so. In a letter dated January 5, 1998,
Attorney General Reno explained that the
CSA was not "intended to displace the states
as the primary regulators of the medical
profession, or to override a state's
determination as to what constitutes
legitimate medical practice." She concluded
that "the CSA does not authorize [the Drug
Enforcement Administration ("DEA")] to
prosecute, or to revoke DEA registration of,
a physician who has assisted in a suicide in
compliance with Oregon law."
With a change of administrations came a
change of perspectives. On November 9,
2001, newly appointed Attorney General
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John Ashcroft reversed the position of his
predecessor and issued the Directive at issue
here. The Ashcroft Directive proclaims that
physician assisted suicide serves no
"legitimate medical purpose" under 21
C.F.R. § 1306.04 and that specific conduct
authorized by Oregon's Death With Dignity
Act "may 'render [a practitioner's]
registration . . . inconsistent with the public
interest' and therefore subject to possible
suspension or revocation." The Directive
specifically targets health c are practitioners
in Oregon and instructs the DEA to enforce
this determination "regardless of whether
state law authorizes or permits such conduct
by practitioners."
To be perfectly clear, we take no position on
the merits or morality of physician assisted
suicide. We express no opinion on whether
the practice is inconsistent with the public
interest or constitutes illegitimate medical
care. This case is simply about who gets to
decide. All parties agree that the question
before us is whether Congress authorized the
Attorney General to determine that
physician assisted suicide violates the CSA.
We hold that the Attorney General lacked
Congress' requisite authorization. The
Ashcroft Directive violates the "clear
statement" rule, contradicts the plain
language of the CSA, and contravenes the
express intent of Congress.
We begin with instructions from the
Supreme Court that the "earnest and
profound debate about the morality, legality,
and practicality of physician-assisted
suicide" belongs among state lawmakers.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
735, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 117
S. Ct. 2302 (1997). In Glucksberg, Justice
O'Connor emphasized that "states are
presently undertaking extensive and serious
evaluation of physician-assisted suicide....
In such circumstances, the. . . challenging
task of crafting appropriate procedures for
safeguarding ... liberty interests is entrusted
to t he ' laboratory' oft he States . . . int he
first instance."
[Unless Congress' authorization is
"unmistakably clear," the Attorney General
may not exercise control over an area of law
traditionally reserved for state authority,
such as regulation of medical care.]
The Ashcroft Directive is invalid because
Congress has provided no indication - much
less an "unmistakably clear" indication
that it intended to authorize the Attorney
General to regulate the practice of physician
assisted suicide. By attempting to regulate
physician assisted suicide, the Ashcroft
Directive invokes the outer limits of
Congress' power by encroaching on state
authority to regulate medical practice.[...]
The Ashcroft Directive not only lacks clear
congressional authority, it also violates the
plain language of the CSA. We hold that the
Directive exceeds the scope of federal
authority under the CSA, misconstrues the
Attorney General's role under the statute,
and fails to follow explicit instructions for
revoking physician prescription privileges.
The CSA expressly limits federal authority
under the Act to the "field of drug abuse."
Contrary to the Attorney General's
characterization, physician assisted suicide
is not a form of drug "abuse" that Congress
intended the CSA to cover. Physician
assisted suicide is an unrelated, general
medical practice to be regulated by state
lawmakers in the first instance. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. at 735, 737 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
The Attorney General misreads the CSA
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when he concludes that he may evaluate the
public interest "based on any of the five
factors identified in the statute." OLC Memo
at 3 (emphasis added). The CSA clearly
provides that all five public interest factors
"shall be considered."
In sum, the CSA was enacted to combat
drug abuse. To the extent that it authorizes
the federal government to make decisions
regarding the practice of medicine, those
decisions are delegated to the Secretary of
Heath and Human Services, not to the
Attorney General. The Attorney General's
unilateral attempt to regulate general
medical practices historically entrusted to
state lawmakers interferes with the
democratic debate about physician assisted
suicide and far exceeds the scope of his
authority under federal law. We therefore
hold that the Ashcroft Directive is invalid
and may not be enforced.
The petitions for review are GRANTED.
The injunction previously entered by the
district court is ORDERED continued in full
force and effect as the injunction of this
court.
DISSENT: WALLACE, Senior Circuit
Judge, dissenting:
As my colleagues in the majority suggest,
this case is not about the ethics or public
policy implications of physician-assisted
suicide. We need not decide whether the
federal government or the states is better
equipped to regulate physician-assisted
suicide. Setting aside the public policy
aspects of physician-assisted suicide that
evoke passionate feelings, this case involves
a single legal question: is the Attorney
General's interpretation of 21 C.F.R. §
1306.04(a) entitled to deference? Because
our past decisions command deference to the
Attorney General's interpretive rule, I would
deny the petition for review on the merits.
Petitioners argue first that deference to the
Ashcroft Directive is not warranted because
the Attorney General did not satisfy the
APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (requiring
that agencies give "interested persons"
notice of proposed rules and "an opportunity
to participate in the rule making through
submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without opportunity for
oral presentation"). The United States
counters that the APA does not require
notice and comment here, because the
Ashcroft Directive is an interpretive rule,
not a legislative rule. If the Ashcroft
Directive is "genuinely an interpretive rule,
it is valid despite the absence of notice and
comment procedures."
We distinguish interpretive and legislative
rules by asking (1) whether, absent the rule,
there would be an inadequate legislative
basis for an enforcement action; (2) whether
the agency "explicitly invoked its general
legislative authority"; and (3) whether "the
rule effectively amends a prior legislative
rule." Id. "If the answer to any of these
questions is affirmative, we have a
legislative, not an interpretive rule.".
The Ashcroft Directive does not bear any of
these three hallmarks of a legislative rule.
First, even absent the Ashcroft Directive, the
Attorney General could bring an
enforcement action because the Controlled
Substances Act itself prohibits distributing a
controlled substance without a prescription,
21 U.S.C. § 829(a), and preexisting
Department of Justice regulations declare
that "[a] prescription for a controlled
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substance to be effective must be issued for
a legitimate medical purpose," 21 C.F.R. §
1306.04(a). Second, the Attorney General
did not expressly invoke his statutory
authority to "promulgate . .. any [legislative
rules] ... which he may deem necessary and
appropriate for the efficient execution of his
functions under" the Controlled Substances
Act. Third, although the Ashcroft Directive
contradicts former-Attorney General Reno's
1998 statement, the Ashcroft Directive is not
inconsistent with any legislative rule.
The A shcroft D irective does n ot p urport to
"create rights, impose obligations, or effect a
change in existing law pursuant to authority
delegated by Congress." Instead, like other
interpretive rules, the Ashcroft Directive is
"essentially hortatory and instructional,"
clarifying what the Controlled Substances
Act means when applied to a narrowly
defined situation. Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d
593, 613 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Hemp,
333 F.3d at 1087 (explaining that
interpretive rules "explain, but do not add to,
the substantive law that already exists in the
form of a statute or legislative rule"). Thus,
General Ashcroft's failure to give
Petitioners advance notice and an
opportunity to comment does not invalidate
the Ashcroft Directive.
The majority asserts that the Attorney
General lacks authority to decide whether
physician-assisted suicide is consistent with
"the public interest" and a "legitimate
medical practice" under the Controlled
Substances Act and its implementing
regulations because Congress intended to
preserve the states' traditional authority to
make these determinations. This argument
ignores the Controlled Substances Act's text
and controlling Supreme Court decisions.
[It is axiomatic that the meaning of federal
law is a federal question.] [...] State law may
be relevant to certain provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act, see, e.g., 21
U.S.C. § 823(f) (instructing the Attorney
General to consider state-law violations
when deciding whether a physician's
registration would be contrary to the public
interest), but nothing in the Controlled
Substances Act plainly evinces a
congressional intent to define "the
public interest" solely according to state
law. On the contrary, section 823 instructs
the Attorney General to identify acts
"inconsistent with the public interest" by
reference to a variety of sources, including a
physician's federal conviction record,
compliance with "Federal . . . laws relating
to controlled substances," and "other
conduct which may threaten public health
and safety." Id. The majority's contention
that the Attorney General cannot suspend or
revoke a physician's registration without
state authorization ignores Mississippi
Band's "plain indication" rule and
contravenes Congress's clearly expressed
intent.
The majority also cites Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735, 737, 138 L.
Ed. 2d 772, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 117 S. Ct. 2302
(1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring), for the
position that the Attorney General must
defer to the Oregon Act because "physician-
assisted suicide is an unrelated, general
medical practice to be regulated by the
States in the first instance." Glucksberg,
however, addressed states' authority to
prohibit physician-assisted suicide in the
absence of federal regulation; the case did
not answer the question whether Congress
may exercise its Commerce Clause power to
deny physicians access to controlled
substances for physician-assisted suicide.
Rather than p lace federalism I imitations on
the federal government's authority to restrict
physician-assisted suicide, Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion stressed that
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"there is nor eason to think t he democratic
process will not strike the proper balance
between the interests of terminally ill . . .
individuals . . . and the State's interests in
protecting those who might seek to end life
mistakenly or under pressure." Id. at 737.
Simply put, courts should defer to the
political process instead of interposing hasty
constitutional constraints.
Glucksberg does not require the Attorney
General to interpret the Controlled
Substances Act and its implementing
regulations according to state standards of
professional conduct. Rather, the Supreme
Court's decision stands for the broader
proposition that federal courts generally
should keep their distance, allowing the
political process to decide whether and how
to regulate physician-assisted suicide. The
majority's shortsighted decision to declare
the Ashcroft Directive invalid has precisely
the opposite effect.
Finally, the majority argues that the
Ashcroft Directive exceeds the Attorney
General's statutory authority because
Congress has not clearly authorized the
Attorney General to upset the delicate
balance between federal regulation of
controlled substances and state control of
medical practices. As support for this
conclusion, the majority invokes the
Supreme Court's recent analysis in Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S.
159, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576 (2001):
Where an administrative interpretation of a
statute invokes the outer limits of Congress'
power, we expect a clear indication that
Congress intended that result. This
requirement stems from our prudential
desire not to needlessly reach constitutional
issues and our assumption that Congress
does not casually authorize
administrative agencies to interpret a statute
to push the limit of congressional authority.
This concern is heightened where the
administrative interpretation alters the
federal-state framework by permitting
federal encroachment upon a traditional
state power.
Solid Waste's clear statement rule is based
upon understandable and significant
federalism concerns, the importance of
which I do not doubt. The question we must
ask ourselves, however, is whether this
canon of statutory interpretation applies to
the case before us.
Turning to the specific issue raised here -
whether the prescription or dispensation of
controlled substances to assist suicide
substantially affects interstate commerce -
we base our assessment on four factors:
1) whether the statute in question regulates
commerce or any sort of economic
enterprise; 2) whether the statute contains
any express jurisdictional element which
might limit its reach to a discrete set of
cases; 3) whether the statute or its legislative
history contains express congressional
findings that the regulated activity affects
interstate commerce; and 4) whether the link
between the regulated activity and a
substantial effect on interstate commerce is
attenuated.
The Ashcroft Directive clearly satisfies
McCoy's first and the last criteria. The
Ashcroft Directive regulates economic
transactions: physicians generally prescribe
and dispense controlled substances for a fee.
There is no indication here, as there was in
Raich with regards to m edicinal m arijuana,
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that drug-induced physician-assisted
suicide "does not involve [the] sale,
exchange, or distribution" of controlled
substances. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229. The
link between these transactions and their
effect on interstate commerce is not
attenuated simply because relatively few
Oregonians use controlled substances for
assisted suicide. We evaluate whether an
activity's link to interstate commerce is
attenuated by assessing whether its effect on
interstate commerce is sufficiently direct,
Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 195; McCoy, 323
F.3d at 1123-24, and we assess individual
provisions as "parts of a wider regulatory
scheme" (i.e., the Controlled Substances
Act), which regulates a field of drug-related
activity that has "a 'substantial affect' on
interstate commerce," Tisor, 96 F.3d at 375.
Here Congress naturally and directly
reduces the amount of a controlled substance
that flows through the interstate channels
when it prohibits the substance's distribution
for a particular use. Thus, the link between
drug prescriptions and interstate commerce
is sufficiently direct and substantial even if
the drugs ultimately are used in intrastate
activities such as physician-assisted suicide
and the activities' disaggregated effect on
interstate commerce is small.
Having demonstrated the fallacies of the
foregoing challenges to the Ashcroft
Directive, I n ow c onsider what s tandard of
review this court should apply when
assessing the Ashcroft Directive's validity.
The degree of deference we accord an
interpretive rule depends upon whether the
rule construes a statute or an agency
regulation.
If the Ashcroft Directive represents a
statutory interpretation, it enjoys deference
as defined in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 89 L. Ed. 124, 65 S. Ct. 161
(1944). Omohundro v. United States, 300
F.3d 1065, 1067-68 (9th C ir. 2 002). Under
Skidmore, "the weight of such a judgment in
a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control."
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. Especially
relevant under Skidmore is the fact that the
Ashcroft Directive reverses the agency's
earlier interpretation.[...]
If the Ashcroft Directive interprets an
agency regulation, rather than the Controlled
Substances Act itself, we must accord it
"substantial deference." Thomas Jefferson
Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 129 L.
Ed. 2d 405, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994). Under
this highly deferential standard, our task is
not to decide which among several
competing interpretations best serves the
regulatory purpose. Rather, the agency's
interpretation must be given controlling
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation. [..
In my view, the Ashcroft Directive
constitutes an interpretation of a regulation
rather than a statutory interpretation. The
Ashcroft Directive's single interpretive act
is to "determine that assisting suicide is not
a 'legitimate medical purpose' within the
meaning of 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (2001)."
Ashcroft Directive, 66 Fed. Reg. at 56,608.
The Petitioners point to General Ashcroft's
warning that prescribing a controlled
substance to assist suicide may render a
physician's registration subject to
suspension or revocation under section
824(a)(4). This statement was not an
interpretation of the Controlled Substances
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Act, however, but an explanation of the
logical consequences flowing from General
Ashcroft's interpretation of 21 C.F.R. §
1306.04. If assisting suicide is not a
"legitimate medical purpose," the direct
result is that a physician cannot prescribe
controlled substances for this purpose
without violating Controlled Substances Act
section 829 and thereby risking suspension
or revocation of their registration under
sections 823 and 824.
Although I am convinced of the merits of
my legal argument, I admit that even if I
persuaded one of my colleagues to join me,
my opinion would not be a final chapter.
Those who are uneasy with my position (as I
assume Petitioners will be) should see its
limited grasp. The Ashcroft Directive
constitutes a final agency action, but it
surely will not be the last word on
physician-assisted suicide. The Ashcroft
Directive does not spell the end of the
public's "earnest and profound debate about
the morality, legality, and practicality of
physician-assisted suicide," Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 735, nor does it halt states' extensive
and serious evaluation of physician-assisted
suicide and other related issues,"
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736, 737
(O'Connor, J., concurring). State legislators
may supplement the Ashcroft Directive's
sanctions, and they may authorize
alternative methods for assisting suicide that
do not involve the prescription of controlled
substances.
More to my point, the Ashcroft Directive is
not even an immutable expression of federal
policy. A change in presidential
administrations or a shift in the current
President or Attorney General's perspective
might precipitate the Ashcroft Directive's
rescission. Certainly, Congress is free to
enact legislation limiting or counteracting
the Ashcroft Directive's effects. Although
opinions differ over the propriety of assisted
suicide, I fully subscribe to Justice
O'Connor's canny observation that there is
simply "no reason to think that the
democratic process will not strike the proper
balance between the interests of terminally
ill, mentally competent individuals who
would seek to end their suffering and the
[governnent]'s interests in protecting those
who might seek to end life mistakenly or
under pressure." Id. In short, we should trust
the democratic process.
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Ashcroft Attacks Oregon's Suicide Law
Los Angeles Times
November 7, 2001
Josh Meyer & Kim Murphy
Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft on Tuesday
directed U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration agents to go after Oregon
doctors in assisted-suicide cases, saying it is
against federal law to dispense or use
controlled medications to help a terminally
ill patient die.
The move by Ashcroft, a strident critic of
assisted suicide, was aimed at overruling an
Oregon law that allows doctors to help
patients who want to hasten their deaths.
Ashcroft's memo specifically allows for the
revocation of drug prescription licenses of
doctors who participate in an assisted
suicide using federally controlled
substances. His directive did not authorize
criminal prosecution of those doctors.
In a memo to DEA Administrator Asa
Hutchinson, Ashcroft said that assisted
suicide is not a "legitimate medical purpose"
for prescribing, dispensing or administering
federally controlled substances. He said that
the use of such drugs by physicians to
manage patients' pain is medically valid.
The action reignited the national debate over
assisted suicide. It drew praise from anti-
abortion groups and criticism from those
who support doctors' efforts to help patients
who want to take a cocktail of barbiturates
to end their pain and suffering.
Ashcroft's directive reverses a June 1998
declaration by his p redecessor, Janet R eno.
She barred federal agents from moving
against doctors who, in keeping with the
requirements of Oregon's assisted-suicide
law, help terminally ill patients end their
lives. That law was passed by voters in
1994, but because of court battles did not
take effect until October 1997.
Within hours of Ashcroft's announcement,
Oregon officials vowed to go to court to
obtain an injunction blocking the directive.
Supporters and opponents alike predicted
that the Supreme Court would ultimately
decide the matter.
"It's beyond my comprehension why, in the
face of what's happening in the world today,
that this would be a priority of any type for
our attorney general," said George Eighmey,
executive director of the Compassion in
Dying Federation in Oregon.
The Oregon group was one of many that
said Ashcroft's directive would have a
chilling effect on doctors nationwide over
fears that their prescription decisions will be
second-guessed by drug agents with no
medical expertise.
Critics of assisted suicide, including anti-
abortion organizations and some religious
groups, hailed Ashcroft's action. Some said
it would protect the elderly and infirm in
Oregon from pressure to take their own
lives.
"This is a carefully crafted ruling that
reassures doctors about their ability to
prescribe federally controlled drugs to
relieve p am while ensuring that t he federal
government does not facilitate assisted
suicide," said Burke Balch, director of
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medical ethics at the National Right to Life
Committee.
Balch said the only doctors who will face
increased scrutiny are those who fill out
state paperwork admitting that they have
participated in an assisted suicide.
"It's not like the DEA is going in anywhere,
trying to second-guess doctors," Balch said.
Neither the attorney general nor his aides
commented publicly on the directive, which
resembled a legal brief and contained little
in the way of explanation or Asheroft's
reasons for issuing it.
"We're letting the memo speak for itself,"
said one Justice Department official.
Ashcroft's memo cited the Supreme Court's
ruling in a medical marijuana case earlier
this year that federal law regulating
controlled substances is uniform throughout
the United States, and cannot be superseded
by state law.
Therefore, Ashcroft concluded, Oregon's
law permitting doctor-assisted suicide is
now legally out of step with the law of the
land.
Ashcroft told Hutchinson that drug agents
around the nation, particularly in Oregon,
should resume enforcement of a DEA policy
prohibiting the dispensing of controlled
substances to assist suicides. Hutchinson
said in a statement that he will instruct
agents to do so immediately.
"I am pleased that this issue has been
clarified for the American public," said
Hutchinson, until recently a GOP
congressman from Arkansas. "DEA will
continue to maintain consistency in striking
the balance between relieving pain and
preventing the abuse of pain medication."
Under Oregon's Death With Dignity Act,
doctors may provide-but not administer-a
lethal prescription to terminally ill adult
state residents. The law requires the
assessment of two physicians that the patient
has less than six months to live, has chosen
to die voluntarily and is able to make health
care decisions.
Seventy Oregon residents have used the law
to end their lives. Another half dozen or so
patients have completed the application
process and have their prescriptions in hand;
a few dozen more are in the middle of the
application process and could be affected by
Ashcroft's directive.
Barbara Coombs Lee of Compassion in
Dying Federation said the relatively small
number of suicides has disproved
opponents' predictions that the law would
cause a dramatic increase in suicides. "We
now have four years of very careful
implementation during which we have only
seen a few people use the law under
extraordinary and compelling
circumstances," she said.
She rejected Ashcroft's linking of the
assisted-suicide issue with the medical
marijuana case, in which the Supreme Court
essentially put an Oakland "buyers' club"
out of business.
In its ruling in May, the court said there is
no exception in federal drug laws for the
medical use of marijuana to ease pain from
cancer, AIDS and other illnesses.
"It's easy to distinguish the federal
government's ability to put these buyer
clubs out of business from what the federal
government is trying to do in this case,
which is override state determination of
what is [a] legitimate medical purpose for
medication already in common use and
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under regulation by the state," Lee said.
"Marijuana is not a medication in common
use"
Oregon officials plan to argue that
Ashcroft's directive would have "dramatic
and irreversible repercussions on the state,"
said Kevin Neely, spokesman for the
Oregon attorney general's office. He said
state lawyers would go to U.S. District
Court in Portland today to seek a temporary
restraining order and a preliminary
injunction to bar enforcement of Ashcroft's
directive.
"Today's Department of Justice decision
was inevitable, as it simply restated federal
law," said Republican Sen. Gordon Smith,
an opponent of the state law.
Democratic Sen. Ron Wyden, who blocked
legislation in Congress that would have
outlawed assisted suicide, accused Ashcroft
of ignoring the will of the state's voters and
of compromising medical care throughout
the country.
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Court Rejects Ashcroft; Backs Suicide Law
Los Angeles Times
May 27, 2004
Henry Weinstein
Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft lost a major round
Wednesday in his attempt to block Oregon's
assisted-suicide law, as a federal appeals
court panel ruled that his efforts exceeded
his authority.
Since Oregon's so-called Death With
Dignity law went into effect in 1997, 171
people - most of them with cancer - have
used the law to hasten their deaths,
according to the state's Department of
Health Services.
Ashcroft, who began campaigning against
Oregon's law when he was a U.S. senator
from Missouri, tried to block it in November
2001 by issuing an order aimed at doctors.
The order said physicians who dispensed
lethal barbiturates to patients under
Oregon's law would be violating the federal
statute designed to restrict narcotics
trafficking and illegal diversion of drugs.
Under that policy, the Justice Department
would have been able to go to court to strip
doctors who assisted in suicides of their
right to prescribe medicine.
That effort by Ashcroft "far exceeds the
scope of his authority under federal law,"
Judge Richard A. Tallman wrote in the
opinion for the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals in San Francisco.
Asheroft's "unilateral attempt to regulate
general medical practices historically
entrusted to state lawmakers interferes with
the democratic debate about physician-
assisted suicide" and is "unlawful and
unenforceable," Tallman wrote.
The 9th Circuit is known for its liberal
opinions and has frequently been reversed
by the U.S. Supreme Court on high-profile
issues.
But in this case Tallman, a former federal
prosecutor appointed to the court by
President Clinton, is generally considered
one of the appeals court's more conservative
members.
Moreover, the Supreme Court considered
assisted-suicide cases from two states in the
late 1990s, ultimately upholding Oregon's
right to enact its law, so the justices may
have little desire to revisit the issue, legal
analysts said.
In one of those cases, the high court said that
"the earnest and profound debate" around
the country "about the morality, legality and
practicality of physician-assisted suicide"
should be left to state lawmakers.
Oregon is the only state to have enacted a
physician-assisted suicide law. Many others,
including California, ban the practice.
In order to invoke the law and obtain the
lethal barbiturates, a patient must
demonstrate to two physicians that he has no
more than six months to live. Doctors have
to be convinced that a patient is mentally
competent to make the decision, and the
patient must administer the medicine to
himself.
"By criminalizing medical practices
specifically authorized under Oregon law,
the Ashcroft directive interferes with
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Oregon's authority to regulate medical care
within its borders," Tallman wrote.
"The Ashcroft directive not only lacks clear
congressional authority, it also violates the
plain language of the Controlled Substances
Act," he wrote.
"We express no opinion on whether the
practice is inconsistent with the public
interest or constitutes illegitimate medical
care," Tallman wrote, referring to assisted
suicides. "This case is simply about who
gets to decide," he added, noting that the law
had been approved twice by Oregon voters,
in 1994 and 1997.
Tallman was joined in the 2-1 opinion by
Judge Donald Lay.
The dissenting judge, J. Clifford Wallace,
said the court should have accorded
"substantial deference" to Ashcroft's
conclusion that physician-assisted suicide
did not serve a "legitimate medical
purpose."
Ashcroft had the authority to take the action
he did, and "Congress is free to enact
legislation limiting or counteracting" the
attorney general's order if it disapproves,
Wallace wrote.
Justice Department spokesman Charles
Miller said department attorneys were
reviewing the decision and would not
immediately comment.
Even some legal scholars who are ordinarily
in tune with Ashcroft's positions said they
thought the attorney general was on shaky
legal ground.
"As someone who often approves of the
work of the attorney general and who also
thinks assisted suicide is morally
indefensible, I understand John Ashcroft's
motivations to intervene in this matter," said
Douglas Kmiec of Pepperdine Law School.
"Yet, on the law, his regulatory intervention
was more questionable," he added. "The
Supreme Court rightly held that the issue of
assisted suicide is one to be debated and
resolved at the state level, and Congress did
not clearly provide otherwise in the
Controlled Substances Act."
The ruling was hailed by Oregon officials as
well as patients who support the law.
Don James, a 78-year-old retired
schoolteacher from Portland who was one of
the plaintiffs challenging Asheroft's order,
said he was delighted with the ruling.
James, who has prostate cancer and is
confined to a wheelchair, said he was on
heavy medication though he was not yet
terminally ill.
"I'm not in a hurry to die. I want to stay
active as long as I can," he said. "I'm not
sure what I will do when that moment
comes, but I wanted the option" of hastening
death.
James, a registered Republican, added, "I
resent that Ashcroft meddled in our affairs
in this democracy to try to deprive us of
something we want."
George Eighmey, executive director of the
Oregon chapter of Compassion in Dying, the
organization that led the battle to get the
suicide law enacted, also praised the ruling.
"I believe today's decision by the 9th Circuit
has been a huge victory for Oregon and for
all Oregonians who believe in end-of-life
choices," he said. "We hope the message is
received by Atty. Gen. Ashcroft that it is
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time for him to keep his hands off Oregon's
law and Oregonians."
But N. Gregory Hamilton, a doctor from
Portland and the former president of
Physicians for Compassionate Care, an
organization opposed to the Oregon law,
denounced the ruling.
"It's amazing that a federal court would
allow any state to nullify federal regulatory
authority and federal law," he said. "If
Oregon is allowed to exempt itself from
federal law about the misuse of controlled
substances for the purposes of overdosing
patients, what is to stop any state from
exempting itself from other important
federal regulations and laws?"
Oregon Right to Life officials also criticized
the decision and expressed hope that
Ashcroft would appeal further.
Gayle Atteberry, executive director of the
group, called the ruling a tragedy.
Some p atients w ho become eligible f or t he
lethal barbiturates "are then abandoned to
depression instead of receiving the help they
need," she said.
Arthur Caplan, director of the Center for
Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania,
said, however, that abuses foreseen by the
law's opponents had not occurred in
Oregon.
The suicide law has not been used as often
as predicted, in part because Oregon's
doctors and nurses have done a good job on
end-of-life palliative care, he said.
After voters passed the law, Ashcroft was
among several members of Congress who
urged then-Atty. Gen. Janet Reno to take
action against physicians who applied it. In
1998, Reno said such action was
unwarranted. Ashcroft reversed that decision
when he became attorney general.
The next day, U.S. District Judge Robert E.
Jones in Portland issued a temporary
restraining order blocking the Ashcroft
directive.
"To allow an attorney general - an
appointed executive whose tenure depends
entirely on whatever administration occupies
the White House - to determine the
legitimacy of a particular medical practice ...
would be unprecedented," Jones, an
appointee of President Reagan, wrote a few
months later in an opinion making the
restraining order permanent.
The Justice Department appealed, setting the
stage for Wednesday's ruling.
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Euthanizing the CSA
National Review
May 27, 2004
Wesley J. Smith
By now it has been widely reported that the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals "upheld" the
assisted-suicide law in Oregon by a vote of
2-1 in Oregon v. Ashcroft yesterday. Not so:
The validity of the Oregon law was never at
stake in the case. Regardless of whether
Ashcroft or the State of Oregon prevailed in
the case, physician-assisted suicide would
have remained legal within Oregon's
borders.
The case is actually very narrow and arcane,
but important nonetheless in a way that
transcends the pros and cons of assisted
suicide. The question before the court was
whether Ashcroft exceeded his legal
authority when, in 2001, he interpreted the
federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) as
prohibiting doctors from prescribing
federally regulated drugs for use in assisted
suicide ont he b asis that hastening death is
not a "legitimate medical purpose" for the
use of drugs under federal law.
The majority ruled that he did. First, it found
that the states have the near-exclusive right
to regulate medical practice within their
borders and that Ashcroft's directive
violated that constitutional principle of
federalism. But as dissenting justice J.
Clifford Wallace pointed out, even Ashcroft
conceded that Oregon physicians would still
have b een free tou se 1 ethal substances n ot
regulated by the CSA to help kill patients
without running afoul of federal law. They
would merely have been precluded from
using substances regulated by the feds under
the purview of the CSA.
The majority next found that the sole
purpose of the CSA is to prevent "drug
abuse," interpreting that term to mean
addiction. But Wallace's dissent points out,
quite accurately, that controlled substances
can be abused in ways besides being taken
as addicting substances. "The Act targets all
'improper use of controlled substances,'
Wallace wrote, "and gives the Attorney
General discretion to decide whether
registering a physician to dispense drugs 'is
consistent with public health and safety.'
Reasonable minds might disagree as to
whether physician-assisted suicide
constitutes an 'improper use' of a controlled
substance, but nothing in the Controlled
Substances Act precludes its application to
physician-assisted suicide."
Finally, the majority ruled that if the federal
government was going to act to prevent the
use of federally controlled substances in
assisted suicide, the secretary of Health and
Human Services should have undertaken the
action rather than the attorney general.
Wallace disagreed. Now there's an issue to
get the blood boiling!
Even though the scope of decision itself was
quite narrow, its impact could be
disturbingly broad. For one thing, it seems
to fly in the face of the United States
Supreme Court's unanimous approval of
federal policy over "medical marijuana." In
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers'
Cooperative, the high court ruled that while
California was certainly free to legalize
medical marijuana under state law, this did
not prevent the federal government from
enforcing the anti-marijuana Controlled
Substances Act. If federal law is not
nullified by a state declaring it a legitimate
medical act for a physician to recommend
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cannabis to patients to palliate pain, how can
the federal government be prohibited from
enforcing the CSA against doctors who use
controlled substances to intentionally kill
patients?
Of greater concern is that the majority's
decision threatens t he uniform enforcement
of the CSA throughout the nation. Under the
ruling, the states in effect have the power to
determine what constitutes legitimate
medical uses of controlled substances under
federal law as part of their power to regulate
the practice of medicine within their
borders. This could lead to chaos, since it
could conceivably mean that the federal
government would be forced to adopt 50
different approaches to enforcing the
medical aspects of the CSA.
Consider the following hypothetical but not
fanciful-situation: Oregon allows physicians
to participate in assisted suicide, but only for
terminally ill patients. Washington State
prohibits physicians from participating in
any assisted suicide. But California and
Florida pass laws permitting assisted suicide
for the disabled and for the elderly who are
"tired of living," as well as the terminally ill.
In Oregon, a doctor who prescribed
barbiturates in lethal dosage for a non-
terminally ill disabled person would have
broken Oregon law, and hence, could also
be prosecuted for violating the CSA. But if
the same doctor prescribed the same drugs
to the same person in California, no federal
law would have been broken. Yet, if she
prescribed controlled substances to a dying
person in Washington, once again, she
would have violated federal law because her
prescribing would not be a legitimate
medical act in that state.
Nor, it is important to stress, would such
chaos be limited to the use of controlled
substances for assisted suicide. What if a
state passed a law permitting morphine to be
used to create euphoria as a "treatment" for
depression or anxiety? If states truly have
the unlimited right to impose their views on
the federal government as to what
constitutes a legitimate medical use of
federally controlled substances, the federal
government would be bound to respect even
the most idiosyncratic policy. The result
could be the utter disintegration of the CSA
and a total fracturing of national drug policy,
at least as it relates to the medical use of
narcotics.
What to do? Ashcroft might be tempted to
request the full Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeal to review the decision, a process
known as an en banc hearing. This would be
a mistake, in my view. The Ninth Circuit is
often quite radical in its rulings, but the
majority decision was appropriately narrow
in scope. Moreover, Judge Wallace issued a
powerfully reasoned dissent. It is unlikely
that another bite at the apple would garner a
better result.
No, the best bet is for Ashcroft to try and
take the case directly to the United States
Supreme Court. The importance of this case
far exceeds the public-policy pros and cons
of a ssisted s uicide. At st ake i s whether t he
federal government can retain ultimate
authority over federal regulations
promulgated under the Controlled
Substances Act or whether we are in the
midst of devolving regulatory power over
drug policy to each of the 50 states.
-Attorney Wesley J. Smith is a senior fellow
with the Discovery Institute, an attorney for
the International Task Force on Euthanasia
and Assisted Suicide, and a special
consultant to the Center for Bioethics and
Culture. He filed an amicus curiae brief in
Oregon v. Ashcroft on behalf of Physicians
for Compassionate Care.
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In Oregon, Choosing Death Over Suffering
New York Times
June 1, 2004
John Schwartz and James Estrin
A Desire to Be in Control
Perhaps the most surprising thing to emerge
from Oregon is how rarely the law has
actually been used.
"We estimate that one out of a hundred
individuals who begin the process of asking
about assisted suicide will carry it out," said
Ann Jackson, executive director of the
Oregon Hospice Association.
Since 1997, 171 patients with terminal
illnesses have legally taken t heir own lives
using lethal medication, compared with
53,544 Oregonians with the same diseases
who died from other causes during that time,
according to figures released by the Oregon
Department of Health Services in March.
More than 100 people begin the process of
requesting the drugs in a typical year.
Doctors wrote 67 prescriptions for the drugs
in 2003, up from 24 in 1998. Forty-two
patients died under the law in 2003
compared with 16 in 1998.
Many patients say they want to have the
option to end their lives if the pain becomes
unbearable or if they are sliding into
incompetence while still thinking clearly.
"I'd say it's less than 50-50 that I'd ever do
this thing," said Don James, a retired school
administrator with advanced prostate cancer
who has not yet received his pills.
A second surprise has been the kind of
people who use the law. They are not so
much depressed as determined, said Linda
Ganzini, a professor of psychiatry at Oregon
Health Sciences University. She led a recent
survey of 35 doctors who had received
requests for suicide drugs. The doctors
described the patients as "feisty" and
"unwavering."
A third lesson is that for most of those who
seek assisted suicide, the greatest concern
appears not to be fear of pain but fear of
losing autonomy, which is cited by 87
percent of the people who have taken their
lives with the drugs. Only 22 percent of the
patients listed fear of inadequate pain
control as an end-of-life concern, perhaps a
sign that pain management has improved
over the years.
And though opponents of the law argued
that patients would feel pressured by
families and even insurers to end their lives
early out of financial concerns, so far
concerns of being a burden to family have
been cited by 36 percent of patients, and
financial concerns by just 2 percent. The
surveys show that the standard version of
health care for terminally i11 patients might
not be what these patients are looking for,
Dr. Ganzini said. The standard version of
care says, in effect, "we're going to take
care of you," she said. But "for them, the
real problem i s other p eople taking c are o f
you."1
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Ms. Jackson said the surveys were changing
the hospice association's practices.
In 1994, the group opposed the Death With
Dignity law. Now the hospices work directly
with programs like Compassion in Dying, a
group that is involved in 75 percent of
Oregon's assisted suicides. Thanks to the
surveys of patients seeking assisted suicide,
Ms. Jackson said, her organization learned
that half the people who rejected hospice
care did so because "they thought that
hospice was condescending or arrogant."
Now the hospices fit their treatments to
patients who seek assisted suicide and
emphasize that their wishes will be
respected, she said.
Opponents of the Oregon law like Dr.
Kenneth Stevens, chairman of the
department of radiation oncology at the
Oregon Health and Science University in
Portland, say it violates the fundamental
tenet of medicine. Dr. Stevens argues that
doctors should not assist in suicides because
to do so is incompatible with the doctor's
role as healer.
"I went into medicine to help people," he
said. "I didn't go into medicine to give
people a prescription for them to die."
Dr. Stevens heads an organization,
Physicians for Compassionate Care, that
opposes assisted suicide and the Oregon
law. Members of his group, he said, tend to
be "people of faith," who believe that
assisted suicide violates their religious
principles. But they base their opposition to
the law on moral and ethical grounds,
arguing that it leads down a slippery slope
toward euthanasia and patient abuses.
He recalled the struggle of his wife, who
died of cancer in 1982. In the weeks before
she died, he said, her doctor offered her an
"extra-large prescription" for painkillers.
"As I helped her into the car, she said, 'He
wants me to kill myself,"' Dr. Stevens
recalled. "It just devastated her that her
doctor, her trusted doctor, subtly s uggested
that."
Others who initially opposed the law, like
the hospice group, say they have learned to
live with it. Michael Bailey, for example,
took out a loan in 1994 to fight the Death
With Dignity act. His daughter has Down
syndrome, and he said that at the time he
could s ee a straight line b etween v oluntary
assisted suicide and forced euthanasia for
the handicapped.
Now Mr. Bailey says he has not seen any
abuses. "I don't see that there's ever been a
scandal," he said, "and the numbers are not
huge." Still, he does not support the law. "If
it was up to me, I'd say no, but I don't think
there's any great human rights crisis here,"
he said.
Support for the law crosses ideological lines,
said Nicholas van Aelstyn, a lawyer in San
Francisco who works with Compassion in
Dying. Some commentators have
characterized the movement as a liberal
cause, but "to most of the people exercising
it, it's a libertarian issue," he said. "Many of
our clients are die-hard Republicans who
don't want government interfering in their
lives."
That certainly describes Mr. Wilson, who
calls himself a "staunch conservative" and
says Mr. Ashcroft is "dead wrong" about the
Oregon law.
The support for the law in Oregon, Mr.
James said, reflects the pioneer spirit that
flows from the wagon trains that brought the
early settlers. "They were pretty well-
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educated, family-oriented people willing to
hack a new life o ut oft his w ilderness," he
said. "Pretty independent folks."
Those who drafted the Death With Dignity
Act say they did not try to come up with a
political document that would warm the
heart of Jack Kevorkian, or that would
permit euthanasia, which is repugnant to a
significant portion of the population,
Instead, they say, they carefully drew up a
law that they believed would gain support of
everyone except the most determined
opponents, and that was loaded with
safeguards against abuse.
Doctors have long made lethal doses of
drugs available to patients inclined to end
their struggle against disease, said Eli
Stutsman, president of the board of the
Death With Dignity National Center.
"We took something that was already
happening, a nd we wrote a law a round i t,"
he said.
Opponents had argued that Oregon would
become a magnet for people seeking suicide,
so the law's provisions were restricted to the
state's residents.
The law also sets a high barrier to getting
the life-ending medications, giving patients
the chance to change their mind up to the
last moment. A patient must make two oral
requests for the drugs and one written
request after a l 5-day waiting p eriod. T wo
doctors must determine that the patient has
less thans ix months to live, a doctor must
decide that the patient is capable of making
independent decisions about health care and
the doctor has to describe to the patient
alternatives like hospice care.
The law also requires that the drugs be self-
administered by the patient, rather than
given by a doctor or family member, to
avoid involuntary euthanasia. The death
certificate, under the law, must state the
cause of death as the underlying disease, not
suicide.
That provision pleases Mr. James.
"I don't like the word 'suicide,"' he said,
because "if I'm really on a path, the natural
path" toward death, and "just hastening it a
little bit, I don't call that suicide."
Mr. Wilson's family supports him in his
wishes, although his wife, Viola, says she is
against the general idea.
"This is his thing, not mine," she said. "It's
not the way I'd go."
Her views flow from her religious beliefs,
she said.
"I'm inclined to think that I have a purpose
in life until I go," she said. "God has a plan
for me, and I'm here until he says it's time
to go.
She said she liked her husband's idea of
having family members gather in a kind of
living wake, however.
"That would be fine," she said. "You should
celebrate the life instead of worry about the
death."
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Suicidal Folly
National Review
August 19, 2004
Jonathan H. Adler
This past May, a divided panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that the federal government could not
prohibit doctors from using prescription
drugs for assisted suicide in Oregon.
Specifically, the court invalidated a directive
issued by Attorney General John Ashcroft in
November 2001 declaring that assisted
suicide was not a "legitimate medical
purpose" under the Controlled Substances
Act (CSA), and that doctors who wrote
prescriptions to hasten their patients' deaths
could be subject to federal prosecution, even
where such prescriptions are legal under
state law. With the court's ruling, doctors in
Oregon are once again free to prescribe
drugs in lethal doses to hasten the death of
terminally ill patients pursuant to Oregon's
Death with Dignity Act. The federal
government sought rehearing of the court's
opinion, but just last week the petition was
denied. Apparently not a single judge voted
for en bane review.
Opponents of doctor-assisted suicide,
including many prominent conservatives,
sternly denounced the Ninth Circuit's ruling
and hope the Justice Department takes the
case to the Supreme Court. After all, any
court decision paving the way for a
generation of Dr. Kevorkians must be
worthy of condemnation and reversal,
particularly if issued by the Ninth Circuit.
This is a predictable and understandable
response to the court's decision in Oregon v.
Ashcroft. It is also wrong.
The question before the Ninth Circuit was
not whether Oregon's decision to allow
doctor-assisted suicide is moral or wise. Nor
was it whether the federal government has
the power to preempt state policy choices
concerning prescription drugs or medical
practice. Rather, the narrow question before
the court was whether the CSA authorizes
the attorney general to prosecute or
otherwise sanction doctors who help their
patients to commit suicide where legal under
state law. Given the lack of any language in
the CSA authorizing such action, and the
states' traditional role in the regulation of
medical practice, the court found the
attorney general had overreached.
Under existing federal regulations, the
attorney general may prosecute a doctor who
prescribes a controlled substance for
anything other than a "legitimate medical
purpose." States are primarily responsible
for the licensing and regulation of medical
professionals. Therefore, the definition of
"legitimate medical purpose" has
historically been a function of state law.
Prior to 2001, the federal government never
sought to define "legitimate medical
purpose" beyond requiring that physicians
only dispense prescriptions in the course of
their "professional practice." "The principle
that state governments bear the primary
responsibility for evaluating physician-
assisted suicide follows from our concept of
federalism, which requires that state
lawmakers, not the federal government, are
the primary regulators of professional
medical conduct," wrote Judge Richard
Tallman for the court's majority. Absent a
clear statement from Congress, this
traditional division of powers must remain.
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It is neither for the courts nor the executive-
whether represented by the attorney general
or any other executive officer to adopt
uniform national rules proscribing private
conduct absent a constitutional command or
congressional authorization. This is
particularly true where, as here, the
executive seeks to extend federal regulation
into an area traditionally left to the states. As
offensive as it is when Congress extends
federal regulatory authority beyond
traditionally recognized constitutional limits,
it is far worse-not to mention undemocratic-
when the equivalent action is taken
unilaterally by the executive or the courts.
As the Supreme Court has noted time and
again, the historic police powers of the states
are not to be superseded unless it is "the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress."
It is likely that, under existing Commerce
Clause precedent, the federal government
could prohibit the use of controlled
substances for doctor-assisted suicide if it so
chose, yet the CSA does not do it. One can
search the CSA's language and legislative
history and never find anything approaching
a clear statement that Congress sought to
prohibit doctor-assisted suicide. Indeed,
Congress has never enacted a law to prohibit
the practice. To the contrary, in 1999 and
2000 Congress explicitly considered-and
failed to adopt-such legislation. Federal law
prohibits the use of federal funds or facilities
for doctor-assisted suicide, but Congress
never took the next step. It has neither
directly prohibited the use of controlled
substances for such purposes nor delegated
the authority to do so to the executive
branch.
Whether or not one agrees that doctor-
assisted suicide is a matter best left to the
states, the only proper basis for federal
preemption is the enactment of legislation.
There is no justification for displacing the
traditional state role in medical regulation
through administrative fiat. Such unilateral
executive action in the face of express
congressional inaction was improper when
the Food and Drug Administration sought to
regulate tobacco as a drug, and when the
Environmental Protection Agency suggested
it could regulate carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases as pollutants. It is no more
proper here.
Writing on NRO, Wesley J. Smith suggested
that Oregon v. Ashcroft "threatens the
uniform enforcement of the CSA throughout
the nation," and that this "could lead to
chaos" as different states adopt different
approaches to doctor-assisted suicide.
According to Smith, the decision suggests
states "have the unlimited right to impose
their views on the federal government as to
what constitutes a legitimate medical use of
federally controlled substances." This is
simply n ot t he c ase: T he decision does n ot
allow state legislation to preempt federal
law. Rather, in this one instance, it makes
federal law dependent upon relevant state
standards unless and until Congress
specifies the contrary.
Smith conjured a bugaboo of variable state
standards compromising the consistency of
federal law, yet it is hardly revolutionary for
federal crimes to be defined by applicable
state laws. Under 27 U.S.C. 122, it is against
federal law to transport alcoholic beverages
into a state in violation of state law. This
regulatory approach embraces federalism
principles by enlisting the federal
government only insofar as federal
assistance is necessary to allow states to
define local standards based upon
community tastes and preferences without
undue interference from neighboring
jurisdictions. Whatever its other merits, this
regulatory regime has hardly led to chaos.
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The regulation of prescription drugs also
varies more than Smith and others would
suggest. As detailed in the June 1 Wall
Street Journal, some states allow medical
professionals other than doctors to prescribe
certain controlled substances. Several states
allow pharmacists to prescribe
immunizations or smoking-cessation drugs
without a doctor's visit, while in other states
psychologists may prescribe antidepressants
and anti-anxiety drugs. Still other states
authorize limited prescription powers to
optometrists, midwives, and nurse
practitioners. Even the CSA is less than
uniform, as a state conviction for a drug-
related offense or state suspension of a
medical license i s a sufficient b asis for the
federal government to revoke a doctor's
registration. In other words, whether a
doctor is able to prescribe drugs under
federal law is already a function the law and
policy of the state in which he opts to
practice.
Contrary to some conservative claims,
Oregon v. Ashcroft is hardly an example of
radical jurists run amok. Nonetheless, the
decision may well be overturned by the
Supreme Court. Administrative law
Professor William Funk, of Oregon's
Northwestern Law School at Lewis & Clark
College, observes that the majority opinion
is poorly argued, even if correct on the
merits. The Supreme Court has shown itself
quite deferential to assertions of federal
authority-a handful of recent federalism
decisions notwithstanding-so it may well
defer to the Justice Department's claims.
Irrespective of the ultimate legal resolution
in this case, it is important for conservatives
to step back and consider the principles at
issue. Doctor-assisted suicide may well be a
grievous wrong. But this does not justify any
and all legal doctrines to prohibit it.
Federalism and separation of powers are the
ultimate bulwarks against government
tyranny. Without a doubt, these divisions of
legal authority may frustrate the adoption of
worthy policies, but they are necessary to
prevent the excessive concentration of
federal power. Granting states the freedom
to experiment with better policies absent
federal interference necessarily allows them
the freedom to adopt unwise or immoral
laws. On this issue, as in many others, we
cannot enjoy the benefits of federalism
without suffering the costs.
As the late Frank Meyer, one of National
Review's founding contributors and
longtime senior editors, noted, "The genius
of the American Constitution rests in the
institutionalization of the limitation of
power, in the division of power so that it is
held by a number of separate and distinct
organs." This is the heart of federalism.
Meyer argued time and again that to
compromise this structure, even for the most
noble policy goal, is shortsighted folly-if
not itself suicidal. Conservatives should not
be so blinded by their opposition to assisted
suicide that they lose sight of this important
truth,
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Why Ashcroft is Wrong on Assisted Suicide
Commentary
February 2002
Nelson Lund
Alone among the American states, Oregon
has legalized physician-assisted suicide.
This step was thoroughly debated and
solemnly taken by the voters of Oregon not
once but twice. In 1994, a narrow majority
approved the policy in a formal referendum,
and a much larger majority rejected a repeal
initiative three years later.
But now, in a ruling issued last November 9,
Attorney General John Ashcroft has
reversed a decision of his predecessor, Janet
Reno, and decided that Oregon doctors may
no longer use federally regulated drugs to
assist their patients in committing suicide.
This decision raises important and troubling
questions. Although I support the goal of
discouraging physician-assisted suicide, I
also believe that Ashcroft is pursuing that
goal in a way that may undermine a
fundamental constitutional principle.
To see why the Attorney General's approach
to the problem is questionable, we need to
begin with a closer look at the problem
itself In my view, the people of Oregon
made a serious mistake in legalizing assisted
suicide. Much of the current enthusiasm for
this practice is driven by a perfectly
understandable yearning for patient
autonomy and by an equally understandable
reluctance to let the frequently arrogant
medical profession force us to endure
degrading, technologically extended deaths.
Unfortunately, the legalization of assisted
suicide is also ab ig step d own a road that
will finally reduce patient autonomy rather
than enhance it.
We need not go down this road. The fear
that obsessive doctors will inflict a
demeaning death by means of high-tech
"heroic measures" is entirely legitimate, but
no patient need consent to unwanted medical
treatments, and directives given in advance
can guard against their use on those who are
unconscious. And if doctors are too often
ignoring "do not resuscitate" orders, as they
may be, the answer is hardly to give them a
new power that can easily be used to
substitute their judgment for their patients'
as to whether a life is worth living. Yet this
is exactly the power that the people of
Oregon have decided to give their
physicians.
Three principal benefits arise from leaving
the states to deal with local concerns. First, a
multiplicity of jurisdictions creates choices
that enable citizens to achieve the mix of
policies that most closely satisfies their
individual wants and needs. Second, and
closely related, federalism promotes
competition among jurisdictions: state
governments that commit serious errors in
satisfying their residents' preferences incur
the costs of emigration (and immigration
forgone) by the taxpayers who make
government possible. Finally, the allocation
of political power to the state level inhibits
the ability of national government to shift
costs and benefits from one place to another,
and thus to create incentives for pork-barrel
policies whose costs exceed their benefits.
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People can and do have different preferences
about this issue, which are presumably
based on their differing assessments of the
risks and benefits to themselves and those
they care about. Convinced though I am that
the risks of allowing physician-assisted
suicide outweigh the benefits, it would be
silly to pretend that no benefits exist, and
presumptuous to suppose that I might not be
wrong. Nor is it easy to see why Oregon and
other state governments should be
considered less capable than the federal
government of settling on appropriate
policies in the light ofnew experience and
information, including new developments in
medicine and the medical profession.
When the Supreme Court wisely declined to
create a constitutional right to assisted
suicide, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
pointed out that in this area there was no
obvious need for judicial intrusion:
Every one of us at some point may be
affected by our own or a family member's
terminal illness. There is no reason to think
the democratic process will not strike the
proper balance between the interests of
terminally ill, mentally competent
individuals who would seek to end their
suffering and the state's interests in
protecting those who might seek to end life
mistakenly or under pressure.
For the very same reason, there is no
obvious need for the federal government to
interfere with Oregon's experiment.
That is hardly to say there will be no bad
effects from Oregon's new policy. To the
contrary, vulnerable people will likely be
pressured to end their lives prematurely;
others will become more distrustful of
doctors, a nd p erhaps I ess willing to submit
to treatment. Some physicians will take
another big step away from their proper role
as healers and comforters, and will become
increasingly corrupted by the very different
role of deciding whose lives are worth
living. Euthanasia of nonconsenting victims
is also entirely possible.
As bad as these effects may be, however,
they will be visited almost entirely on
Oregonians, and will not threaten the
citizens of other states. Nor will Oregon's
policy necessarily spread to other states.
Every state in the union remains free to
outlaw physician-assisted suicide and to
enforce its laws as vigorously as it sees fit.
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THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT
Law Backing Two-Sex Marriage Is Upheld by Federal Judge
The New York Times
August 19, 2004
Adam Liptak
A 1996 federal law that defines marriage as
"a legal union between one man and one
woman" is constitutional, a federal judge in
Tacoma, Wash., ruled Tuesday. It is the first
decision of a federal court to address the
constitutionality o ft he I aw, t he D efense o f
Marriage Act.
The decision is not binding on other courts,
and the question of the constitutionality of
the marriage law is likely to give rise to
many decisions in coming years.
The Tacoma decision arose from a
bankruptcy filing. Lee and Ann Kandu, two
American women, were married in British
Columbia in August 2003 and filed a joint
bankruptcy petition i n T acoma t wo m onths
later. The Justice Department opposed the
joint filing, saying the federal marriage law
forbade it.
The Defense of Marriage Act, signed into
law by President Bill Clinton in 1996, has
two significant provisions. One says that
only married couples made up of a man and
a woman can qualify for rights and benefits
under federal programs that take marital
status into account. A report by the General
Accounting Office in 1997 said more than
1,000 federal laws were affected.
The second significant provision of the
marriage law allows states to decline to
recognize same-sex marriages from other
states. That aspect of the law was not an
issue in Tacoma.
In that decision, Judge Paul B. Snyder of
Federal Bankruptcy Court considered the
interaction of the marriage law and the
bankruptcy code. A bankruptcy law allows
spouses to file joint petitions. But the
marriage law specifies that "the word
,spouse' refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."
Judge Snyder ruled that there was no
fundamental constitutional right to marry
someone of the same sex and that it did not
violate the equal-protection clause of the
Constitution to allow opposite-sex couples
to marry but to prohibit same-sex couples
from doing so.
The government argued that the differing
treatment was justified as "rationally related
to the legitimate government interest in
encouraging the development of
relationships optimal for procreating and
childrearing."
Judge Snyder accepted that rationale, but
reluctantly.
"This court's personal view," he wrote, is
"that children raised by same-sex couples
enjoy benefits possibly different, but equal,
to those raised by opposite-sex couples."
He said he was required to give Congress
great deference in reviewing the marriage
law.
"This court cannot say," Judge Snyder
continued, that the "limitation of marriage to
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one man and one woman is not wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the
government's interest."
Contact information was not available for
the petitioner in the bankruptcy case, Lee
Kandu, who represented herself without a
lawyer. Ann C. Kandu died in March.
Susan Sommer, a lawyer with Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund, said
Judge Snyder should have been more
skeptical.
"The judge applied a sort of rubber-stamp
approach," Ms. Sommer said. "There is a
fundamental right to marry that applies
without exception to all people. You can't
dole out fundamental rights only to some."
This month, a state court judge in Seattle
ruled that same-sex couples were entitled to
marry under the state's Constitution. Though
that case did not involve the federal
marriage law, its reasoning about whether
the state's interest in promoting procreation
can justify a ban on same-sex marriages was
sharply at odds with that of Judge Snyder.
"The precise question," the judge in the
Seattle case, William L. Downing of King
County Superior Court, wrote, "is whether
barring committed same-sex couples from
the benefits of the civil marriage laws
somehow serves the interest of encouraging
procreation. There is no logical way in
which it does so."
Judge Downing stayed his decision pending
review by the Washington Supreme Court.
The sole state in which same-sex couples
can marry is Massachusetts, under decisions
of its Supreme Judicial Court. Yesterday, a
trial judge in Boston upheld a 1913 state law
that prevents marriage licenses from being
issued to couples from outside the state if
their marriages would be illegal where they
live.
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Marriage Act Is Upheld In Pair's Bankruptcy
The Seattle Times
August 20, 2004
Maureen O'Hagan
A Tacoma bankruptcy judge ruled Tuesday
that the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act is
constitutional the first such ruling in the
country by a federal judge.
When Ann and Lee Kandu decided last
October they'd have to file for bankruptcy,
they were on the edge of catastrophe. They
both had been diagnosed with cancer the
same week, they were unable to work and
their debts were mounting.
Naturally, the couple checked the box on the
bankruptcy form that said they were
married.
That seemingly simple truth, and what
inevitably flowed from it, has turned into a
legal battle with nationwide implications
one that has drawn the scrutiny of federal-
government lawyers, civil-rights groups and
conservative activists, and resulted in a first-
of-its-kind court ruling Tuesday.
The issue? The pair, both women, were
together 13 years before they were legally
married last summer in British Columbia.
Getting sick and going broke has made them
a sort of test case for the implications of the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) as it
collides with the recent wave of same-sex
marriages.
"When Ann and I filed for bankruptcy," Lee
Kandu said, "this wasn't about making a
case for same-sex marriage. It was about
dealing with our life situation. We were not
trying to change the laws. We were not
trying to push an issue. We were just trying
to get through it."
Tuesday, a U.S. Bankruptcy Court judge in
Tacoma ruled in the Kandus' case that
DOMA, which defines marriage as the
union of a man and a woman, is
constitutional. It is the first such decision by
a federal court since the law was passed in
1996. And while the ruling will have little
precedential value, it gives a glimpse of
legal battles to come, as gays begin to
encounter the ordinary hurdles of life for the
first time as legally married couples.
"One thing that it really illustrates is how
pervasive the rights and benefits are that
come with marriage and how many different
settings I think we're going to start seeing
this issue pop up in," said Jamie Pedersen, a
Seattle lawyer with Lambda Legal. "The
simple fact is there are going to be many
people getting married in Canada and
Massachusetts and hopefully here as well,
and there are thousands of ways that every
one of those couples is affected by
marriage."
Gay-marriage opponents, such as Liberty
Counsel, lauded the decision as a "welcome
step toward preserving the traditional
definition o f marriage as b etween o ne m an
and one woman," the group's president,
Mathew Staver, wrote in a statement.
He praised Bankruptcy Judge Paul B.
Snyder for "exercising judicial restraint and
'interpreting' rather than 'creating' the law."
For Lee Kandu, the situation has become
even more difficult, both emotionally and
legally. Ann Kandu died in March,
thousands of dollars in debt. Now creditors
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can go after their Castle Rock, Cowlitz
County, home to satisfy her debts.
She filed her own legal briefs in the case,
arguing that DOMA violates their rights of
equal protection and due process, among
other constitutional protections. She likened
her situation to that of interracial couples
wrongly prohibited from marrying.
In a 30-page opinion, Snyder disagreed,
saying Congress had a right to enact
DOMA.
"This court's personal view that children
raised by same-sex couples enjoy benefits
possibly different, but equal, to those raised
by opposite-sex couples, is not relevant to
the court's ultimate decision," Snyder wrote.
"It is within the province of Congress, not
the courts, to weigh the evidence and
legislate on such issues."
But for Lee Kandu, the decision means the
pair cannot discharge their debts jointly
through bankruptcy the way other married
couples do. They c an't refile s eparately, as
single people with joint debt might do,
because one is deceased.
And Lee Kandu said because the house was
still in Ann Kandu's name when they filed
for bankruptcy, it can't be protected through
her own bankruptcy filings, though it's in
her name now. That leaves her facing the
loss of the home they shared.
"We were just in a devastating position," she
said. "The two of us ended up with cancer at
the same time. We were trying to make the
best of it."
Several months after their marriage, a doctor
told Ann Kandu her cancer w as f atal. " We
filed for bankruptcy shortly thereafter just
because we wanted to be able to save some
sort of security for me, which I think is
reasonable.
"For an opposite-sex couple, it would still be
this horrendous experience, but there would
be some legal protections," Lee Kandu said.
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Bush Has The Wrong Remedy to Court-Imposed Gay Marriage
The National Journal
March 13, 2004
Stuart Taylor Jr.
"Because of the full faith and credit clause
of the Constitution (which makes every state
accept 'the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State'),
gay marriage c an b e i mposed ont he entire
country by a bare majority of the state
supreme court of but one state [. . .] The
1996 Defense of Marriage Act? Nonsense. It
pretends to allow the states to reject
marriage licenses issued in other states. But
there is not a chance in hell that the Supreme
Court will uphold it."
So says columnist Charles Krauthammer.
Not so fast, contends my colleague Jonathan
Rauch: "The U.S. Supreme Court is unlikely
to impose one state's gay marriages on the
whole country."
Since columnists disagree, let's go to the
scholars. Professor Lea Brilmayer of Yale
Law School sides with Rauch: "Marriages
have never received the automatic effect
given to judicial decisions. They can be
refused recognition in other states without
offending full faith and credit," she said in
congressional testimony on March 3. But
others agree with professor Larry Kramer of
New York University's law school, who
wrote in 1997, "States cannot selectively
discriminate against each other's laws, [and]
Congress cannot authorize them to do so."
This debate is of more than academic
interest. Much of the energy behind the
Bush-backed proposal to ban gay marriage
by constitutional amendment comes from
fear of nationwide imposition of gay
marriage by a kind of judicial chain reaction.
The same fear gave birth to the federal
Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, known as
DOMA, which authorizes states to ignore
gay marriages performed in other states, and
the "little DOMA" laws in 38 states, which
declare their intent to do just that.
Is this fear of a nationwide, judicially
engineered redefinition of marriage
plausible? Yes, somewhat, although it's
likely to take several years i fit happens at
all. Is the proposed constitutional ban on gay
marriage a justifiable response? No,
emphatically. There are ways to get the
courts out of the gay-marriage business
without tying the hands of future voting
majorities who may - and, I hope, will -
eventually come to see gay marriage as good
for us all.
The most direct and sweeping way for the
Supreme Court to impose gay marriage is
also the least likely. That would be to
legalize gay marriage everywhere by
announcing that the 14th Amendment's
equal protection clause (or the due process
clause, or both), which the Court used in
1967 to strike down laws against interracial
marriage, can no longer tolerate the
man-woman definition of marriage that has
been a cornerstone of civilization for the
past few thousand years.
Last June's decision in Lawrence v. Texas,
which used the due process clause to strike
down all state laws making it a crime to
have gay sex, led Justice Antonin Scalia to
suggest in a bitter dissent that the Court had
set the stage to declare a right to gay
marriage. But there is a big difference
between ruling that gays cannot be branded
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criminals and ruling that they must be given
the privileges of marriage. Few serious
analysts expect the justices to take that big a
leap unless and until public opposition to
gay marriage softens to the point that they
could pull it off without provoking a
firestorm.
The stealthier way to promote gay marriage,
and the way that is most feared by
opponents, would be the full-faith-and-credit
two-step: Step one is for the justices to
watch from the sidelines while state courts
in Massachusetts and perhaps elsewhere use
their state constitutions to impose gay
marriage upon their own electorates. Step
two would be for the Court to require that
other states recognize those marriages and,
in the process, to strike down all of the
defense-of-marriage acts.
Brilmayer and s ome o thers s ay t he j ustices
will not take step two. And the traditional
judicial interpretation of the full faith and
credit clause is on their side. While the norm
has always been for states to recognize
marriages celebrated in other states, "the full
faith and credit clause has never been
understood to require recognition of
marriages entered into in other states that are
contrary to local 'public policy'
[representing] deeply held Iocal v alues," as
Brilmayer testified. Under this "public
policy" doctrine, states have been free to
disregard marriages in other states between
first cousins, people too young to marry in
their home states, people
who remarried after quickie Nevada
divorces, and (before 1967) people of
different races.
But Brilmayer's views are disputed by
dozens of law review articles arguing that
DOMA, the 38 state DOMAs, and (many
add) even the long-standing "public policy"
doctrine, are all unconstitutional, at least in
the gay-marriage context. Gay-advocacy
groups have prepared a well-orchestrated
litigation campaign to use the full faith and
credit clause to force recognition of gay
marriages across the country. And Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy has provided them
with powerful ammunition with his majority
opinions in both Lawrence and the 1996
decision in Romer v. Evans, which used the
equal protection clause to strike down a
Colorado referendum barring adoption of
gay-rights laws anywhere in the state. Both
decisions held that animus against
homosexuals - which Scalia called "moral
disapprobation" - is an irrational and
illegitimate basis for some, if not necessarily
all, anti-gay laws. It would not be a great
leap to extend this logic to strike down
DOMA and its state-law clones, and then to
carve a gay-mamage exception into the
public policy doctrine.
"The prophecies of what the courts will do
in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are
what I mean by the law," Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr. once said. In that spirit,
I prophesy that Kennedy, his four more-
liberal colleagues, and possibly Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, will seek to promote
gay marriage but will proceed cautiously,
with their fingers to the winds of
public opinion. They may begin by i ssuing
narrowly drawn decisions enforcing state
court judgments - which other states have
almost always been required to honor -
such as judicially approved property
settlements in divorce decrees growing out
of Massachusetts gay marriages. And when
these justices sense that the time is ripe -
assuming that those who remain on the
Court have the votes - they will apply the
full-faith-and-credit two-step to ban states
from discriminating against other states' gay
marriages in any way.
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This prospect leaves me quite conflicted.
While I strongly support gay marriage, I
oppose its imposition by judicial fiat. And
while judicial activism at its best can build
public consensus for long-overdue reforms, I
am concerned that the courts have
increasingly crossed the line from exercising
healthy activism into usurping legislative
powers, disdaining representative
government, and casually casting aside
tradition in the guise of interpreting the
Constitution.
So I have some sympathy for the idea of
amending the Constitution to prohibit any
judicial decision construing that document
to require recognition of any gay marriage.
(The problem of state courts in
Massachusetts and elsewhere inventing state
constitutional rights can and should be
handled at the state level.) Because
amending the Constitution is a grave step
that risks unintended consequences, I am not
yet ready to support that approach, as long
as the Supreme Court proceeds cautiously
and incrementally on gay marriage. But a
sudden, broad decision requiring all other
states to honor Massachusetts' gay
marriages, for example, might persuade me
that the time has come to reclaim some of
the rights of the people to govern
themselves.
By no stretch o ft he i magination, h owever,
is the proposed amendment behind which
Bush has placed his prestige an appropriate
way to protect representative government.
Quite the contrary. The first clause of the so-
called Musgrave amendment (sponsored by
Rep. Marilyn Musgrave, R-Colo.) would
impose a uniform federal definition of
marriage upon the whole country: "Marriage
in the United States shall consist only of the
union of a man and a woman." This amounts
to an anti-democratic, anti-federalist effort
to ban all state legislatures, for all time, from
experimenting with gay marriage - even if
and when most voters in most states come to
support gays' right to wed. And public
opinion appears to be headed in that
direction: Although polls still show voters
opposing gay marriage by a ratio of about 2-
to-1, the numbers appear to be softening
over time. Especially significant is that
young voters are far more open to gay
marriage than old ones.
In this sense, the president's position on gay
marriage has something in common with
that of the Massachusetts court: Neither is
willing to defer to democratic governance.
While the court has imposed its definition of
marriage on today's voters, Bush seeks to
impose his own definition on their children
and grandchildren.
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Supreme Court Paved Way for Marriage Ruling With Sodomy Law Decision
The New York Times
November 19, 2003
Linda Greenhouse
In its gay rights decision five months ago
striking down a Texas criminal sodomy law,
the Supreme Court said gay people were
entitled to freedom, dignity and "respect for
their private lives." It pointedly did not say
they were entitled to marry.
In f act, b oth Ju stice Anthony M. K ennedy,
in his majority opinion for five justices, and
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in her
separate concurring opinion, took pains to
demonstrate that overturning a law that sent
consenting adults to jail for their private
sexual behavior did not imply recognition of
same-sex marriage, despite Justice Antonin
Scalia's apocalyptic statements to the
contrary in an angry dissent proclaiming that
all was lost in the culture wars.
The Texas case "does not involve whether
the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter," Justice
Kennedy wrote. And Justice O'Connor
wrote: "Unlike the moral disapproval of
same-sex relations - the asserted state
interest in this case - other reasons exist to
promote the institution of marriage beyond
mere moral disapproval of an excluded
group.
And yet, despite the majority's disclaimers,
it is indisputable that the Supreme Court's
decision in Lawrence v. Texas also struck
much deeper chords. It was a strikingly
inclusive decision that both apologized for
the past and, looking to the future, anchored
the gay-rights claim at issue in the case
firmly in the tradition of human rights at the
broadest level.
And it was this background music that
suffused the decision Tuesday by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that
same-sex couples have a state constitutional
right to the "protections, benefits, and
obligations of civil marriage." The second
paragraph of Chief Justice Margaret
Marshall's majority opinion included this
quotation from the Lawrence decision: "Our
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not
to mandate our own moral code."
"You'd have to be tone deaf not to get the
message from Lawrence that anything that
invites people to give same-sex couples less
than full respect is constitutionally suspect,"
Professor Laurence H. Tribe of Harvard
Law School said in an interview. Professor
Tribe said that had the Texas case been
decided differently - or not at all - "the odds
that this cautious, basically conservative
state court would have decided the case this
way would have been considerably less."
The Massachusetts decision was based on
the state's Constitution, which Chief Justice
Marshall described as "if anything, more
protective of individual liberty and equality
than the federal Constitution." She said the
Massachusetts Constitution "may demand
broader protection for fundamental rights;
and it is less tolerant of government
intrusion into the protected spheres of
private life."
Clearly, the state ruling, Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health, was not
compelled by the Supreme Court's decision
in Lawrence v. Texas and, given its basis in
state law, cannot be appealed to the Supreme
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Court. Whether it will influence other state
high courts remains to be seen. A similar
case in the New Jersey state courts was
dismissed this month at the trial level and is
now on appeal.
Yet just as clearly, the Massachusetts
decision and the Lawrence ruling were
linked in spirit even if not as formal
doctrine. The Goodridge decision "is
absolutely consistent with and responsive to
Lawrence," Suzanne Goldberg, a professor
at Rutgers University Law School who
represented the two men who challenged the
Texas sodomy law in the initial stages of the
Lawrence case, said in an interview. Ms.
Goldberg added: "It's impossible to
overestimate how profoundly Lawrence
changed the landscape for gay men and
lesbians."
Professor Goldberg said that sodomy laws,
even if not often enforced, had the effect of
labeling gays as "criminals who deserved
unequal treatment." With that argument
removed, discriminatory laws have little left
to stand on, she said, adding that the
Supreme Court "gave state courts not only
cover but strength to respond to unequal
treatment of lesbians and gay men."
The Massachusetts court considered and
rejected the various rationales the state put
forward to defend opposition to same-sex
marriage. These included providing a
"favorable setting for procreation" and
child-rearing and defending the institution of
marnage.
"It is the exclusive and permanent
commitment of the marriage partners to one
another, not the begetting of children, that is
the sine qua non of civil marriage," Chief
Justice Marshall said. Noting that the
plaintiffs in this case "seek only to be
married, not to undermine the institution of
civil marriage," she said, "The marriage ban
works a deep and scarring hardship on a
very real segment of the community for no
rational reason."
The decision will usher in a new round of
litigation. The federal Defense of Marriage
Act anticipated this development by
providing that no state shall be required to
give effect to another state's recognition of
same-sex marnage.
On the books since 1996, the law has gone
untested in the absence of any state's
endorsement of same-sex marriage. With 37
states having adopted laws or constitutional
provisions defining marriage as between a
man and a woman, same-sex couples with
Massachusetts marriage licenses may soon
find themselves with the next Supreme
Court case in the making.
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States' Recognition of Same-Sex Unions May Be Tested
The Washington Post
November 19, 2003
Charles Lane
Alarmed by a 1996 Hawaii court case that
raised the prospect of legalized same-sex
marriage, Congress and 37 states enacted
laws designed to keep the phenomenon from
spreading across the country.
It was a kind of legal flood-control system,
built from statutes that defined marriage as
the union of one man and one woman,
designed so that no state would have to
recognize a same-sex marriage from another
state.
Now, because of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, Americans are about to
find o ut whether t his c ontainment structure
can stand up under pressure.
If the ruling goes into effect six months from
now as the court envisions, and if same-sex
couples carrying Massachusetts marriage
licenses settle in other states, it probably will
be only a matter of time before someone
goes to court claiming the right to have a
same-sex marriage recognized outside the
Bay State, legal analysts on both sides of the
issue said.
"The floodgates will be tested," said Dale
Carpenter, a law professor at the University
of Minnesota.
It is likely they w ill h old, at least initially,
legal analysts said. Hawaii's ruling was
never put into practice because the state's
voters adopted a constitutional amendment
permitting a ban on same-sex mamiages.
Supreme courts in states where the
legislature has spoken only recently against
same-sex marriage probably would not
strike down those laws.
The U.S. Supreme Court's landmark
decision in June to overturn state same-sex
sodomy laws, Lawrence v. Texas, celebrated
the dignity of same-sex relationships and
clearly helped inspire yesterday's
Massachusetts decision. But the court said in
Lawrence that it was not expressing a view
on same-sex marriage, and few believe that
the justices are eager to take on the issue
soon.
Still, the impact of the Massachusetts ruling
is not only legal but also emotional and
political. It could ultimately reverberate in
ways that may not be apparent from a
reading of black-letter law as it exists today.
"I very much feel this case has a lot of
resonance with what the California Supreme
Court did in 1948 when it became the first to
strike down a ban on interracial marriage,"
said Mary L. Bonauto, the lawyer who
represented the seven same-sex couples who
won in Massachusetts yesterday. "That was
at a time when nine out of 10 Americans
still opposed interracial marriage and no
court had ever ruled in favor of it."
The post-1996 legislation, known in its
federal version as the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA), reinforced Supreme Court
doctrine, which interprets the U.S.
Constitution to require states to give "full
faith and credit" to one another's court
judgments - but not necessarily to their
legislative or administrative acts. IfKansas
started issuing driver's licenses to 14-year-
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olds, for example, police in next-door
Missouri still could order drivers younger
than 16 off the roads.
"It is settled that states are not required to
recognize every marriage performed in
every other state," Carpenter said. "And
they're not required to do so when they have
a public policy contrary to recognizing that
marriage."
This is why most of the state versions of
DOMA include explicit language declaring
that same-sex marriage is contrary to their
public policy.
Still, it is possible that at least one state,
Vermont, which has a law recognizing civil
unions, would recognize a Massachusetts
marriage, and the same might happen in
California, which recently adopted a
domestic partnership law that gives same-
sex couples marriage-like status.
And in the states that do not have DOMAs
yet, said Matthew Coles, director of the
American Civil Liberties Union's Lesbian
and Gay Rights Project, "courts are likely to
find an absence of public policy."
Another line of attack against the federal
and state DOMA legislation would be to
argue that, by denying those who wish to
form same-sex couples a right that is
enjoyed by opposite-sex couples, they
violate the constitutional guarantee of equal
treatment under the law.
The ACLU is currently pressing such a
claim in a Nebraska federal court, arguing
against the state's constitutional amendment
on marriage, adopted by referendum in
2000, which prohibits the legislature from
adopting any measure that would recognize
same-sex marriage, civil unions or domestic
partnerships.
The ACLU believes it has a strong case
based on a 1996 Supreme Court ruling that
invalidated a Colorado constitutional
amendment. The amendment would have
abolished state anti-discrimination laws
benefiting gay men and lesbians, Coles said.
Still, in most cases, the equal protection
argument would require advocates to
convince courts that opposition to same-sex
marriage is so irrational that no reasonable
legislator could have voted for it, legal
analysts noted. That argument won in
Massachusetts but probably would not in,
say, Alabama.
Mathew D. Staver, president and general
counsel of Liberty Counsel, which opposes
same-sex marriage in courts and legislatures
nationwide, noted that trial and appeals
courts in Arizona, New Jersey and Indiana
have recently dismissed equal-protection
claims in same-sex marriage cases. But
those cases will be appealed.
Still well over the horizon is the question of
what states would do in the case of a same-
sex couple that had married and then
divorced in Massachusetts. If the divorce
court awarded one member of the couple
some of their property in another state,
would he have a right to expect that state's
courts to enforce the judgment?
The answer is probably yes, said William
Eskridge, a law professor at Yale University.
Though the second state would not have to
recognize the marriage license, a divorce
decree - resulting from an adversarial
judicial proceeding - is the kind of action
that the Supreme Court has required the
states to recognize mutually, he said.
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Leave Marriage To the States
The Washington Post
August 21, 2003
Bob Barr
The political right and left in America share
one unfortunate habit. When they don't get
their way in courts of law or state
legislatures they immediately seek to
undercut all opposition by proposing an
amendment to the Constitution.
As they say, bad habits die hard. Apparently
White House lawyers and the Senate
Judiciary Committee are currently
examining the merits of a constitutional
amendment, pending in the House of
Representatives, to deny any and all "legal
incidents" of marriage (in layman's terms,
any of the hundreds of legal benefits and
obligations of the legal institution of
marriage) to all unmarried couples, be they
homosexual or heterosexual. They should
reject this approach out of hand.
When I authored the Defense of Marriage
Act, which was passed overwhelmingly by
both chambers of Congress and signed into
law by President Clinton in 1996, I was
under intense pressure from many of my
colleagues to have the act prohibit all same-
sex marriage. Such an approach, the same
one taken by the Federal Marriage
Amendment, would have missed the point.
Marriage is a quintessential state issue. The
Defense of Marriage Act goes as far as is
necessary in codifying the federal legal
status and parameters of marriage. A
constitutional amendment is both
unnecessary and needlessly intrusive and
punitive.
The 1996 act, for purposes of federal
benefits, defines "marriage" as a union
between a man and a woman, and then
allows states to refuse to recognize same-sex
marriages performed in other states. As any
good federalist should recognize, this law
leaves states the appropriate amount of
wiggle room to decide their own definitions
of marriage or other similar social compacts,
free of federal meddling.
Following the Defense of Marriage Act, 37
states prohibit same-sex marriage and refuse
to recognize any p erformed i n other s tates,
while a handful of states recognize domestic
partnerships, one state authorizes civil
unions, and a couple of others may have
marriage on the horizon. In the best
conservative tradition, each state should
make its own decision without federal
government interference.
Make no mistake, I do not support same-sex
marriages. But I also am a firm believer that
the Constitution is no place for forcing
social policies on states, especially in this
case, where states must have the latitude to
do as their citizens see fit.
No less a leftist radical than Vice President
Dick Cheney recognized this when he
publicly said, "The fact of the matter is we
live in a free society, and freedom means
freedom for everybody. . . . And I think that
means that people should be free to enter
into any kind of relationship they want to
enter into. It's really no one else's business
in terms of trying to regulate or prohibit
behavior in that regard. [ . . .] I think
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different states are likely to come to
different conclusions, and that's appropriate.
I don't think there should necessarily be a
federal policy in this area."
The vice president is right. There shouldn't
be a constitutional definition of marriage. As
an institution, and as a w ord, marriage has
very specific meanings, which must be left
up to states and churches to decide. The
federal government can set down a baseline
- already in place with the Defense of
Marriage Act - but states' rights demand
that the specific boundaries of marriage, in
terms of who can participate in it, be left up
to the states.
This also means that no state can impose its
view of marriage on any other state. That is
the federal law already on the books. I
drafted it, and it has never been successfully
challenged in court. Why, then, a
constitutional amendment?
I worry, as do supporters of the
constitutional amendment on marriage, that
a nihilistic amorality is holding ever greater
sway in the United States, especially among
the young. Similarly, I agree that the kernel
of basic morality in America - the two-
parent nuclear family - has eroded under the
influence of the "me" generation, which has
left us with an astronomical divorce rate and
a tragic number of hurting families across
the country.
Restoring stability to these families is a
tough problem, and requires careful,
thoughtful and, yes, tough solutions. But
homosexual couples seeking to marry did
not cause this problem, and the Federal
Marriage Amendment cannot be the
solution.
The writer was a Republican representative
from Georgia from 1995 to 2003. He
currently practices law in Georgia and writes
and consults extensively on civil liberties
issues.
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FEDERAL BAN ON PARTIAL BIRTH ABORTION
Court Rules That Governments Can't Outlaw Type of Abortion
New York Times
June 29, 2000
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court ruled by a 5-to-4 vote
today that the government cannot prohibit
doctors from performing a procedure that
opponents call partial-birth abortion because
it may be the most medically appropriate
way of terminating some pregnancies.
The decision declared unconstitutional the
Nebraska law before the court and, in effect,
the laws of 30 other states. In addition, the
bill to create a federal ban on the procedure,
which President Clinton has vetoed twice
and which may reach his desk again this
year, would also be unconstitutional under
the court's analysis: like all the other laws, it
does not contain an exception for the health
of the pregnant woman.
The decision, with a majority opinion by
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, was analytically
broader than many people expected, finding
fault not only with the law's concededly
imprecise language, but with the absence of
an exception for women's health. Excerpts,
Page A26. At the same time, the 5-to-4 vote
was unexpectedly close for a court where
support for the underlying right to abortion
has been counted as 6 to 3.
The combination of the broad ruling and the
close vote led Janet B enshoof, president of
the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy,
which represented the Nebraska doctor who
challenged the law, to describe the day as
one for "Champagne and shivers." The
immediate reaction from politicians and
advocates on both sides of the abortion
debate made it likely that the court's future
composition would be the subject of greater
than usual focus during the remainder of this
election year. Page A26.
The decision, one of four today that totaled
391 pages, came on the final day of the
court's term.
"Partial-birth abortion" is the term
opponents of abortion use to describe a
method that doctors use infrequently to
terminate pregnancies after about 16 weeks.
Anti-abortion forces c oined t he t erm i nt he
mid-1990's and have focused on graphic
descriptions of the procedure as a way of
undermining public support for abortion.
The ruling today represents a significant
setback to that strategy.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's dissenting
opinion was a major surprise to both sides of
the abortion debate. Not only his
disagreement with the majority, but also the
terms in which he expressed his views both
in this case and in a second abortion-related
decision today indicated Justice Kennedy's
deep unease with a 1992 decision, of which
he was a joint author, that had reaffirmed the
right to abortion. The second decision
upheld restrictions on demonstrations
outside abortion clinics.
Emphasizing what he described as the
"consequential moral difference" between
the "partial-birth" method and other abortion
procedures, Justice Kennedy said that in its
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1997 law, Nebraska "chose to forbid a
procedure many decent and civilized people
find so abhorrent as to be among the most
serious of crimes against human life."
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg in an opinion
concurring with the majority, said it was
"simply irrational" to find a fundamental
difference in one procedure over another.
Justice Stevens said it was "impossible for
me to understand how a state has any
legitimate interest in requiring a doctor to
follow any procedure other than the one that
he or she reasonably believes will best
protect the woman" in exercising the
constitutional right to obtain an abortion.
Eight of the nine justices - all but David H.
Souter, who joined Justice Breyer's majority
opinion - wrote opinions in the case,
Stenberg v. Carhart, No. 99-830. In addition
to Justices Souter, Stevens and Ginsburg,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined the
majority opinion. In addition to Justice
Kennedy, Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas wrote dissenting opinions.
In striking down the Nebraska law, the
majority went further than the federal
appeals court whose decision the court
upheld today. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in St. Louis,
had found Nebraska's law unconstitutional
because, while it was ostensibly aimed only
at a particular type of late-term abortion, its
vague wording would chill doctors in
performing a common second-trimester
abortion procedure that undoubtedly had
constitutional protection under the Supreme
Court's precedents.
The Supreme Court agreed with that
analysis but went on to rule that even a more
precisely worded statute that avoided that
problem would still be unconstitutional in
the absence of a health exception.
Surveying medical opinion on the subject,
Justice Breyer said there was a "substantial
likelihood" that the method at issue was "a
safer abortion method in certain
circumstances." He added, "If so, then the
absence of a health exception will place
women at an unnecessary risk of tragic
health consequences."
Justice Breyer called the ruling "a
straightforward application" of the court's
1992 ruling in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
which reaffirmed the 1973 ruling in Roe v.
Wade. But the dissenters disagreed and said
the decision went further in the direction of
protecting an unqualified right to abortion.
Justice Kennedy, an author of the Casey
decision, said the ruling today was based on
a "misunderstanding" of that decision and
"contradicts Casey's assurance that the
state's constitutional position in the realm of
promoting respect for life is more than
marginal."
James Bopp, general counsel of the National
Right to Life Committee, which drafted the
model law on which the Nebraska statute
and many of the others were based, called
the decision a "radical expansion of the right
to abortion."
Under the Nebraska law, a doctor who
performed a "partial-birth abortion" that was
not necessary to save a woman's life faced a
sentence of up to 20 years in prison. The law
was successfully challenged in Federal
District Court in Omaha by Dr. Leroy
Carhart and has never taken effect. Dr.
Carhart and his wife, Mary, were in the
courtroom today.
The statute defined the procedure as "an
abortion procedure in which the person
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performing the abortion partially delivers
vaginally a living unborn child before killing
the unborn child and completing the
delivery." That was defined further to mean
"deliberately and intentionally delivering
into the vagina a living unborn child, or a
substantial portion thereof' before
terminating the pregnancy.
Nebraska's attorney general, Don Stenberg,
argued that the state Legislature meant to
ban one specific procedure, known in the
medical profession as dilation and
extraction, or D & X. In that procedure, used
beginning in about 16 weeks of pregnancy
when the fetus's head has grown too big to
pass safely through an undilated cervix,
doctors seeking to keep the fetus as intact as
possible for various reasons extract it feet
first and then use a sharp instrument to
collapse the fetal skull.
But the lower courts found, and the majority
today agreed, that the statutory definition of
what Nebraska was prohibiting also applied
to a procedure known as dilation and
evacuation, or D & E, which is used much
more commonly for abortions after the first
trimester of pregnancy. In this procedure,
the fetus is dismembered during the
abortion, meaning that a "substantial
portion" of it may be pulled into the vagina
while the fetus is still alive.
In his opinion, Justice Breyer said the court
had to review t he statute as it w as w ritten,
and did not have authority to accept the
attorney general's invitation to make it
narrower. Consequently, Justice Breyer said,
all doctors u sing t he D & E method "must
fear prosecution, conviction and
imprisonment," making the law an "undue
burden upon a woman's right to make an
abortion decision."
To that extent, the decision tracked the
ruling last year by the Eighth Circuit. Where
the majority today went further was in its
insistence that even a more precisely written
law needed to have an exception to protect
women's health, in addition to the provision
to save the life of the mother, which
Nebraska's law and the other states' laws
have.
Further, Justice Breyer made it clear that the
health exception had to go beyond
"situations where the pregnancy itself
creates a threat to health." He said that
although the medical testimony was
somewhat equivocal, the court accepted the
view that "a statute that altogether forbids D
& X creates a significant health risk" and
would be unconstitutional for that reason
alone.
In the second abortion decision today, the
court ruled 6-to-3 that a Colorado law aimed
at protecting abortion clinic patients and
doctors from harassment by protesters did
not violate the protesters' First Amendment
rights. The decision, Hill v. Colorado, No.
98-1856, upheld a ruling by the Colorado
Supreme Court. Within 100 feet of the
entrance to any health care facility, no one
may make an unwanted approach within
eight feet of another to talk or pass out a
leaflet.
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer. Justices Scalia, Thomas and
Kennedy dissented. Justice Scalia and
Justice Kennedy read their impassioned
dissenting opinions in the courtroom this
morning for more than half an hour, making
clear that this First Amendment debate was
in many respects a proxy for the court's
ongoing abortion debate.
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Senate Passes Ban On Abortion Procedure; Bush Set to Sign Bill;
Foes Plan Court Fight
The Washington Post
October 22, 2003
Helen Dewar
In a major victory for antiabortion forces
after an eight-year struggle, Congress
yesterday gave final approval to legislation
banning a particularly controversial
procedure for ending pregnancies, ensuring
a legal showdown that could help define the
scope - and limits - of abortion rights in the
United States.
Voting 64 to 34, the Senate joined the House
in passing the measure to prohibit what
abortion foes call a "partial-birth" procedure
and to punish doctors who violate the ban
with fines and as many as two years in
prison.
The bill, which the House approved 281 to
142 earlier this month, now goes to
President Bush, who has indicated that he is
eager to sign it into law. But opponents plan
to challenge the measure in court and to seek
an injunction to bar its enforcement, relying
in part on the legislation's failure to allow
such an abortion to protect a woman's
health, as required by earlier court decisions.
As described in the bill, the procedure,
generally performed during a pregnancy's
second or third trimester, involves a
physician puncturing the skull of a fetus and
removing its brain after it is partially
delivered.
Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kan.), a leader in
the fight for the bill, said after the vote:
"This is an enormous day" for the country.
But Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif), an
opposition leader, called it "a very sad day
for the women of America."
Bush said in a statement: "This is very
important legislation that will end an
abhorrent practice and continue to build a
culture of life in America."
In the 30 years since the Supreme Court's
Roe v. Wade d ecision, which established a
woman's constitutional right to have an
abortion, Congress has never banned a
specific procedure, although it has
repeatedly restricted federal funding for
abortions, including barring payments to
Medicaid patients.
Sponsors said the legislation was designed
to end an especially brutal procedure that
Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) described as "a
stain on the conscience of America."
But foes of the measure said its language is
broad enough to cast legal doubt over other,
more common abortion procedures. They
said the bill is "step one," as Sen. Tom
Harkin (D-lowa) put it, toward the eventual
destruction of abortion rights in this country.
In part because of such disagreements, there
are no reliable figures on how many
abortions might be banned under the new
law. Critics of the procedure say thousands
of such abortions are performed annually; its
defenders say they are relatively rare.
As they did in earlier debates, the bill's
sponsors surrounded themselves with large,
made-for-television sketches of fetuses.
Supporters focused on the procedure, while
opponents emphasized the broader issue of
abortion rights.
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"We cannot allow this kind of brutality to
corrupt us," said Sen. Rick Santorum (R-
Pa.), who led the fight for the bill.
"Women's right to choose is in greater
danger now than it has been at any time
since the Supreme Court issued the Roe v.
Wade decision 30 years ago," said Sen.
Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.).
In yesterday's vote, 17 Democrats joined 47
Republicans in backing the legislation, while
30 Democrats, three Republicans and one
independent voted against it. Virginia's
senators voted for it; Maryland's senators
opposed it.
The first "partial-birth" abortion bill was
introduced in 1995, after Republicans won
control of both houses of Congress. It was
passed twice in the late 1990s but was
vetoed by President Bill Clinton.
Another effort stalled in 2000 after the
Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, struck
down a Nebraska statute that was similar in
most respects to the bill that Congress was
considering. The court found the Nebraska
law insufficiently specific in defining the
procedure to be banned and flawed because
it did not include an exception for protecting
a woman's health.
The bill got another chance this year after
Republicans regained the Senate majority,
putting them in control of both houses a nd
the White House.
The key legal question is whether the
current bill's drafters have changed the
measure enough to pass muster with the
Supreme Court.
Backers of the legislation say they defined
the procedure with all the specificity that the
court might require and addressed the health
issue by asserting in a series of findings that
such an abortion is never needed for health
reasons.
But critics said the bill fell short on the
grounds of both specificity and health. They
predicted that the Supreme Court will strike
it down.
Three separate lawsuits against the measure
are planned by the Planned Parenthood
Federation of America, the Center for
Reproductive Rights and the National
Abortion Federation. The latter will be
represented by the American Civil Liberties
Union.
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Partial-birth Ban Debated in Court
Washington Times
March 30, 2004
Amy Fagan
The federal ban on partial-birth abortions is
too broad and unconstitutionally threatens
women's access to abortion, an attorney for
plaintiffs argued at the beginning of one of
three federal court challenges of the new law
yesterday.
Attorneys for the government, meanwhile,
argued that Congress was right to ban the
"inhumane procedure."
Even before President Bush signed the bill
into law in November, it was challenged by
pro-choice groups in federal district courts
in New York, Nebraska and California. The
trials began yesterday and will range from
two to four weeks.
"Our evidence will show the court [that] the
act unconstitutionally compromises a
woman's right to reproductive choice," said
Stephen Hutt, an outside attorney for the
National Abortion Federation, which, along
with the American Civil Liberties Union, is
challenging the federal law in New York.
"It would, and frankly seems intended to,
remove the range of abortion alternatives
available to women in the second trimester
that have been proven to be safe," he argued
before the court.
Supporters of the law say Congress narrowly
wrote the language to apply to one type of
abortion, in which a living fetus is almost
fully delivered before its skull is pierced and
its brain removed.
The law bans this procedure except when
needed to save the life of the mother.
"Evidence at trial will illuminate that partial-
birth abortion is never medically necessary
and is an inhumane procedure that should be
banned," Assistant U.S. Attorney Sean H.
Lane told the court.
Opponents say the law is just as
unconstitutional as a Nebraska ban on
partial-birth abortion that was overturned by
the Supreme Court in 2000. The court said
Nebraska's definition oft he procedure was
too broad and the law didn't include an
exception for the mother's health.
"The federal ban suffers from the same two
fatal flaws," said Louise Melling, director of
the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project.
In place of a health exception, Congress has
included a findings section stating that,
based on the extensive congressional-
hearing record, a partial-birth abortion is
never necessary to preserve health and is
outside the standard of medical care.
The remaining court challenges were
brought by the Center for Reproductive
Rights on behalf of Dr. LeRoy Carhart, the
Nebraska abortionist who successfully
challenged his state ban, and the Planned
Parenthood Federation of America in San
Francisco.
The Supreme Court is expected to have the
final say, however.
"This is the beginning of a very long legal
road that ultimately leads to the Supreme
Court," said Jay Sekulow, chief counsel of
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the American Center for Law and Justice, a
group that supports the ban.
Douglas Johnson, legislative director for the
National Right to Life Committee, said he
hopes either the votes or composition of the
high court changes by the time that happens.
"We believe that this law will ultimately be
reviewed by the Supreme Court, where five
justices in 2000 said Roe v. Wade
guarantees the right to perform abortions at
will," Mr. Johnson said. "We can only hope
that by the time this law reaches the
Supreme Court, there will be at least a one-
vote shift away from that extreme and
inhumane decision."
Mr. Sekulow attended the court challenge in
New York yesterday and said, "Round one
so far has been a good one for the United
States."
He said the plaintiffs' attorney told the judge
that testimony would be graphic and
discomforting at times, and government
attorneys seized on this warning,
emphasizing that the testimony is disturbing
"because the procedure itself is
discomforting, raw and blurs the line
between live birth and abortion."
Mr. Sekulow predicted the issue of fetal pain
will play a key role in the trials.
An estimated 2,200 to 5,000 partial-birth
abortions are performed annually in the
United States, most during the fifth or sixth
months of pregnancy. Mr. Johnson said that
it has been medically established that a fetus
at this stage can feel pain and is even more
sensitive to pain than a newborn or an older
child.
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Next on Abortion: Supreme Collision
The Washington Post
November 23, 2003
Simon Lazarus
Abortion opponents won a major victory
recently by pushing a "partial-birth"
abortion ban through Congress, but that
victory could turn sour when the case
reaches the Supreme Court.
Why? First, because a 5-4 court struck down
a similar Nebraska law three years ago. But
there's another, far more consequential
reason: Over the past decade, a different
majority - led by conservatives Chief Justice
William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas - has struck
down other federal laws that attempted to
regulate activities traditionally left to the
states. This majority has also held Congress
to a strict interpretation when it used
constitutional language such as the Interstate
Commerce Clause to claim federal
jurisdiction, which is exactly what Congress
did in enacting the abortion ban. Ironically,
these are the same three justices who have
reliably supported abortion opponents in
defending state anti-abortion laws. And now
the court will have to choose.
In keeping with its pattern of decisions that
enhance states' rights and curtail federal
power in the name of "federalism," the court
may well decide that Congress lacks the
authority to pass any law banning or
regulating abortions. That result would not
only extinguish the new law, it would
decimate much oft he r est oft he "pro-life"
agenda, in particular the wish to secure
nationwide bans on such practices as
euthanasia, cloning and stem-cell research.
So the question is: Will Rehnquist, Scalia
and Thomas keep their federalism faith,
even if that requires betraying political allies
on the religious right?
Their quandary does not revolve around an
abstract philosophical tension between
states' rights and big government, but rather
around a specific matter of law. Congress
justified the new abortion law on the basis of
the commerce clause, the constitutional
provision that authorizes it to "regulate
commerce among the states." The law
imposes criminal sanctions on practitioners
who, "in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce," perform the banned procedure.
Until recently, this drafting technique might
have raised no eyebrows. Beginning in the
New Deal era, Congress reflexively invoked
the commerce clause as a catch-all to
legitimize laws which, like the new abortion
ban, address activity that is neither
"interstate" nor "commerce." The Supreme
Court went along, never once overturning a
federal statute on the grounds that it
exceeded Congress's commerce clause
power.
But in 1995, in a case known as United
States v. Lopez, the court canceled its blank
check to Congress. With great rhetorical
fanfare, a 5-4 court majority led by
Rehnquist struck down the 1990 Gun Free
School Zones Act, which made it a federal
crime to possess a firearm within 1,000 feet
of a school, as outside the bounds of the
commerce clause. And in 2000, in United
States v. Morrison, the same majority, using
the same grounds, invalidated the 1994
Violence Against Women Act, which
authorized federal civil lawsuits to redress
gender-based violence against women.
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Rehnquist prescribed two new rules in his
landmark opinions: First, that Congress
cannot regulate activities merely because
they "affect" interstate commerce, but only
if they "substantially affect" it; second, if an
activity is not commercial or economic in
nature, its effects on interstate commerce
will not be considered "substantial" merely
because, if repeated many times over, the
aggregate effect might arguably be
substantial. In Morrison, Rehnquist made
clear that he and his allies meant business,
brusquely dismissing voluminous
congressional findings that the aggregate
impact of gender-motivated violence
damaged the national economy. "Simply
because Congress may conclude that a
particular activity substantially affects
interstate commerce does not necessarily
make it so," he wrote.
If Rehnquist and his four colleagues
(Justices Anthony Kennedy and Sandra Day
O'Connor often join Thomas and Scalia to
form this majority) take to heart what the
chief justice wrote in Lopez and Morrison,
they will have two options when the latest
abortion law reaches them. They can take
the high ground and strike the law down on
the basis that it addresses activity which, in
line with the spirit as well as the letter of
those cases, "the states may regulate and
Congress may not." Or in deference to
Congress, they can construe the statute
narrowly to avoid (technically) invalidating
it altogether, by strictly limiting its scope to
activities that actually occur in interstate
commerce. In that event, as veteran Supreme
Court litigator Alan Morrison has observed,
the long and bitter struggle for this law
could end up barring late-term abortions on
interstate flights, train trips and highways,
but not much else.
The three most ardent champions of states'
rights - Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas - are
passionate critics of Supreme Court
decisions that invalidated state anti-abortion
laws. If they join the majority from the
Nebraska case and reject the new federal
law, the movement that calls itself "pro-life"
will be hard-pressed to blame rejection of
abortion bans on an arrogant band of liberal
ideologues. More importantly, however, the
movement's other major targets -
euthanasia, cloning and stem-cell research -
are inherently no more "in or affecting
interstate commerce" than is abortion.
Except to the extent that such practices can
be curbed by cut-offs of federal funding,
they, too, could be beyond Congress's grasp.
Of course, the conservative justices could
suspend their distaste for untethered federal
power, which they displayed not only by
striking down the Gun Free School Zones
law and the Violence Against Women Act,
but by limiting other social legislation as
well, such as the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act. They could recycle any
number of once-commonly used artifices,
such as positing that late-term abortions are
performed with instruments previously
circulated in interstate commerce. But if
they strain to distinguish recent precedents
in order to save legislative artifacts of the
religious right, they will sorely wound their
federalism crusade, validating liberal
charges that it is a selectively applied sham.
Logically, abortion rights advocates should
jump at the chance to confront their judicial
adversaries with so painful a dilemma. Why
have they not done so? Perhaps because they
and their political allies abhor the Rehnquist
court's restrictions on federal civil rights,
environmental, health care and other major
20th-century social legislation. Their failure
to unsheathe this weapon may stem from a
wish to avoid bolstering the legitimacy of
the still-fragile federalism jurisprudence.
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Their judicial allies - Justices John Paul
Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Stephen Breyer - continue to dissent
from the majority's incursions on federal
power. They continue to assert that the new
doctrinal protections for states' rights are
incorrect and "not the law."
But whatever discomfort abortion rights
advocates may feel about a states' rights
assault on the latest abortion law, sooner or
later the issue will arise. For one thing, their
litigators have a professional, ethical
obligation to make every reasonable
argument available to advance the goals of
their clients who, as medical practitioners,
seek to perform abortions without exposure
to liability or litigation. When the hands of
abortion rights advocates are forced, all
parties may feel that they have been put on
the spot. Their mutual unease could
reinforce criticisms that the court's
federalism campaign is a solution without a
problem, and certainly without a
constituency.
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U.S. Judge in San Francisco Strikes Down Federal Law Banning Form of Abortion
New York Times
June 2, 2004
Adam Liptak; Carolyn Marshall contributing
A federal judge in San Francisco yesterday
struck down a federal law that banned a
form of abortion, saying it created a risk of
criminal liability for virtually all abortions
performed after the first trimester. The law,
the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, enacted
in November, makes it a crime for doctors to
perform any "overt act" to "kill the partially
delivered living fetus."
In a 117-page decision, the judge, Phyllis J.
Hamilton, ruled that the law was
unconstitutional in three ways. She said that
it placed an undue burden on women
seeking abortions, that its language was
dangerously vague and that it lacked a
required exception for medical actions
needed to preserve the woman's health.
The decision was the first ruling on the
merits of the law. Two other cases, in
Nebraska and New York, are pending. All
three judges had halted enforcement of the
law while they conducted trials.
The federal law is similar to a Nebraska law
struck down by the Supreme Court in 2000,
and yesterday's decision did not surprise
legal experts. Groups opposing abortion said
yesterday that they hoped the new cases
would give the Supreme Court an
opportunity to reconsider.
The White House said it would continue to
fight for the law.
"The president strongly disagrees with
today's California court ruling, which
overturns the overwhelming bipartisan
majority in Congress that voted to pass this
important legislation," the president's press
secretary, Scott McClellan, said in a
statement. "The president is committed to
building a culture of life in America, and the
administration will take every necessary step
to defend this law in the courts."
A Justice Department spokesman said that
lawyers were studying Judge Hamilton's
decision and that the department would
continue to litigate the other two cases
vigorously.
The California case was brought by the
Planned Parenthood Federation of America
and a local affiliate, and they were later
joined as plaintiffs by the city and county of
San Francisco. Yesterday's decision follows
a three-week trial in March and April before
Judge Hamilton, who was appointed by
President Bill Clinton.
Beth H. Parker, a San Francisco lawyer who
represented Planned Parenthood, said the
decision was "an enormous victory."
"It reaffirms that the government has no role
in this very intimate decision between the
woman and her physician," Ms. Parker
added. "Today's decision also gives
physicians the comfort that they don't have
to be concerned that the procedures
performed can expose them to two years in
prison for violating the act."
Ms. Parker, of the San Francisco law firm
Bingham McCutchen, said the decision
would protect doctors who work for local
governments, as well as doctors affiliated
with Planned Parenthood clinics around the
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nation. Judge Hamilton declined, however,
to issue a broader nationwide injunction, in
deference, she said, to the Nebraska and
New York courts.
Dennis Herrera, the city attorney in San
Francisco, said the decision would allow the
city to deliver a complete array of health
care options.
"The population that we service at San
Francisco General Hospital," Mr. Herrera
said, "many of them indigent and from the
minority communities, will continue to have
services and counseling available to them
with respect to their reproductive rights."
Substantial passages in Judge Hamilton's
decision concerned nomenclature. "The term
'partial-birth abortion,"' she wrote, "is
neither recognized in the medical literature
nor used by physicians who routinely
perform second trimester abortions." She
referred to the procedure as intact dilation
and e vacuation. It is also sometimes c alled
dilation and extraction. The law defines the
procedure as one in which the doctor
"deliberately and intentionally vaginally
delivers a living fetus" until either the head
or the body up to the navel is "outside the
body of the mother" and then kills it.
Judge Hamilton's ruling turned largely on
the testimony of medical experts. She said
they had demonstrated that the contested
procedure was a variant of and in some ways
safer than the most common form of
abortion used in the second trimester of
pregnancy, which she called dilation and
evacuation by disarticulation, in which the
fetus is typically not removed intact.
In that and other forms of abortion, Judge
Hamilton found, "the fetus may still have a
detectable heartbeat or pulsating umbilical
cord when uterine evacuation begins" and
thus "may be considered a 'living fetus."'
That means, she wrote, that the law could
apply to ban such abortions as well.
In the 2000 Supreme Court decision
concerning the Nebraska law, the court ruled
that the Constitution forbids placing "undue
burdens" on the right to abortion.
The California plaintiffs said the 2003 law
created a burden because common abortion
methods could violate the law. The
government said the law was meant to apply
only to the disfavored procedure.
Judge Hamilton, relying on the Supreme
Court decision, agreed with the plaintiffs.
She also noted that the law did not
distinguish between procedures used before
fetal viability and those used after, when the
government may regulate or ban abortion
except where it is necessary for the
preservation of the life or health of the
woman.
In ruling that the law is unconstitutionally
vague, Judge Hamilton wrote, "It deprives
physicians of fair notice and encourages
arbitrary enforcement." She objected in
particular to what she said were the
ambiguous terms "partial-birth abortion"
and "overt act."
Finally, Judge Hamilton said that the law did
not i nclude a c rucial exception required b y
the Supreme Court. In the Nebraska case,
the court ruled that such laws must include
an exception for the preservation of the life
or health of the woman. The federal law
provides an exception for the woman's life
but not for her health.
Government lawyers said this was
defensible, since, they said, the procedure is
never medically necessary.
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Judge Hamilton disagreed, ruling that the
procedure is sometimes required and can be
safer than other forms of abortion. In those
other procedures, she wrote, fetal parts are
sometimes left in the uterus, creating a risk
to the woman's health. The contested
procedure is typically shorter, reducing the
risk for complications from anesthesia. And
relatively intact fetuses can be used in
autopsies, which can help in the planning of
further pregnancies.
The government suggested that doctors
fearful of prosecution under the law "could
simply effect fetal demise before performing
the procedure to escape liability under the
act," Judge Hamilton wrote. The plaintiffs
responded that they should not be required
to perform an additional medical procedure
"that poses some risk and no benefit to the
patient solely to protect themselves from
liability."
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U.S. Court in New York Rejects Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
New York Times
August 27, 2004
Julia Preston
A federal judge in New York ruled
yesterday that a federal law banning a rarely
used method of abortion was
unconstitutional because it did not exempt
cases where the procedure might be
necessary to protect a woman's health.
The ruling, by Judge Richard Conway
Casey, came i n a challenge brought b y t he
National Abortion Federation and seven
doctors to a November 2003 law that bans
the method known as partial-birth abortion.
Judge Casey determined that the Supreme
Court required, in a decision four years ago,
that any law limiting abortion must have a
clause permitting doctors to use a banned
procedure if they determine that the risk to a
woman's health would be greater without it.
The Supreme Court ruling "informed us that
this gruesome procedure may be outlawed
only if there exists a medical consensus that
there is no circumstance in which any
women could potentially benefit from it,"
Judge Casey wrote. The Supreme Court's
opinion struck down a state law in Nebraska.
The New York case, which w as argued b y
lawyers from the American Civil Liberties
Union, was one of three cases challenging
the partial-birth abortion law. On June 1, a
federal judge in California ruled the law
unconstitutional on similar but broader
grounds than Judge Casey cited. The Justice
Department has appealed that decision. A
challenge in Nebraska is still in federal court
there.
The ruling is a new blow to legislation that
abortion opponents have hailed as one of
their most significant victories. President
Bush strongly backed the bill.
Attorney General John Ashcroft said in
Washington yesterday that the Justice
Department would continue to defend the
law vigorously and would appeal the ruling.
A department statement quoted President
Bush, who had said the law would "end an
abhorrent practice and continue to build a
culture of life in America."
The ruling by Judge Casey, in United States
District Court for the Southern District of
New York, makes it considerably less likely
that the Bush administration will be able to
implement the law as it is currently written.
It also will shift the focus of the abortion
debate back to the Supreme Court and its
cornerstone 1973 ruling in Roe v. Wade
upholding a women's broad right to
abortion.
At issue is a procedure, generally used in the
second or third trimester of pregnancy, that
involves partially extracting an intact fetus
from a woman's uterus and then killing it by
emptying the brain from the skull. Also
known as DandX, for dilation and
extraction, it has been used in cases of rare
or unanticipated severe medical
complications of pregnancy.
After listening to doctors describe the
procedure in detail during 16 days of
hearings this spring, Judge Casey wrote that
it is "gruesome, brutal, barbaric and
uncivilized." He cited medical experts'
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testimony that the procedure subjects the
fetus to "severe pain."
He also dismissed much of the testimony by
A.C.L.U. witnesses, saying he did not
believe that many of their "purported
reasons for why DandX is medically
necessary are credible; rather they are
theoretical or false."
But Judge Casey was even more pointedly
critical of Congress, saying that it had voted
for the law without seriously examining the
medical issues. "This court heard more
evidence during its trial than Congress heard
over the span of eight years," the judge
wrote.
He found that Congress, in writing the law,
had ignored furious dissension among
doctors over the safety and necessity of the
disputed abortion. The lawmakers had
overlooked testimony in their own hearings,
he said, and based the bill on the conclusion
that partial-birth abortion is "never
necessary."
The law includes an exception if there is a
risk to a woman's life, but not a broader
exception if a doctor decides that there is a
risk to a patient's health. A violation is a
felony punished with up to two years in jail
and fines up to $250,000.
The A.C.L.U. suit did not center on
defending the procedure, but on contesting
the limitations in the law on doctors' and
women's ability to determine medical care.
"This is a great day for women's health,
because it means the Constitution holds that
doctors will treat women's health and not
Congress," said Talcott Camp, an A.C.L.U.
lawyer in the case.
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